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Abstract
Mobile devices, such as smart phones and tablet computer, become increasingly
popular. One reason that makes these devices so popular, is the availability of mobile
applications that allow to add a wide range of functionality to the operating system
of a mobile device. Recently, concerns have been raised with respect to the private
information that these mobile applications are able to access. Usually, privileges
can be granted to a mobile application in order to limit the data they have access
to. However, since mobile applications generally do not run if not all privileges are
granted, users tend to grant all necessary privileges. From a privacy perspective,
this is particularly an issue, because a mobile application usually consists of several
parts: One part written by its developers and several external libraries written by
third parties.
In this work, we present 3Ov, a tool that analyses the source code of mobile
applications in order to identify the privileges necessary for the mobile application
itself and the privileges that are necessary for the third party libraries. The ultimate
goal of 3Ov is to ﬁnd permissions that needs to be granted to a mobile application
solely because the third party library requires it. We provide the evaluation of 89
applications of a proof of concept. Our results show that external libraries increase
the privileges that need to be granted to the application. Since this means that users
allow potentially many parties to access their private data, we discuss protecting
possibilities on the example of location data. We propose LPDroid, a tool that
enables to embed location privacy protecting mechanisms in the operating system
itself. In particular, LPDroid allows the user to choose the level of protection and
the operating system obfuscates the user’s location data automatically to all mobile
applications accessing location data.
iv
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
As of May 2014, there are 6.91 mobile subscriptions in the world, equivalent to
the 95.5% of the world’s population1. By the end of 2014, 1.75 billion people are
expected to be using smart-phones, mobile phones with enhanced capabilities and
improved connectivity2. Every mobile phone necessitates the use of an operating
system (OS). Concretely, smart-phones rely on Android (79% of smart-phones), iOS
(14.2%), Windows Phone (3.3%) and Black Berry (2.7%). Smart-phones’ popularity
can be mostly contributed to their better hardware and the growing use of mobile
applications. These applications can be included within the OS or can be developed
by the device vendor, third-party companies and/or amateur developers. Usually,
every OS has its own market where developers can upload their applications and
make them available, free or at a certain price, to allow users to download, install
and use them. Further, the success of an OS mainly depends on its applications
market. With more than 1 200 000 applications as of May 20143, the Google Play
market is the leader market. Almost 1 000 000 of these applications are free to be
downloaded from the market4. Indeed, for every paid application downloaded on the
market, users download 82 free applications [1].
When downloading an Android application from the Google Play market, users
ﬁrst have to allow the application certain permissions. Only then, may users
download and install it. As it will be explained later, these permissions can provide
applications with access to users’ sensitive data. Related work has already shown
that Android applications declare further permissions in their manifest ﬁle to allow
third-party libraries access sensitive data [5, 6, 7, 8]. However, our work tries to
relate this tendency to declare further permissions with the diﬀerent categories of
1Mobile phones statistics website:
http://mobithinking.com/mobile-marketing-tools/latest-mobile-stats/a\#subscribers
2Online article about smart-phones popularity: http://www.emarketer.com/Article/
Smartphone-Users-Worldwide-Will-Total-175-Billion-2014/1010536
3Android applications statistics: http://www.appbrain.com/stats/number-of-android-apps
4Android applications statistics:
http://www.appbrain.com/stats/free-and-paid-android-applications
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third-party libraries. For the moment, we will refer to this permissions with the term
over-privileges.
Naturally, application developers need to ﬁnd some way to generate revenue,
if they are not directly charging for their product. Running in parallel to the
growing popularity of smart phones is the ever growing number of mobile advertising
business. These businesses, including the likes of AdMob, Millenial Media, InMobi,
Chartboost etc. provide advertising libraries which include diﬀerent mechanisms
through which application developers can embed advertising banners in the devices’
user interfaces during the application run-time. We will refer to these libraries
as third-party advertising libraries. Developers use these third-party advertising
libraries to generate revenues through the usage of their applications. Stevens et
al. [2] hypothesize that the more precise the target of the advertisement is, the more
personalized the advertisement will be and, hence, the more revenue for both the
developer and the advertising company. So far, all we can say is that it is likely that
the more personalized an advertisement is, the more likely it is for a user to buy the
advertised product. Therefore, advertising companies can ask for higher prices to the
contractors and hence the developers can generate more revenue. Advertising libraries
are not the only third-party libraries used by application developers. Development
tools libraries as well as Social Software Development Kits (SDKs) are also common in
the applications. The former allow Android developers to enhance their applications
functionality by extending the Android Application Programming Interfaces (APIs).
The latter allow developers to interact with Online Social Networks (OSNs). For
instance, a browser-type application could use a library that managed HTTP-type
transactions such as Apache. For another example, a game-type application that
wanted to share users’ score with their friends on Facebook could use the Facebook
SDK. Although at ﬁrst sight we could think that Development tools libraries are not
likely to gather information from the users, it would make sense to think that Social
SDKs might do it. The fact that, for the last years, several cases of personal data
trading between OSNs, governments and companies have been uncovered, illustrates
this point [3, 4].
In order to conduct such personalized advertising, advertising companies, and
therefore developers, need to gather information from their users. For the rest of
this work, we encompass the gathered information within the term sensitive data
which includes: Users’ location, contacts list, phone number, passwords, messages
and devices’ International Mobile Station Equipment Identity (IMEI), International
Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI), phone ID number etc. Third parties can then
access this data and send it to third party servers for user proﬁling or personalized
advertisement targeting. For instance, a third-party advertising library can determine
the location of a certain user and, therefore, advertise shops, restaurants and other
establishments in the surrounding area.
If applications have been shown to access users’ sensitive data and send it to
third-party servers, it would be necessary to provide a tool to protect users against
such an act. The protection of the plethora of information that is considered to
be sensitive was infeasible due to time constraints. Consequently, we decided to
focus on one the location data privacy as location coordinates potentially reveal
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many important information about an individual. For the last years, Location Based
Services (LBSs) have become more and more popular. Through them, it is possible
for users to have access to certain services related to their current location. The use of
LBSs has increased lately due to embedded Global Positioning Systems (GPS) chips
in smart-phones and the popularity of wireless data connections. Examples of LBSs
include mapping applications (e.g. Google Maps), GPS navigation (e.g. TomTom)
and location-aware social networks (e.g. FourSquare). The growing exposure of users’
location data leads towards a series of privacy issues. For instance, location data
can be used to infer individual’s home or work location, sexual preferences, political
views, religious inclinations, etc.
1.2 Objectives, Scope and Main Conclusions
Firstly, we will introduce Third Party Over-privileges (3Ov), a tool that statically
analyzes Android applications for ﬁnding over-privileges. Additionally, it also searches
for the presence of unnecessary and missing permissions. The former are those
permissions that are granted to the application but are not required by any of
its method calls. The latter are those permissions that should be granted to the
application but are not. The implementation of 3Ov required to be aware of all
the third-party libraries from the diﬀerent categories: Development tools libraries,
Advertising libraries and Social SDKs. Hence, we started out with the lists from
the Appbrain project5 and included in 3Ov a tool to ﬁnd new third-party libraries
present in the analyzed applications. Further, 3Ov requires the usage of PScout,
a tool that analyzes the Android source code and maps all the methods to their
required permission. 3Ov will identify the method calls in the analysed applications
and will try to link these method calls to the permissions they require according to
PScout.
Secondly, we will introduce Location Privacy Droid (LPDroid), an extension of
TaintDroid that provides users with further mechanisms to protect their location
data. LPDroid introduces a set of tools that allow users to communicate with
Android’s location framework and modify its behaviour for the sake of users’ location
data protection. It is meant to pave the future research for the implementation of
Location Privacy Preserving Mechanisms (LPPMs) in Android devices as it will be
addressed in Chapter 6.
As there is not an oﬃcial deﬁnition of the concept over-privilege, in this work we
provide ﬁve diﬀerent heuristics and analyse them with 3Ov. As a proof of work, we
inspect a set B of 89 applications for the presence of over-privileges considering each
heuristic. In all the situations, 3Ov identiﬁes the presence of over-privileges in the
analysed applications. To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst time, a work
relates the presence of over-privileges with the use of Advertising libraries, Social
SDKs and Development tools libraries.
5Statistics about Android third-party libraries:
http://www.appbrain.com/stats/libraries/overview
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With the implementation of LPDroid we show that the correct place to implement
LPPMs is the Android location framework rather than in any other level of the
Android OS stack. Further, we introduce the necessary mechanisms to allow Android
developers to implement diﬀerent LPPMs and allow users to control their behaviour.
Moreover, we provide three dummy mechanisms that can be considered as an example
of that procedure.
The rest of this document is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 is dedicated to review the related work. This encompasses the
previous work that has been conducted on the presence of over-privileges in Android
applications as well as the leakage of sensitive data by third-party libraries. Further,
it covers the previous studies on the ﬁeld of location privacy.
Chapter 3 provides the theoretical background related to Android’s internals
and Android applications necessary to understand the following chapters.
Chapter 4 introduces 3Ov, a static analysis tool that seeks for over-privileges
in Android applications, and presents the outcome of its analysis. The tool consists
in 6 diﬀerent steps which will be covered in diﬀerent sections: crawling the Google
Play market, downloading the applications, parsing Android’s permissions, reverse-
engineering the applications and generating Android Manifest type ﬁles.
Chapter 5 is devoted to introducing LPDroid, an extension of TaintDroid
that provides users with further capabilities to protect their location data, and its
implementation on a real device. Firstly, we will introduce the current tools available
in the Google play market to protect users’ location data. Secondly, in front of the
drawbacks presented by those applications, we will go deeper into the Framework
level. Finally, we will analyse the lowest layers of the Android OS to check whether
it can inﬂuence user’s location privacy or not.
Chapter 6 presents the future work that can be considered as an extension of
this thesis. Firstly, we will consider all the enhancements that can be carried out to
improve 3Ov. Secondly, we will introduce a way to improve the implemented mecha-
nisms through the implementation of a mechanism to provide geo-indistinguishability.
Chapter 7 presents the main conclusions of the thesis.
4
Chapter 2
Related Work
In this chapter we will discuss the previous work that concerns our research. To this
end, we will divide the chapter into two diﬀerent sections. In Section 2.1, we will
address all the work related to analysing the Android Open Source Project (AOSP)
as well as the applications from the Google Play market. In Section 2.2, we will
focus on the work dedicated to the study of location privacy.
2.1 Privacy Implications of Android Applications
Adrienne et al. [5] introduce Stowaway, a tool that detects over-privileges in Android
applications. They determine the set of API calls that an application uses and then
maps those API calls to permissions. Stowaway was tested in 900 applications and it
identiﬁed 323 (35.8%) over-privileged applications. In front of those results, Adrienne
et al. justify the tendency to over-privilege applications by a series of common
developer errors: mistaken permission names, deputies, related methods, copy and
paste, deprecated permissions, testing artefacts and so on. Our work extends this
approach in the way that it distinguishes between when these over-privileges are
likely to happen due to developer errors (such as the ones mentioned before) and
when they are likely to happen due to the presence of third-party libraries.
Another approach is the one followed by Theodore et al. [6] in which they
relate the presence of privileges with the Advertising Libraries. They reconstruct
the API for 103 advertising libraries and study how the privacy leaking API calls
from the top 20 libraries are used. Our work extends theirs by considering also
Development tools libraries and Social SDKs. Felt et al. [7] manually analyse 956
Android applications seeking for over-privileges and analyse their permissions to
evaluate whether application permissions are eﬀective at protecting users’ sensitive
date. Their results indicate that application permissions can have a positive impact
on system security when applications’ permission requirements are declared up-front
by the developer. Vidas et al. [8] introduce a tool that allows developers fulﬁlling the
least privilege principle by performing an over-privilege analysis on their applications
source code and informing the user about the presence of over-privileges. In a
diﬀerent approach, Theodore et al. [11] investigate changes over time in the behavior
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of Android Advertising libraries observing how most of the guaranteed permissions
increase over the years. For instance, the INTERNET permission has increased from a
presence of less than a 10% in 2008 to more than a 60% in 2012.
Grace et al. [9] develop AdRisk, a platform to systematically identify potential
risks in Android applications, ranging from uploading sensitive information to remote
servers to executing untrusted code from Internet sources. Equally, Enck et al. [10]
apply the Fortify Java tool with the same goal. Both show the leakage of sensitive
information by third-party libraries.
Against this increasing tide of over-privileged applications, Shashank et al [12].
propose Flow Permissions, an extension to the Android permission mechanism. It
allows users to examine and grant permissions within an application during the
run-time. For instance, if a user does not want to share her location with the
application, she can block the ACCESS_LOCATION type permission. In the same
direction Ilias et al. [13] present a privacy protection framework that aims to achieve
an equilibrium between the developer’s revenue through advertising libraries and the
user’s privacy. The proposed framework is based on the establishment of a feedback
control loop that adjusts the level of privacy protection on mobile phones, in response
to advertisement generated revenue. They present a similar approach to the one
introduced by Stevens et al. [2] and implement a framework to limit the amount of
sensitive data that applications can access. Shashi et al. [14] propose AdSplit, an
extension of Android that allows applications and their advertisements to run as
separate processes eliminating the need of applications to request permissions on
behalf of their advertising libraries.
A part from that, Kathy et al. [15] present PScout, a tool that extracts the
permission speciﬁcations from the Android source code. Basically, PScout relates
all the API calls from the Android OS to their required permissions. For example,
it relates the getLastKnownLocation() method with an ACCESS_LOCATION type
permission. The Android documentation is far away of being complete. There are
lots of undocumented and internal APIs. PScout is aware of that and includes the
methods from these APIs in its analysis.
Enck et al. [16] develop TaintDroid, an extension of Android capable of tracking
sensitive data leakage. Finally, Hornyack et al. [17] introduce AppFence an extension
of TaintDroid that implements two privacy controls that (1) replace sensitive data
by obfuscated data and (2) block network transmissions that contain sensitive data.
Further information about TaintDroid and AppFence can be found in Section 5.2.
2.2 Location Privacy
A great variety of LPPMs have been proposed in the literature. One big group is the
one that encompass the obfuscation-based LPPMs. As shown in [18], obfuscation-
based LPPMs cover various methods that reduce the accuracy and/or precision of
the events’ spatiotemporal information: location hiding, perturbation, adding dummy
regions and reducing precision. The location hiding consists of not sending the
location data. Some LPPMs propose to change pseudonyms after a period of location
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hiding [21, 22, 23]. LPPMs that rely on perturbation submit a location diﬀerent
from user’s actual location [24]. The adding dummy regions strategy [25] consists
of submitting fake locations along with the user’s actual location. Finally, with the
reducing precision strategy [26, 27] a user would send a cloak region that contains
her current location, but she would not reveal her precise whereabouts. The key
limitation of this approach is that it does not distinguish between the information
revealed to trusted parties and to the service provider. Hence, in order to protect
their location information towards the service provider, users must lower the quality
of location information shared with their trusted parties.
In front of that drawback, other approaches for implementing LPPMs have
been proposed such as diﬀerential privacy and privacy based on cryptographic
primitives. Dong et al. [28] propose to use proxy-encryption, which guarantees that
the service provider is not able to learn the location update and, furthermore, that
the ciphertext can be modiﬁed by the service provider such that only intended
receivers are able to successfully decrypt. Zhong et al. [29] propose three protocols
for friend nearby notiﬁcation. In this setting, users are notiﬁed if a friend is in close
proximity. Bilogrevic et al. [30] propose two protocols to allow users to calculate a
fair rendez-vous point in a privacy preserving manner. Finally, some works apply
Private Information Retrieval (PIR) in which the users retrieve information (e.g.,
points of interest) related to their surroundings [31, 32]. PIR could in principle be
employed to build privacy-preserving LSBS.
Shokri et al. [19] propose a method to ﬁnd the optimal LPPM for a LBS given
each user’s service quality constraints against an adversary implementing the optimal
inference algorithm. Such LPPM is the one that maximizes the Expected Distance
Error that the optimal adversary incurs in reconstructing the actual location of a
user, while fulﬁlling the user’s Quality of Service (QoS) requirement. This strategy is
extended by Hermann et al. [20] by considering bandwidth constrains. Their results
show that the maximum value of privacy a user can enjoy can be reached by either
suﬃciently relaxing the quality loss or the bandwidth constraints, or by choosing an
adequate combination of both constraints.
In [18], Shokri et al. provide a formal framework for LPPM evaluation. This
framework considers the prior information an attacker may have and the various
attacks she can perform. Further, they clarify the diﬀerence between three aspects of
the adversary’s inference attacks: their accuracy, certainty, and correctness (Expected
Distance Error). They show that the latter determines the privacy of users.
There are four accepted metrics to measure the notion of location privacy:
Expected Distance Error, k-Anonymity, Diﬀerential Privacy and Transformation-
based approaches. Expected Distance Error states that the expected estimation error
of the adversary is the metric of users’ location privacy. k-Anonymity states that
the user’s location should be indistinguishable among a set of k points. Diﬀerential
privacy is a notion of privacy inherited from the world of Databases. It aims to
provide means to maximize the accuracy of queries from statistical databases while
minimizing the chances of identifying its records. Concretely it requires that the
probability that a query returns a value v when applied to a database D, compared
to the probability to report the same value when applied to and adjacent database
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D′ should be within a bound of e. As shown in the studies introduced in future
work [36] and also in [37], diﬀerential privacy has also been applied in the context
of location privacy. Finally, Transformation-based approaches claim that the users’
location should be completely invisible to the service provider. This is achieved by
transforming all data to a diﬀerent space, usually employing cryptographic primitives.
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Chapter 3
Background
In this chapter we introduce the basic Android concepts necessary for understanding
the following chapters of the thesis. In Section 3.1, we introduce the basic concepts
of the Android OS software stack. Section 3.2 is entirely dedicated to introduce the
user level.
3.1 Internals of the Android Operating System
Android is an operating system designed for hand-held systems such as smart-phones
or tablet computers. It was set up by Andy Rubin in October 2003 and was later
acquired by Google in 2005. The ﬁrst version of Android, Android 1.0, was released
in 2008 running on the HTC Dream device. As of May 2014, 1.5 million of Android
phones were activated every day, up from 1.3 million in January 2013, 400 000 in
June 2011 and 200 000 in August 2010. The most important feature of Android is
its open source nature. That means its source code is available for free and can
be modiﬁed. The diﬀerence with other open source projects such as The Linux
Foundation, Debian or Python amongst others is that Android is developed by a
closed group, without help from external groups or independent developers.
The basic structure of the Android software stack distinguishes between four
diﬀerent levels: (1) The Linux Kernel level, (2) the Libraries/Run-time level, (3) the
Application Framework level and ﬁnally (4) the Applications level. This is however
a coarse separation of the stack. Therefore, we will introduce the stack presented by
Karim [33] shown in Figure 3.1. In blue, it represents all the Java-coded components
of the stack while in green, it represents the C/C++-coded part. Finally, in yellow,
it represents the applications included in the AOSP and all the other applications.
In the following paragraphs we will introduce each level of the stack.
Although an extended knowledge of the Linux kernel is not required to understand
this work, there is an important concept the reader should be aware of. Android
developers modify the vanilla Linux kernel (kernels from The Linux Kernel Archives1)
to meet Android devices requirements. The kernel version used in Android devices
is not the latest version of the Linux kernel (mainline) but a long-term release
1Linux Kernel Archives website: https://www.kernel.org/
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Figure 3.1: Complete Android Software Stack diagram as proposed by Yaghmour Karim.
(stable version). For instance, Android 4.4.2 is based on the kernel version 3.4.91
while the mainline as of May 2014 was the 3.15-rc5 . The higher levels of the stack
wouldn’t work unless they were running on an "Androidized" kernel. "Androidized"
kernels typically contain several hundred patches over the standard kernel. There
are six main "androidizms": (1) Wakelocks, (2) Low-Memory Killer, (3) Binder, (4)
Anonymous Shared Memory, (5) Alarms and (6) Logger.
Android relies on a Hardware Abstraction Layer (HAL) level. This layer contains
what are called hardware abstractions which are sets of software routines that emulate
some platform-speciﬁc details, providing applications with access to the hardware.
The AOSP normally includes hardware support code for a few devices. These are
generally those that were used by Google to develop new Android releases (e.g.,
Samsung Nexus S, Crespo, for Gingerbread or Galaxy Nexus, Maguro, for Jelly Bean).
One of the main features of relying in a HAL layer is that the license under which
the driver is distributed is up to the manufacturer. Hence, a device manufacturer
can create a basic driver that implements the minimum mechanisms to control a
certain component and make that driver available under the General Public License
(GPL). The GPL is the most used free software license which guarantees users the
freedom to use, modify and share the software. However, enhanced functionalities
would be implemented within a proprietary shared library in the user space and
will not be available publicly. This is because only the Linux kernel and the vanilla
AOSP are available under the GPL. No matter which mechanism is used to load
the drivers, a system service, included in the AOSP, corresponding to the type of
hardware is typically responsible for loading and interacting with them. For instance,
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the GPS device will be controlled by the Locations service. That system service will
be responsible for interacting and coordinating with the other system services, such
as the WiFi and the Telephony services, to make the hardware behave coherently
with the rest of the system and the APIs provided to application developers.
The Native User space encompass all the user space components that run outside
the Dalvik Virtual Machine (DVM, see next paragraph). This includes a few programs
that run natively on the CPU such as the Init/Toolbox, the Native Daemons and the
Native Libraries. Android relies on approximately 100 dynamically loaded libraries,
all stored in the /system/lib directory. A great number of these libraries come from
external projects. They were ported Android in order to make their functionality
available within the Android software stack. For instance, BlueZ (support for the core
Bluetooth layers and protocols), OpenSSL (toolkit for implementing Secure Socket
Layer [SSL] and Transport Layer Security [TLS] protocols as well as a general purpose
cryptography library), SQLite (for SQL databases support) database amongst others
are included.
The DVM is a virtual machine specially designed for running on a (1) slow
CPU, (2) little RAM, (3) no swap memory and (4) battery powered devices. In
Android systems, each application is assigned his own DVM instance. Moreover,
the DVM is also the interpreter of the Java Native Interface (JNI) which allows
inter-programming-language communication. JNI is fundamentally a bridge between
Java and C/C++. Internally, the AOSP depends on JNI to facilitate Java services
and components to work with Android’s lower levels that are written in C/C++.
Java system services, for example, very often use JNI to communicate with matching
native code that interfaces with a given service’s corresponding hardware. A large
part of the procedure that allows Java to communicate with other languages through
JNI is done by the DVM.
Android comes with a number of system services that are constantly running
and available for developers. These system services include the Location service,
Sensor service, WiFi service, Telephony service, Bluetooth service and so on. System
services are started at boot time and are guaranteed to be running by the time an
application is launched.
3.2 Android Mobile Applications Fundamentals
An Android application is an installable unit which may or may not run independently
of other Android applications. By this, we mean that Android applications can, in
principle, interact with other applications, by sharing data for example, but usually
run in an isolated way from other applications. Applications consists of diﬀerent
Android software components and resource ﬁles. Concretely, there are four diﬀerent
components that can be used to create an application: (1) Activities. (2) Intents, (3)
Broadcast Receivers and (4) Content Providers.
Applications are usually written in Java using the proper SDK which includes the
Android API. This SDK is freely available at the Android developers website and is
can be loaded in several Integrated Development Environments (IDEs). Furthermore,
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it includes the Android Development Tools (ADT). Applications can also be extended
with C/C++ programs thanks to the Native Development Kit (NDK).
3.2.1 Development Environment
The Android IDE can be downloaded from the Android website and includes all the
necessary tools to start developing Android applications. When installing it in our
working environment (CentOS 64 bits machine), we had to install the 32 bit libraries
as well. It can be done with the command sudo apt-get install ia32-libs.
The ADT basically includes the Android Virtual Device Manager (AVDM) and
the Android SDK Manager. The former allows developers to create virtual devices
which can be used to test applications in an emulator. The latter, is used to keep the
SDK updated with the latest APIs. Furthermore, the ADT includes the Dalvik Debug
Monitor Server (DDMS) perspective which includes several tools for application
analysis and testing. For instance, developers can see the state of the heap at
run-time with the Heap tool, or the network state through the Network Statistics
tool. Further information that are beyond the scope of this work can be found in
the developers oﬃcial website2.
3.2.2 Application basic components
In this section we will in detail elaborate on the four Android application components.
Further, we will introduce the Graphic User Interface (GUI) as well as the permissions
system of the applications.
Activities
An activity is an application component that represents a GUI which covers the
whole screen. Applications can be formed by more than one activity but there must
always be a main activity that will act as a start screen. For example, a game
application can have one activity to log in a certain user account, another activity to
choose the settings and another activity for playing. Each time a new activity starts,
it is pushed onto a back stack (LIFO stack) and takes user focus. The previous
activity is stopped, but the system preserves it in the back stack.
Each activity has its own life-cycle. Android developers, have no control over
in which state their applications are. However, developers can be notiﬁed when
the state is going to change thanks to a set of call-back methods. Figure 3.2 from
Android developers website shows the complete life-cycle of an activity.
• onCreate(): this method is called when the activity is initiated for the ﬁrst
time.
• onStart(): is called just before the activity loads the GUI on the screen.
2Oﬃcial Android developers website: http://developer.android.com/
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Figure 3.2: Activity’s life-cycle from Android developers website.
• onResume(): is called when the activity can start interacting with the user.
Usually, sounds or animations are being started in this state.
• onPause(): is used when the activity is going to be pushed to the background.
Here is where the application state needs to be saved.
• onStop(): used when the activity is not visible to the user anymore and is
not going to be visible for a while.
• onRestart(): called when the activity is no longer visible to the user, because
another activity has been resumed and is covering this one.
• onDestroyed(): Called before the activity is destroyed. This is the ﬁnal call
that the activity will receive.
Intents
An intent is a messaging object that developers can use to request an action from
another application component. This other component can either belong to the same
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application or to another one. There are three diﬀerent cases in which is feasible to
use intents. For the scope of this work only the one case is important. Developers
can start a new activity by passing an intent to the startActivity() method. This
intent can carry information in order to deliver it to the started activity. For instance,
in a game-type application, when the user clicks the options button to open the
options menu, an Intent object indicating which activity should be started, is passed
to the startActivity() method as an argument.
There are two types of intents:
• Explicit intents name the component to which they are referring. They are
normally used to start a component within the application such as a new
activity.
• Implicit intents do not name a speciﬁc component, but instead declare a general
action to perform, which allows a component from another application to handle
it.
Broadcast Receivers
A broadcast receiver is an Android component which allows developers to register for
system or application events. All registered receivers for an event are notiﬁed by the
Android run-time once this event happens. For example, applications can register for
the ACTION_BOOT_COMPLETED system event which is ﬁred once the Android system
has completed the boot process.
Content Providers
Content providers manage access to a structured set of data such as users’ contacts
list. They encapsulate the data, and provide mechanisms for securing it. In Chapter
5 we will explain how certain permissions can be queried by the content providers
in order to access their content. Content providers allow Android applications to
access data which belongs to other applications.
Content providers follow the client/server scheme. When developers want to access
data in a content provider, they use the ContentResolver object to communicate with
the provider as a client. The provider receives data requests from clients, performs
the requested action, and returns the results.
Android itself includes several content providers that manage diﬀerent data such
as audio, video, images, and personal contact information.
Layout
A layout deﬁnes the visual structure for a GUI, such as the one for an activity or
application widgets such as buttons. Layouts can be declared in two ways: statically
or dynamically. Android oﬀers the possibility to use either or both of them for
declaring and managing application’s GUIs.
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1 <manifest xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/android"
2 package="com.android.app.myapp" >
3 <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.INTERNET" />
4 ...
5 </manifest>
Figure 3.3: Permission section of the Android Manifest ﬁle from an application that requires access
to the Internet.
• Statically: Declare GUI elements in XML. AOSP’s View classes and sub-classes
elements, such as those for widgets (buttons, images) and layouts (predeﬁned
structures that deﬁne the layout of an activity), can be referred in XML
language.
• Dynamically: Instantiate layout elements at run-time. Applications can create
View class objects and variate their properties at run-time.
Android applications are, however, composed of more than just code. They may
require resources that are separate from the source code, such as images, audio ﬁles
etc. One of the most important aspects of providing resources separate from the
source code is the ability for developers to provide alternative resources for diﬀerent
device conﬁgurations. For instance, it is easy to develop an application in diﬀerent
languages as only the string resource, where all the text is written, needs to be
provided in the diﬀerent languages.
AndroidManifest and applications permissions system
The central design point of the Android security architecture is that no application,
by default, has permission to perform any operations that would impact other
applications, the operating system, or the user. This includes reading or writing
the user’s sensitive data such as contacts or emails, reading or writing another
application’s ﬁles, performing network access, keeping the device awake, and so on.
This approach is known in Android as sandboxing
Nevertheless, applications may need to share resources and data. They do this
by declaring the permissions they need for additional capabilities not provided by
the basic sandbox. Applications statically declare the permissions they require, and
the Android system prompts the user for consent at the installation-time. Android
has no mechanism for granting permissions at run-time because, as they claim, it
complicates the user experience to the detriment of security.
A basic Android application has, by default, no additional permissions and
thus it cannot access users’ data or have control over some hardware devices. To
make use of protected features of the device, developers need to include in their
applications’ AndroidManifest.xml ﬁle the <uses-permission> tags declaring the
permissions the application needs. Figure 3.3 provides an example on how to access
the android.permission.INTERNET permission.
15
3. Background
At the installation-time, the permissions requested by the application are granted
to it by the package installer. The package installer is the application that Android
uses to install applications. This application, interactively asks the users to accept
all the permissions declared in the application prior installing it. No checks with
the user are done while an application is running; the application is either granted
a particular permission when installed, and can use that feature as desired, or the
permission is not granted and any attempt to use the feature fails without prompting
the user.
3.2.3 Building an application
The building process of an application is shown in Figure 3.4 from the Android
developers website. During the build process, Android projects are compiled and
packaged into an Android Package (.apk) ﬁle, which contains the application binary.
Further, it contains all of the information necessary to run the application on a device
or emulator: compiled .dex ﬁles (.class ﬁles converted to Dalvik byte code), a
binary version of the AndroidManifest.xml ﬁle, compiled resources (resources.arsc)
and uncompiled resource ﬁles.
When developing Android applications with Eclipse, the ADT plug-in automati-
cally builds the project as new changes are made to the source code. Eclipse creates
an .apk ﬁle and signs it with a digital signature that identiﬁes the developer. Android
requires all the installed applications to be signed with a certiﬁcate whose private
key is held by the application’s developer. Android uses the certiﬁcate to identify
the developers.
Figure 3.4: Building process of an Android application as shown in the Android developers website.
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3Ov: Identifying Over-privileges
in Android Applications
In this chapter, we introduce the Third Party Over-privileges (3Ov) tool, a tool that
performs a static analysis of Android applications by inspecting their source code in
order to investigate its granted permissions. 3Ov identiﬁes the privileges that are
granted to Android applications due to the usage of third party libraries and not
because the application requires them. 3Ov also evaluates the increase of permissions
granted to the application due to the usage of third-party libraries. Furthermore,
3Ov identiﬁes privileges that are actually not required by the application or third
party libraries, e.g. falsely granted by the developer, and missing permissions.
3Ov is capable of crawling and downloading all currently available applications on
the Google Play market. After downloading an application, 3Ov starts its inspection.
It therefore ﬁrstly reverse engineers the application using the apktool and secondly,
identiﬁes the application for its AOSP permissions by parsing and analysing the
source code. Therefore, our tool uses the PScout tool [15] to link the application’s
Android API calls to the privileges required by the application. Figure 4.1 shows the
work ﬂow of 3Ov.
Providing a formal deﬁnition of the term over-privilege is not an easy task as it
depends on the individual’s point of view. For instance, an advertising library can
be considered as unnecessary by an application user but can be extremely important
for the developer. Therefore, we will deﬁne ﬁve diﬀerent heuristics and we will
thoroughly seek for over-privileges in Android applications according to them. As
a proof of work, we analyze a set B of 89 applications and identify over-privileged
applications when considering all the ﬁve heuristics.
4.1 The Google Play Market
Android’s store was launched in August 2008 as the Android Market. On March
2012, however, with the merging of the Android Market and Google Music, the
store was renamed Google Play. As mentioned in the introduction, with more than
1 200 000 applications, it is the most popular applications market in the world.
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Figure 4.1: Flow chart of 3Ov.
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As of May 2014, its catalogue was divided into six diﬀerent categories: music,
books, newsstand, movies and TV, games and applications. For our work, we are
only interested in the last two categories. Android applications are divided into 26
categories such as Business, Education and Photography. Android games are divided
into 20 categories such as Arcade, Casino and Sports. Please note that the Google
Play is diﬀerent in every country and, hence, some of the oﬃcial categories may not
exist in a certain country and/or additional categories may be found.
Once a certain application or game category is selected, consumers can choose
between seven lists of products. Concretely, consumers can choose between the Top
Free, Top Paid, Top Grossing Free, Top Grossing Paid, Top New Paid, Top New
Free and Trending. Once an application from one of the lists is selected, several
information about the mentioned application can be accessed. Concretely, users can
access the URL, the rating, the minimum version of Android that is required, its
name, the number of reviews etc.
4.2 Crawling the Google Play Market
In order to automatically download applications from the Android Play store we
adjusted a Python program published by Anuvrat Singh [34]. Therefore, we ﬁrstly
ported the program to the Python version 2.6.6, which is the version available in
our working environment. Secondly, we removed unnecessary steps in the program,
such as crawling for the meta-data of the application’s price. Finally, we crawled the
Google Play for free applications only. We provide the source code of the program in
the Appendix A.1.
The crawling process downloaded 7.8 MB of data and took in total around 11.5
hours. We downloaded the information of 19 335 applications from the Google Play
market belonging to 30 diﬀerent application categories such as Business, Entertain-
ment, Medical and Photography. Please note that the Google Play market may be
diﬀerent at every country. Therefore, the applications available in Belgium can be
diﬀerent from the applications that are available in another country.
Similarly to Singh’s code, our modiﬁed version stores the crawled information
from each application in separate ﬁles, depending on its category, in the JSON format
as shown below. JSON stands for JavaScript Object Notation and is a standard
format for transmitting readable data consisting of attribute-value pairs. For instance,
in the example below, "app_url" is the attribute and "https://play.google.com/
store/apps/details?id=com.facebook.orca" is its value.
1 {"app_url": "https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.facebook.orca", "rating": "
4.22878", "operating_system": "Verschilt per apparaat", "title": "Facebook Messenger", "
reviewers": "3343878", "downloads": "100.000.000 - 500.000.000", "content_rating": "
Volwassen: medium", "date_published": "27 februari 2014", "developer_link": "/store/apps/
developer?id=Facebook", "category": "Communicatie", "badge": "Topontwikkelaar", "
developer": "Facebook"}
For our next step, to download the applications, we only required the URL
attribute of an application. From all the created text ﬁles, we extracted the URL,
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by applying the following bash command:
1 cat $permissionfile | grep http | grep -shoP ’http.*?[">]’
4.3 Downloading the Applications
The next step consisted in downloading the .apk packages. To this end, we ﬁrstly
wanted to take advantage of the Apk Downloader website1. The website oﬀers an
online, unoﬃcial tool where users can insert the URL of an application and it will
automatically generate a download link from which the .apk ﬁle can be downloaded.
However, our ﬁrst approach of using the Apk Downloader turned out to be ineﬃcient
because: (1) every three consecutive downloads users are automatically redirected to
an advertising website and (2) the amount of downloads per day is limited (not per
user but in total). Please notice that the daily amount of downloads is not disclosed.
Therefore, we used the Chrome browser extension Apk Downloader2 which allowed
us to download the .apk ﬁles without limitations. The extension is automatically
activated when a Google Play’s site is accessed by showing an icon at the end of the
browser’s search bar. When the user clicks the icon, the download of the .apk ﬁle
related to the application starts.
The problem with this extension was that we could not manually press the
button each time we wanted to download an application. Hence, we modiﬁed the
extension to automatically start the download process once the website was accessed.
Google Chrome extensions are coded in Java Script, HTML or CCS languages. Once
programmed, they are compressed into .crx ﬁles making their source code accessible
by changing the extension to .zip. In the case of the Apk Downloader, the source
code consisted of several Java Script ﬁles. We modiﬁed the backgroud.js ﬁle to
automate the download process. We deﬁned the function autoDowloadApk() which
checks whether the URL in the search bar matches the scheme followed by the
URLs of Google Play applications’ and calls the download() function of the APK
Downloader extension. Figure 4.2 and 4.3 show the source code of the modiﬁcations
in the backgroud.js ﬁle.
Once the extension was properly modiﬁed, a program to automate the download
process using the modiﬁed version of the Apk Downloader extension was written.
The program was written in Python in order to use the Selenium library. Selenium is
a testing framework for web applications that provides tools for automating websites.
Appendix A.2 shows the source code of the program that automates the download
process.
1Apk Downloader website: http://apps.evozi.com/apk-downloader/
2Apk Downloader Chrome extension website: https:
//chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/apk-downloader/obhlfmheblhjhkmacldlhdnbgbaiigba
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1 function autoDowloadApk(details){
2 var tabId = details.tabId;
3 var tabUrl = details.url;
4 console.log("this is a log"+ tabUrl);
5 var match = /play\.google\.com\/store\/apps\/details\?(?:|.*&)id=([\w\d\.\_]+)/i.exec(
tabUrl);
6 if (match) {
7 MarketSession.download(match[1], tabId);
8 }
9 }
Figure 4.2: This function automatically initiates the download process.
1 chrome.webNavigation.onHistoryStateUpdated.addListener(autoDowloadApk, urlFilter);
Figure 4.3: Once the application’s website is loaded, we call the autoDownloadApk() function.
4.4 Parsing the AOSP’s Permissions
Once we had a set A of 1126 applications downloaded from the market, we moved
on to the next step as it was a fair number of applications to work with. Key to our
evaluation of which applications’ permissions are due to third-party libraries is to
learn the function calls present in the application that require a certain permission.
For example, we would like to know all the methods included in the Android
APIs that require the BLUETOOTH permission, the READ_MESSAGES permission or the
ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION etc. To this end, we used the PScout tool, developed by
Kathy et al. [15]. It analyses the AOSP and maps all the API methods with their
required permissions. We analysed the latest available version of Android, Android
4.4.3, using the PScout tool. The fact that PScout is not limited to documented
APIs but it also considers the undocumented methods, such as the ones from hidden
APIs, is particularly beneﬁcial as it is not rare for application developers to use
these methods. Although we explained in Chapter 3 that Android is an open source
OS, there is a handful number of APIs which are not exposed to the SDK. For
instance, there are two diﬀerent classes for sending SMS messages (SmsManager and
SmsMessage) but there are no public classes for receiving them. In order to develop
an application capable of receiving SMSs, developers need to use a hidden API.
In the end of the analysis, PScout came up with 66 ﬁles (one for each permission)
containing a total of 28 813 methods from the AOSP that require the mentioned
permissions. Please notice that Android currently declares 146 permissions. However,
on the one hand, some of these permissions are declared as deprecated and hence are
not in use any more. On the other hand, some of these permissions are internal and
not used by the applications. At this point, we needed to deﬁne a set of identiﬁers
that uniquely identify the methods. This procedure was necessary to, later, uniquely
identify such methods in the downloaded applications. Five diﬀerent identiﬁers are
necessary to have a unique identify a method: (1) Method name, (2) Class package
to which the method belongs, (3) Return type package of the method, (4) Number of
21
4. 3Ov: Identifying Over-privileges in Android Applications
arguments and (5) Arguments type package. By the term package, we are referring
to the complete path to the class.
To extract these ﬁve identiﬁers from the PScout’s output ﬁles we wrote a parse
program that analyses each method from each ﬁle and creates a method array which
contains all the unique identiﬁers. For instance, given a certain permission, the
parser program analyses all its methods and creates an array for each one. This
array contains the ﬁve identiﬁers in each one of its ﬁelds. Below, we provide the
generated arrays for the ﬁrst two methods that require the INTERNET permission:
hasUploadingPermission 0 com/android/inputmethod/research/Uploader boolean
isPossibleToUpload 0 com/android/inputmethod/research/Uploader boolean
onHandleIntent 1 com/android/inputmethod/research/UploaderService void andr-
oid/content/Intent
Once we parsed all the methods we were were able to start working on the
downloaded ﬁles. Please consult Appendix A.3 to see the source code of the parser
program.
4.5 Reverse-engineering the Applications
There are several tools available to reverse engineer Android applications. Some
years ago, the only option to reverse engineer the .apk ﬁles was as follows: ﬁrstly, the
.apk ﬁle extension needed to be changed to .zip. Secondly, the content was able to
be extracted from the compressed ﬁle and, hence,the classes.dex ﬁle was able to be
accessed. Using a tool such as dex2jar, it was possible to convert the classes.dex
ﬁle into a compressed jar. Finally, by decompressing the ﬁle, the application content
was accessible. A problem with that procedure was, however, that the content from
the Android Manifest ﬁle was not readable as it was presented in a binary format
(BXML). This format reduces the verbosity of XML documents but hinders the use
of ordinary text editors to view and edit the document. Therefore, developers were
forced to use other tools such as devtcg (which basically convert BXML ﬁles into
XML ﬁles) to access its content.
From March 2010 onwards, developers can make use of the Apktool3 tool to
reverse engineer Android applications. This tool, reverse engineers the applica-
tions and presents their content in .smali ﬁles. Further, the content from the
AndroidManifest.xml ﬁle is treated to convert it from a binary format (BXML)
into a readable format (XML). The reverse-engineering process, followed by this
tool, is slightly diﬀerent to the one depicted before. It is based on what is known
as the baksmali process ("baksmali" means disassembler in Icelandic). This process,
introduced in June 2009, basically acts as a disassembler for .dex ﬁles and presents
the outcome in so called .smali ﬁles. This format is basically the Dalvik byte-code
representation of the application’s .dex ﬁle. Please recall from Chapter 3 that
3Apktool oﬃcial website: https://code.google.com/p/android-apktool/
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when an Android application is compiled, the compiler converts the Java code into
byte-code (the same way that javac converts Java to Java byte-code for a standard
Java Virtual Machine (JVM) application) using the 256 dalvik opcodes4. An opcode
(operation code) is the portion of the machine language instruction that speciﬁes the
operation to be performed.
The only problem that can be found with the baksmali process is that some
developers may use obfuscation techniques to avoid the reverse engineering procedure.
For the sake of simplicity, we distinguish between two levels of obfuscation. The ﬁrst
level obfuscates the entire source code, excluding the Android API calls, by making it
completely unreadable. For instance, an obfuscation tool replaces all the characters
by lower-case "l" and upper-case "i" as was observed in the com.mt.airad package.
The second level obfuscates the methods’, directories’ and classes’ names deﬁned by
the developer or by third-party libraries by replacing them with single characters.
For instance, a, a/a, a/b, a/b/a, a/c directories and a, b, c, d ﬁles can be found in
some reverse engineered applications that have used ProGuard. ProGuard is a free
Java ﬁles optimizer and obfuscator. It detects and removes unused classes, ﬁelds,
methods and attributes and renames the remaining classes, ﬁelds, and methods using
short meaningless names. Even with obfuscated ﬁles, it is still possible to identify
whether a ﬁle belongs to the core of the application or not. It can be checked whether
the method calls are to the core application, meaning that they are likely to be from
the developer as third-party libraries are not aware of the methods declared by the
developer.
A bash script program to reverse-engineer the downloaded applications and
extract the necessary permissions from their Android Manifest was written. We
present the source code of the script in the Appendix A.4.
4.6 Parsing and Analyzing the Applications
To check whether an application requires a certain permission or not, we developed
a bash script to analyse the source code from each application and check for the
methods found with the PScout tool introduced in Section 4.3. Please recall that
PScout classiﬁes the methods depending on the permission they require to be called.
Therefore, if we are able to identify one of these methods in an application, it will
indicate that the mentioned application needs to declare the permission required by
that method.
As it has been explained in the previous section, once an application has been
reverse-engineered, its output is presented in the .smali format. To develop a parser
that analyses the methods used in an application we needed ﬁrst to understand the
structure of the .smali ﬁles. Every .smali ﬁle can contain the following sections:
class information, static ﬁelds and methods. Figure 4.4 shows an example of how it
is organized.
4Website that lists all the dalvik opcodes and their meaning:
http://pallergabor.uw.hu/androidblog/dalvik\_opcodes.html
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Figure 4.4: General structure of a smali ﬁle.
The only section that actually matters to our task is the methods section. Android
developers can create their own methods or can call the ones from the Android APIs
or other libraries’ APIs. When a developer deﬁnes a method, this method will not
be part of the Android API and therefore it will not be mapped to any permission.
Hence, that method is not interesting. When a developer calls a method it will be
reﬂected in the .smali ﬁle with a method invocation tag which begins with one of
the following opcodes:
• invoke-virtual: is used to invoke a normal virtual method (a method that is
not static or ﬁnal, and is not a constructor).
• invoke-super: is used to invoke the closest superclass’ virtual method.
• invoke-direct: is used to invoke a non-static direct method (a method that is
by its nature non-overridable, namely either a private instance method or a
constructor).
• invoke-static: is used to invoke a static method.
• invoke-interface: is used to invoke an interface method, that is, on an object
whose concrete class is not known, using a method_id that refers to an interface.
Identifying method invocations allows us to identify method calls. Once the
invocation of a method is identiﬁed, we can analyse it to extract all the necessary
data that uniquely identiﬁes it. Similar to the process in Section 4.3, we developed
a bash script that extracts the ﬁve identiﬁers that uniquely identify a method.
Subsequently, the parse program constructs method arrays containing these ﬁve
identiﬁers in order to later compare them with the method arrays from the permission
ﬁles. For instance, in Section 4.3 we constructed the method array onHandleIntent
1 UploaderService void Intent. Further, we know that this method requires a
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.smali nomenclature Java nomenclature
V void
I int
Z boolean
B byte
S short
C char
J long
F ﬂoat
D double
Table 4.1: Return and argument type nomenclature in .smali ﬁles and their meaning.
the permission READ_PHONE_STATE as shown by PScout. At this point, we analyze
an application and create a list that contains all the methods, uniquely identiﬁed,
used by the application. This will allow us to check whether a certain method array
in the application is present or not in one of the permission ﬁles. For instance, if we
identify the method onHandleIntent 1 UploaderService void Intent within the
application, it will indicate that the application should declare the READ_PHONE_STATE
permission in its manifest ﬁle.
Please note how the argument types and return types, can follow a diﬀerent
nomenclature in the .smali ﬁles as shown in Table 4.1. Our parsing program replaces
the .smali nomenclature by the one used in Java.
Since we want to investigate the number of privileges due to the diﬀerent third-
party libraries, we noted that code ﬁles on an application can belong to ﬁve diﬀerent
categories: (1) Application itself, (2) Development tools, (3) Advertisement Libraries,
(4) Social SDKs and (5) Obfuscated. The Application category contains all the
ﬁles that belong to the application itself (ﬂies within the package speciﬁed by
the developer). The other categories are basically due to the presence of their
respective third-party libraries. Finally, we include a category that encompasses all
the obfuscated ﬁles, e.g. the derivative ﬁles due to the usage of obfuscation programs
such as ProGuard. Please notice that there is no way, other than manually inspecting
the obfuscated ﬁles, for classifying the obfuscated ﬁles in a certain third-party library
or another. The only thing we can do is to distinguish whether it belongs to the
Application itself or not.
At this point, we needed to diﬀerentiate the ﬁles belonging to each category.
When developing an application, the developer deﬁnes a package for the application.
Therefore, all the application-related ﬁles will be included within that package.
Following this rule, it is easy to discern whether a ﬁle belongs to the application
itself or not regarding its current directory. To distinguish whether an application
belongs to a certain permission or to another one, we consulted three lists of the
most popular Advertising Libraries, Development tools and Social SDKs. This initial
lists were obtained from the Appbrain project. Once we knew how to correctly
classify each directory, the script was executed. Its output consists in ﬁve diﬀerent
output directories: (1) MethodsApp, (2) MethodsDevelopmentTools, (3) Method-
sAdLibraries, (4) MethodsSocialSDKs and (5) MethodsObfuscated. These directories
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contain ﬁles with the method arrays formed with all the methods found in each
.smali ﬁle belonging to each category. For further information about this program
please check the Appendix A.6.
Please note that sticking to a ﬁxed list of third-party libraries is a very limited
approach as there can be other third-party libraries rather than the ones included in
the Appbrain lists. Consequently, we wrote a bash script that ﬁnds new third-party
libraries. The outcome of this script is a ﬁle which contains all the newly found
third-party libraries which are not present in the Appbrain lists. Later, we can
manually analyse and classify them into one category. Please note that the amount
of third-party libraries is not ﬁxed and, therefore, there is no way to ﬁnd them out
other than manually inspecting and categorizing them. The source code of the bash
script can be found in A.5.
Once all the third-party libraries that were included within the set of applications
A were identiﬁed, we determined that the rest of the directories had been obfuscated
and we added them in the Obfuscated category. After the manual inspection an
classiﬁcation of the newly found third-party libraries, we had a list of 80 Advertising
libraries, 212 Development tools libraries and 15 Social SDKs.
Before going on, the set A of 1126 applications from the Google Play market was
analysed. In total, 76 new third-party libraries were discovered including Advertising
Libraries and Development Tools libraries. Table A.1 in the Appendix A.5 shows
the name of the found third-party libraries, how many applications used them, what
are they used for and their category.
We noticed that 74 out of 76 of these libraries are development libraries and
only two are advertising libraries. Taking advantage of the code wrote to ﬁnd new
third-party libraries, we wrote a bash script to get statistics about the usage of
third-party libraries in the considered applications. By slightly modifying the script
from Appendix A.5, we got a list with all the third-party libraries and the number
of times they were found in the set of applications A. Figure 4.5 shows the top ten
most popular libraries from each category.
Image (a) shows that Google/ads is clearly the leading Advertising library. The
reader needs to know that the Google/ads library is branded as AdMob. It is found
in 761 applications (67.51%). Further, the diﬀerence with respect to the second most
popular, Charboost, is of 543 applications. In this case, the second, third, forth and
ﬁfth place are clearly allocated: Charboost, Millennial Media, Inmobi and Tapjoy.
With respect to the Development libraries, graph (b) shows how the Android
supporting tools is the top library. It is found in 1053 applications (93.52%). Please
note that Android supporting tools encompass the Android Annotation, Android
Support, Android Vending and Android GSM libraries. The diﬀerence with respect
to the second most popular, Flurry, is rather big (present in 788 applications less).
As we can see from graph (b), the diﬀerence between all the Development tools
libraries is rather small (13 applications between the third most popular and the ﬁfth
most popular) and we can therefore conclude that the market is clearly competing
for the third place.
Finally, Facebook is clearly the leading OSN SDK. In particular, it is present in
299 applications out of 1126 (26.55%), being more than six times as popular than
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(a) (b)
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Figure 4.5: Most popular third-party libraries found in the 1126 analyzed applications. Graph (a)
shows the most popular Advertising, graph (b) the most popular Development tools libraries and
graph (c) the most popular Social SDKs.
the second in the list, Twitter, which is only present in the 3.99% of the applications.
Interestingly, in the set A we only found seven diﬀerent Social SDKs libraries, while
we found 197 Development libraries and 63 Advertising libraries. Please notice that
the updated versions of the Appbrain’s lists contain 14 Social SDKs, 211 Development
libraries and 80 Advertising libraries. Therefore, we only were able to identify the
50% of the Social SDKs, a 78.75% of the Advertising libraries and a 93.36% of the
Development tools libraries in the set A.
Figure 4.6 presents two graphs that illustrate the presence of Development and
Advertising libraries in the applications. In the set of 1126 applications we identiﬁed
the presence of 197 Development libraries and 63 Advertising libraries. The vast
majority of them seem to be not common and are only used in between 1 to 5
applications. Concretely, 118 (almost 60%) Development tools libraries are only
present in between one and ﬁve applications. That means, that the vast majority
of these libraries are not common. Only six libraries are used in more than the
10% of the applications. With respect to the Advertising libraries, we ﬁnd a similar
situation. More than the 40% of the Advertising libraries are used in between 1
to 5 applications. Finally, only 4 libraries are used in more than the 10% of the
applications.
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(b)
Figure 4.6: Presence rate of Development tools (a) and Advertising libraries (b).
4.7 Generating Android Manifest Type Files
The last step, consisted in analysing the permissions required by the applications
and compare them with the declared permissions in their Android Manifests. To
deﬁne the permissions an application requires, we checked whether a certain method
array created in Section 4.4 was present in the list containing all the method arrays,
created in Section 4.6, from an application. Basically, we read all the methods from
the permission ﬁles and sought for these methods in the application ﬁles. If a certain
method m from the permission p is present in the application, that permission p
should be declared in the Android Manifest. We developed a bash script that seeks
the permission methods in the application ﬁles. In the end, it generates 5 manifest
type ﬁles, one for each category, containing all the necessary permissions that should
be included to use all the methods provided by the third-party libraries or called in
the application itself.
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Notice that some reverse-engineered applications occupy up to 90 MB and contain
more than 8 000 ﬁles. This fact implies that generating the corresponding manifest-
type ﬁle can require a lot of time as we have to seek for the presence of more than
28 000 methods in more than 8 000 ﬁles. For large applications (>50 MB), the entire
procedure followed by 3Ov can last up to eight hours (in a 97.8 MB application).
Please consult Appendix A.7 to see the source code of the bash script.
4.8 Limitations of 3Ov
Before discussing the outcome of our research, we state the limitations of our approach.
3Ov is a static analysis tool. This means that it only analyses the raw source code of
the applications and not their behaviour at run-time. Android permissions, however,
are only necessary at run-time. For instance we can build an application that uses
the GPS without declaring the ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION permission. We will also be
able to install it. Now, suppose the application retrieves the coordinates from the
GPS only when a certain button "get GPS data" is pressed. The application will
only crash if that button is pressed.
This fact rises a problem. Suppose an application with an embedded Advertising
library and a Social SDK such as AdMob and Facebook. If a certain permission,
present in the manifest, is not required by the Application itself but it is required
by both the Advertising library and the Social SDK, it is not possible for 3Ov to
distinguish whether the mentioned permission is present in the manifest due to the
Advertising library, the Social SDK or both. In the next section, we will deﬁne ﬁve
diﬀerent heuristics that will study the presence of over-privileges in each category
independently from the others. However, for what we have shown in the previous
example, if a certain permission in granted in more than one third-party library, there
is no way in which 3Ov can determine whether the mentioned permission has been
granted to the application due to a certain third-party library, due to more than one
or due to all of them. This issue leads us towards the necessity of deﬁning a lower and
an upper bound in the number of over-privileges. Consequently, for the lower bound,
if a certain permission is only granted due to one category of third-party library it
will be counted as an over-privilege while if it is present in more than one category it
will be dismissed. For the upper bound, if a certain permission, which is not due
to the Application itself, is present in a third-party library, it will be considered as
an over-privilege independently to whether this permission is also present in other
third-party libraries or not.
Finally we have to state the limitations due to the obfuscation tools. There is
no way in which 3Ov can distinguish whether a certain obfuscated ﬁle belongs to
a certain third-party library or to another one. Therefore, the only way in which
we could classify the obfuscated libraries would be to manually analyse them. This
issue will be addressed in Chapter 6.
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Permission Name Application Development Advertising Social SDKs
ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION 0.0562 0.0234 0.0674 0.0000
ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION 0.0225 0.0234 0.0674 0.0000
ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE 0.2247 0.1122 0.6517 0.3538
ACCESS_WIFI_STATE 0.0562 0.0210 0.0787 0.0000
BLUETOOTH 0.0225 0.0047 0.0000 0.0000
BLUETOOTH_ADMIN 0.0112 0.0023 0.0000 0.0000
DISABLE_KEYGUARD 0.0225 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
INTERNET 0.2697 0.1192 1.0000 1.0000
KILL_BACKGROUND_PROCESSES 0.0112 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
READ_PHONE_STATE 0.0899 0.0327 0.1236 0.0000
READ_PROFILE 0.2921 0.1449 0.6517 0.0000
READ_SYNC_SETTINGS 0.1910 0.0350 0.0000 0.0000
RESTART_PACKAGES 0.0112 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
SET_WALLPAPER 0.0449 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
WAKE_LOCK 0.3258 0.1122 0.6404 0.0000
WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0154
Table 4.2: Shows the probabilities of requiring the permissions from the ﬁrst column by the
Application itself, the Development tools, the Advertising libraries and the Social SDKs.
4.9 Proof of Work
At this point, we analysed a subset B of 89 applications seeking for the presence of
over-privileges. Firstly, we studied the increase of permissions due to the usage of
third-party libraries. Secondly, we analysed the presence of over-privileges. Within
the subset B we identiﬁed 27 diﬀerent Advertising libraries, 63 Development tools
libraries and ﬁve Social SDKs. Please notice that 89 applications hardly represent
a useful percentage out of the total number of crawled applications. Due to time
constrains, we could not analyse more applications and therefore we introduce this
section as a Proof of Work and not as a ﬁnal result.
Analysing the likelihood of ﬁnding the diﬀerent Android permissions granted in
the manifest gives us a ﬁrst idea about how diﬀerent third-party libraries are more
likely to declare certain permissions than others. If Android applications were shown
to be over-privileged, the diﬀerent permissions required by the diﬀerent categories of
third-party libraries, would lead towards the presence of diﬀerent over-privileges. We
started considering each category independently, e.g. only the Application itself, only
Development tools libraries and so on. Then, we studied the pair combination of
the Application with all the third-party libraries, e.g. Application with Development
tools, Application with Advertising libraries and so on. With this analysis, we
determined how certain permissions are more likely to be granted to the application
when a certain category of third-party library is used to extend the applications’
functionality. Please note that all the obfuscated directories an ﬁles cannot be
classiﬁed in a certain category. Hence, the obfuscated libraries will be analysed
later. Table 4.2 shows all the probabilities identiﬁed when analysing each category
(Obfuscated category excluded) independently from each other. Please notice that
the table only shows all those permissions whose probability was greater than zero.
To see the source code of the bash script that calculates the probabilities please
consult the Appendix A.8.
Notice from the previous table that only ﬁve permissions are likely to be granted
to more than a 10% of the applications when considering only the Application it-
self: ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE, INTERNET, READ_PROFILE, READ_SYNC_SETTINGS and
30
4.9. Proof of Work
WAKE_LOCK being that last one the likeliest (32.58% of the applications declare this
permission in their manifest). The WAKE_LOCK permission grants the application
with privileges to keep the CPU from sleeping or the screen from dimming. The
likeliest permissions regarding the Development and Advertising libraries and the
Social SDKs are READ_PROFILE (14.49%), INTERNET (100%) and INTERNET (100%)
respectively. As it was expected, Advertising libraries and Social SDKs require the
INTERNET permission in order to work. More interesting, the likeliest permission
required by the Development tools libraries is the READ_PROFILE permission. This
permission allows an application to read the user’s personal proﬁle data. User proﬁle
encompasses several device settings such as the Bluetooth, GPS, WiFi, Mobile Data
and Volume states. A part from that, it can also be observed how a lower number of
permissions are granted to the diﬀerent third-party libraries. In this way, 16 diﬀerent
permissions are declared by the Application itself, eleven by the Development tools
libraries, eight by the Advertising libraries and only three diﬀerent permissions by
the Social SDKs.
Following, we analysed the probabilities when grouping pairs of the Application
itself with the rest of third-party libraries. Table 4.3 shows the mentioned proba-
bilities. As before, we only present non-null probabilities. Before explaining the re-
sults, we want to state that the ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION, ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION,
ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE, ACCESS_WIFI_STATE, READ_PHONE_STATE, READ_PROFILE
and READ_SYNC_SETTINGS permissions provide diﬀerent mechanisms to access users’
sensitive data. When grouping the Application itself with the Development libraries,
it can be observed how all the previous permissions decrease. For instance, the
ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE permission decreases from a likelihood of 22.47% to a 9.86%
or the READ_PROFILE permission from a 29.21% to a 12.77%. This means that the
usual permissions required by the Development tools libraries are not meant to
access users’ sensitive data. However, when grouping the Application itself with
the Advertising libraries, the likelihood of requiring all the previous permissions,
excluding READ_PROFILE and READ_SYNC_SETTINGS, increases. That means that
Advertising libraries require more often permissions to access users’ sensitive data.
Finally, when combining the Application itself with the Social SDKs, we see how
all the permissions, except the ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE permission, decrease. This
permission allows applications to determine whether the user has an internet connec-
tion or not, determine the type of connection (WiFi, 2G/3G/4G) and subscribe to
changes in the connectivity. Therefore, we can conclude that Social SDKs are not
meant to gather personal data from the user excluding the necessity of being aware
of the Internet connection status as it is essential for their functionality.
Taking advantage of the tools included in 3Ov, we analysed the ﬁve most popular
third party libraries from each category in order to provide further information
about the permissions required by each of them. Please notice that, ideally, we
would have analysed all the found third party libraries in the set B. However, due
to time constrains, we considered only the top ﬁve libraries which are present in a
fair Android applications as shown in Table 4.4. Please notice that the rest of the
third-party libraries from each category are used in less than the 1% of the current
applications. Figure 4.7 illustrates the results. Notice that we do not provide any
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Permission Name ApplicationDevelopment
Application
Advertising
Application
Social SDKs
ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION 0.0251 0.0562 0.0327
ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION 0.0213 0.0449 0.0131
ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE 0.0986 0.3539 0.2843
ACCESS_WIFI_STATE 0.0213 0.0674 0.0327
BLUETOOTH 0.0077 0.0112 0.0131
BLUETOOTH_ADMIN 0.0039 0.0056 0.0065
DISABLE_KEYGUARD 0.0039 0.0112 0.0131
INTERNET 0.1364 .8764 0.4365
KILL_BACKGROUND_PROCESSES 0.0019 0.0056 0.0065
READ_PHONE_STATE 0.0329 0.0843 0.0523
READ_PROFILE 0.1277 0.3708 0.1830
READ_SYNC_SETTINGS 0.0368 0.0955 0.1111
RESTART_PACKAGES 0.0019 0.0056 0.0065
SET_WALLPAPER 0.0077 0.0225 0.0261
WAKE_LOCK 0.1122 0.3596 0.1895
WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE 0.0000 0.0000 0.014
Table 4.3: Shows the probabilities of requiring the permissions from the ﬁrst column by the
Application along with the third-party libraries.
Name Presence Name Presence Name Presence
Facebook 12.36% Google/ads 37.4% Android Support 43.56%
Twitter4j 1.63% Millennial Media 3.63% Flurry 7.4%
Playheaven 0.75% InMobi 3.11% Actionbar Sherlock 7.33%
Heyzap 0.58% Chartboost 2.31% Apache 5.75%
Scoreloop 0.4% Tapjoy 1.59% Amazon 1.63%
Table 4.4: shows the name and the presence percentage (out of the total number of applications)
that use the mentioned third party libraries.
graph concerning the Social SDKs because only the INTERNET permission (required
by the ﬁve of them) and the ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE (required by two) were found.
Notice that the number of diﬀerent permissions identiﬁed in both categories is very
similar (11 for the Development libraries and 10 for the Advertising). Further, there
are seven permissions which are required by both categories.
(a) (b)
Figure 4.7: Graph (a) shows the permissions required to use the top ﬁve Development tools
libraries. Graph (b) shows the permissions required to use the top ﬁve Advertising libraries.
The fact that a certain permission is more likely to be granted to the application
when a certain third-party library is used, does not necessary lead towards the
presence of over-privileges in Android applications. A formal deﬁnition of the term
over-privilege is diﬃcult to provide as it is basically a point of view. For instance,
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what the user could consider as an over-privilege, e.g. an advertising banner, for the
developer could be the most important feature of her application. Therefore, we are
going to consider ﬁve diﬀerent heuristics which will be thoroughly studied. Please
notice that for each heuristic, we will determine a lower and an upper bound for
the number of over-privileges as it was explained in the previous section. The ﬁve
heuristics are:
1. Heuristic 1: Only permissions granted due to the presence of third-party
Advertising libraries can be considered as over-privileges. We could argue
that a permission granted to the application only because of the usage of
an Advertising library should be considered as an over-privilege as far as an
embedded banner is not necessary for the proper functionality of the application.
2. Heuristic 2: Only permissions granted due to the presence of third-party
Development tools libraries can be considered as over-privileges. Only a manual
thorough analysis would determiner whether these libraries are gathering
sensitive data from the user and sending it to third-party servers or not.
3. Heuristic 3: Only permissions granted due to the presence of third-party Social
SDKs libraries can be considered as over-privileges. Sharing the application’s
data with the OSNs is not necessary for the correct functionality of an appli-
cation. For instance, sharing the score of a game-type application with users’
friends on Facebook is not necessary to play the game.
4. Heuristic 4: Only permissions granted due to the presence of obfuscated libraries
can be considered as over-privileges. In this case, we are considering that the
Obfuscated category only encompass ﬁles belonging to the third party libraries
and not to the Application itself. As explained in the previous section, this
must be cautiously considered as ﬁles belonging to the Application itself could
also have been classiﬁed within the Obfuscated category. However, all the ﬁles
that belong to the Application itself should be, theoretically, included within
the application’s package. Therefore, we assume this heuristic as feasible.
5. Heuristic 5: Only permissions granted due to the presence of Advertising
libraries, assuming that the Development tools libraries and the Social SDKs
belong to the core of the application, can be considered as over-privileges. No
obfuscated libraries are considered in this heuristic. We could argue that, in
the end, advertising banners are not necessary for the proper functionality of
the application. Basically, an application can oﬀer the same possibilities to the
users independently of using Advertising libraries or not. Hence, in this last
situation, we consider the Development tools libraries and the Social SDKs as
belonging to the core of the application.
We studied the number of over-privileged applications considering the ﬁrst four
heuristics. In Figure 4.8, both graphs show the number of applications that present
a certain number of over-privileges according to the ﬁrst four heuristics. Graph (a)
considers the deﬁnition of the lower bound while graph (b) considers the upper.
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Figure 4.8: Over-privileges found according to the ﬁrst four heuristics. Graph (a) considers the
lower bound while graph (b) the upper.
On the one hand, graph (a) shows the number of over-privileged applications
when considering the ﬁrst four heuristics and the lower bound. Notice how the vast
majority of applications are not over-privileged. When we analysed the applications
from the subset B, we only identiﬁed 22 diﬀerent permissions (33.33% of the total of
permissions identiﬁed by PScout) declared in the applications’ manifest ﬁles. All
together means that this set of 22 permissions are very common and, hence, the
likelihood of ﬁnding these permissions declared in other libraries’ manifest-type ﬁles
is very high. Finally, notice that Development libraries leads towards the presence
of a greater number of over-privileges than the Advertising libraries or the Social
SKDs. This is due to their varied nature. However, the obfuscated libraries are the
ones responsible for the greatest number of over-privileges. This situation is logical
as we are assuming the Obfuscated category as a set of all the other categories of
third-party libraries. Therefore, permissions such as CAMERA, CHANGE_WIFI_STATE
and RECORD_AUDIO were only present in the obfuscated libraries. On the other
hand, graph (b) considers the upper bound. In this graph it can be observed
how Development tools and Advertising libraries can lead towards the presence
of seven and six over-privileges (respectively), while the Social SDKs only up to
two. Notice that the Development tools and the Advertising libraries normally lead
towards the presence of one, two or three over-privileges (49.44% and 58.43% of the
applications respectively). Reasonably, the number of over-privileges found due to the
obfuscated libraries when considering the upper bound does not importantly increase.
Once again, this is due to the presence of some unique permissions declared in the
obfuscated libraries. Concretely ﬁve out of the 18 (27.78%) permissions found in the
obfuscated libraries were unique. Therefore this ﬁve permissions were considered as
over-privileges by both the upper and the lower bound.
Figure 4.9 presents the results of the ﬁfth heuristic. Only the permissions granted
to the application due to the usage of Advertising libraries are considered as over-
privileges. Further, no obfuscated libraries are considered in this case as there is no
way to distinguish between the diﬀerent categories of third-party libraries. Please
notice that there is no necessity to deﬁne an upper and a lower bound. We consider
a permission as an over-privilege when it is declared in the manifest but it is not
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needed by the set of the Application itself, Development tools libraries and Social
SDKs. Notice how the most common number of over-privileges in this situation is
two. Concretely 17 applications (almost 20%) presented two over-privileges.
Figure 4.9: Over-privileges found according to the ﬁfth heuristic.
Afterwards, we analysed the most popular over-privileges when considering the
ﬁrst three heuristics. In Figure 4.10, it can be seen the most popular over-privileges
found according to the diﬀerent categories of third-party libraries. Please notice
that no over-privileges were found do to the Social SDKs when considering the
lower bound and only 13 applications were over-privileged when considering the
upper bound. Further, only the INTERNET (present in the 13 applications) and the
ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE (present in one application) permissions were classiﬁed as
over-privileges in this last case. Notice that the INTERNET permission is the most
popular over-privilege when considering the upper bound. When considering the
lower bound, the ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE permission becomes the most popular
one. Moreover, notice from the Advertising libraries graph that only nine diﬀerent
permissions were found when analyzing the 27 found Advertising libraries.
(a) (b)
Figure 4.10: Most popular over-privileges due to the usage of the diﬀerent categories of third party
libraries. Graph (a) shows the most popular over-privileges due to Development libraries. Graph (b)
shows the most popular over-privileges due to Advertising libraries.
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Further, we studied the most popular over-privileges due to the ﬁfth heuristic.
Please recall from the deﬁnition of the heuristic that this is a very special case.
Thus, we analyse it separately. Considering the fact that the Obfuscated category
only contains ﬁles belonging to the diﬀerent categories of third-party libraries, we
analysed the most popular over-privileges due to the Obfuscated libraries. Notice
from the Figure 4.11 that there is not a big diﬀerence with respect to the most
popular over-privileges caused by the three categories of third-party libraries. This is
a good reason to think that the Obfuscated category could only contain obfuscated
third-party libraries.
Figure 4.11: Over-privileges found according to the fourth heuristic.
We also analysed the presence of missing permissions. Out of the set of 89
applications we found two of them that were missing a permission. A permission was
assumed as missing when it was required by the core of the application but it was not
declared in the manifest ﬁle. Concretely, application com.miniclip.plagueinc was
missing the READ_PROFILE permission and application mobi.artibus.slotmaniacs
the WAKE_LOCK permission. We manually inspected both applications to check
whether we had a false positive or the applications were really missing the mentioned
permissions. We could not determine any cause for which these two permissions were
missing. Therefore, we concluded that either both applications had dead code or the
PScout tool was mistaking certain mappings.
Finally, we studied the unnecessary permissions granted to the applications. In
Figure 4.12, it can be observed how 13 applications (14.61%) declared unnecessary
permissions in their manifest ﬁle. A permission was assumed as unnecessary when
it was declared in the manifest but it was not present in any of the manifest-type
generated ﬁles. The com.blocks.game.brick.puzzle.blockpuzzle declared ﬁve
unnecessary permissions. Further, the most popular unnecessary permissions are
READ_SYNC_SETTINGS and SET_WALLPAPER. The former allows applications to access
the online accounts managed by the mobile phone such as email accounts and OSNs
accounts. The latter allows applications to set a wallpaper.
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(a) (b)
Figure 4.12: Image (a) shows the number of applications that have declared one or more unnecessary
permissions. Image (b) shows which are the most popular permissions unnecessarily granted to the
applications.
4.10 Discussion
Firstly, by analysing the set A, we found out 74 new Development tools libraries and
2 new Advertising libraries that were not included in the Appbrain lists. In this way
we provide a ﬁnal list with 211 Development tools libraries, 80 Advertising libraries
and 14 Social SDKs. Furthermore, we showed how the vast majority of third party
libraries are rarely used in more than ﬁve applications out of 1126 (0.45% of the
applications).
So far we have shown that the term over-privilege is not easy to deﬁne. Therefore,
we have introduced ﬁve diﬀerent heuristics that can pave the way for future investi-
gation. Whatever the reader decides that an over-privilege is, she can play with the
provided data to ﬁgure out how many over-privileges she is likely to ﬁnd according
to her deﬁnition. As a proof of work, we have shown how Android applications are
over-privileged independently of the heuristic. Only when considering the Social
SDKs and the deﬁnition of the lower bound no over-privileges where found in the
set B. Further, we have shown how only a small set of Android permissions (around
30%) are commonly used. This implies that the most popular over-privileges found
due to the diﬀerent heuristics are similar. Only the Development tools libraries lead
towards the presence of more varied over-privileges. Moreover, we have shown how
Android applications can miss permissions in their manifest ﬁles, e.g. the presence
of dead code generates false positives. Finally, we have illustrated how developers
declare unnecessary permissions in their applications manifest.
A part from that, we have analysed the probabilities of declaring certain permis-
sions in the manifest due to the usage of diﬀerent third party libraries. Coherently,
we showed how Advertising libraries and Social SDKs always require the INTERNET
permission to be declared in order to use them. Development tools libraries are the
ones that require greater number of diﬀerent permissions while Social SDKs are the
ones that require less (eleven and three respectively) Furthermore, we showed that
Development tools libraries are more likely to require a greatest variety of permissions.
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When combining the Application itself with the diﬀerent third party libraries, it is
specially interesting to pinpoint how the probability of declaring permissions which
potentially can access users’ sensitive data increases.
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Chapter 5
LPDroid: Application
Transparent Protection of
Location Data
In Chapter 4, we presented how an important number of the applications from the
set B are over-privileged. Concretely, we found over-privileges when considering all
the ﬁve heuristics. Apart from that, previous work has shown that sensitive data
can be transferred to third-party servers [10, 11] for user proﬁling and personalized
advertisement targeting. This makes sensitive data protection mechanisms necessary.
In this section, we provide an example on how to protect users’ sensitive data. In
particular, as explained in the Introduction, we focus on protecting users’ location
data.
In Section 5.1 we will elaborate on what Android applications do at the user level
to protect users’ location data. Since we will identify several shortcomings, we will
discuss how user data can be protected in lower levels of the AOSP in Sections 5.2
and 5.3. Consequently, we will introduce LPDroid, an extension of TaintDroid that
provides developers with a set of tools to pave the way for future implementation of
LPPMs. As a proof of work, we implement three trivial protection mechanisms.
5.1 Protecting Users’ Location at the User Level
5.1.1 Current Applications
There are several location privacy tools available in the Google Play market. The vast
majority of them consist of location spoofers which allow users to fake their location
coordinates. Table 5.1 illustrates the top ten location-spoofer type applications
present in the Google Play market as of May 2014.
Their functionality is almost the same in all cases: ﬁrstly, users need to activate
the allow mock locations option from the settings menu. Once it is done, users can
proceed to fake their location. We manually tested all the applications listed in Table
5.1 and realized that all of them include the option to manually set fake coordinates
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Name Number ofdownloads
Minimum
Android
version
Drawbacks
com.lexa.fakegps 500,000 - 1,000,000 1.5 Wrong updating timing forfaked coordinates
org.ajeje.fakelocation 100,000 - 500,000 1.6 Does not work with Face-book 4.0 nor with Youtube
com.fakegps.mock 100,000 - 500,000 2.3 Does not work with Face-book 4.0
com.my.fake.location 100,000 - 500,000 1.5 Manual conﬁguration of thefaked coordinates
kr.woot0pia.gps 100,000 - 500,000 1.5
Can’t stop faking the coordi-
nates unless you destroy the
application
com.incorporateapps.fakegps.free 50,000 - 100,000 2.1 No missfunctionalities wereidentiﬁed
com.appandmobile.locationspooferfree 10,000 - 50,000 1.5 Does not work in Android4.4.2
ait.com.locationfaker 1,000 - 5,000 2.2 No missfunctionalities wereidentiﬁed
com.hyunnyapp.fakemylocation 1,000 - 5,000 2.2 No missfunctionalities wereidentiﬁed
com.mjhdev.fakelocationfree 500 - 1,000 4.2 Does not work in Android4.4.2
Table 5.1: Shows the top 10 location spoofer applications available in the Google Play market as
of May 2014.
or to pick randomly generated coordinates. The com.lexa.fakegps application also
allows to set an obfuscation radius (centered at the user’s current location) and an
obfuscation time interval. When setting an obfuscation radius and a time interval,
the application generates fake coordinates within that radius at every time interval.
Besides location spoofer type applications, applications such as Clueful Privacy
Advisor or LBE Privacy Guard read the Android Manifest ﬁle of the installed
applications at run-time. Then, according to a certain criteria, they classify the
applications in low risk, medium risk or high risk depending on the permissions
declared in the Android Manifest ﬁle. The followed criteria to classify the analyzed
applications is hard coded in the application and therefore it is not available publicly.
There is one application that includes all the mentioned features: Place Mask. It
allows users to monitor the privacy level of their installed applications at run time
and obfuscate the location coordinates. It oﬀers the possibility to manually set the
faked coordinates or to select an obfuscation radius and a generating time interval.
Once these values are set, the application generates new random coordinates within
the radius at every time interval. Please notice that all the protection mechanisms
implemented in these applications are very easy to break.
Although it is not yet an oﬃcial Android feature it is worth to mention the App
Ops application. App Ops is a hidden menu present from Android 4.3 onwards that
lets users manage the permissions used by the applications. It was found by the
Android Police1 team who created an application to show this hidden menu and let
users administrate the privileges granted to their installed applications. Android
Police is a web blog dedicated to the Android world. App Ops menu presents four
permission groups: location, personal, messaging and device. Each group is shown in
a tab which presents a list of applications sorted by the time when they last used the
1Android Police oﬃcial website: http://www.androidpolice.com/
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permissions of the current tab. For example, in the Location tab, all the applications
that have queried access to an ACCESS_LOCATION type permission will be displayed
in a list sorted by the time they queried the access to the mentioned permission.
App Ops also shows the permissions used by each application. Users can disable
permissions for each application they have installed, even for system applications.
Sometimes, however, disabling permissions does not have any eﬀect. For instance,
when we tried to block Facebook’s ACCESS_LOCATION type permissions, it still had
access to location data.
Interesting enough, Google immediately modiﬁed the App Ops menu to avoid it
being opened by the Apps Ops application developed by the Android Police team2.
Consequently, in Android 4.4.2 versions it was not accessible anymore. Google
claimed that the menu was experimental, and that it could break some of the
applications policed by it. Currently, it is unclear what will the Android team do
with App Ops.
In the following sections we present two Android applications to understand how
LBAs work. Firstly, we will present an application that shows users’ current location.
Secondly, we will introduce an application that lists all the installed applications
that require either the ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION or the ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION
permissions. Finally, we will analyze the location spoofer type applications. Develop-
ing the ﬁrst application will allow us to later check whether the mechanisms that
we will implement to protect users’ location work or not. The second application
will provide users with a tool to see how many of their installed applications are
potentially dangerous concerning to their location data. Both applications will be
part of LPDroid which will be introduced in Section 5.2.5.
5.1.2 MyLocation Application
In Android systems, users have access to 3 diﬀerent Location Providers: GPS,
Network and Passive providers. Firstly, the GPS provider determines users’ location
using satellites. It is the most accurate provider although it is the most expensive
in terms of energy consumption and it is only available outdoors. It requires the
ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION permission to be used. Secondly, the Network provider
determines the location based on cell towers and WiFi access points. It requires
the ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION permission to be used. Finally, the Passive provider
returns the locations generated by other providers. It is a combination of the GPS
and the network providers and requires the ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION permission to
be used.
Every LBA obtains an instance of the Location Manager class by calling the
method getSystemService(LOCATION_SERVICE). This is done in onCreate() as
this class cannot be instantiated following the regular Java procedure for object
invocation. After, LBAs create a LocationListener object from which the following
callback methods can be overridden:
2Article that informs about the actions taken by Google to remove the App Ops menu:
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/12/
google-removes-vital-privacy-features-android-shortly-after-adding-them
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• onLocationChanged(): is called when new coordinates are received. During
the registration time, developers can specify how often the location coordinates
should be updated.
• onProviderDisabled(): is called when a provider is disabled, e.g. when
a user is running out of battery and, therefore, decides to disable the GPS
provider.
• onProviderEnabled(): is called when a provider is enabled, e.g. when a user
that is currently using the Network provider decides to change to the GPS
provider in order to receive more accurate coordinates.
• onStatusChanged(): is called when the status of a provider changes. There
are three diﬀerent status for a location provider: OUT_OF_SERVICE if the
provider is out of service, and this is not expected to change in the near future;
TEMPORARILY_UNAVAILABLE if the provider is temporarily unavailable but is
expected to be available shortly; and AVAILABLE if the provider is currently
available.
In onResume(), the method requestLocationUpdates() is called in order to
subscribe the application to one of the providers. The desired provider can be
speciﬁed through a hard coded Criteria object. For instance, we can specify the
FINE_ACCURACY criteria in order to subscribe to the GPS provider. Further, it can
be speciﬁed the time interval in which location updates should occur. For example, a
developer may want to develop a battery-aware application that queries for location
updates only when they are necessary and not "as soon as possible". Moreover, the
distance interval in which location updates should occur can also be speciﬁed. For
instance, if the application’s accuracy is not an important parameter, developers
can set a certain update distance rather than update the location every time new
coordinates are available.
According to the procedure described above, we ﬁrst developed MyLocation, an
application that displays the location providers and their information as shown in
Figure 5.1. It selects the best provider according to a hard coded criteria and ﬁnally
shows the location coordinates of the user. The criteria used in our case was the
ACCURACY_FINE criteria which only allows the usage of the GPS provider. As it will
be addressed in Section 5.2.5, this application will belong to LPDroid. MyLocation
will allow LPDroid users to check the functionality of the LPPMs implemented in
LPDroid. Please refer to Appendix B.1.1 to see the source code of this application.
5.1.3 LocationApps Application
We developed LocationApps, an application that lists all those installed applications
that require one of the two location related permissions: ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION or
ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION. This application can be useful to determine the number
of installed applications potentially dangerous with respect to users’ location privacy.
Therefore, this application will also be part of LPDroid and it will allow users to
have an overview on how many applications have access to their location data.
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(a) (b)
Figure 5.1: Show MyLocation application running in a real device. Image (a) shows the information
about the providers while image (b) shows the information embedded with the received coordinates.
LocationApps ﬁrst retrieves a list containing all the installed applications by
calling the getInstalledPackages() method. Later, for every application installed,
it checks whether it requires a location based permission or not. The following
portion of code is used to make this veriﬁcation:
1 if (PackageManager.PERMISSION_GRANTED == packageManager.checkPermission(Manifest.permission.
ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION,
2 pk.packageName) || PackageManager.PERMISSION_GRANTED == packageManager.checkPermission(
Manifest.permission.ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION,
3 pk.packageName))
4 results.add("" + pk.applicationInfo.loadLabel(packageManager));
Finally, it retrieves the names of those applications and displays them on a list.
Figure 5.2 shows a screen-shot of the application.
To see the full code of the application, please consult the Appendix B.1.2.
5.1.4 Location Spoofer Type Applications
In this section, we introduce the basis of location spoofer type applications. If these
applications correctly protected users’ location data in all situations, our work would
be done as far as users’ location would be protected. Consequently, it was important
to thoroughly analyse these applications and deeply understand how they work.
The ﬁrst step to develop a location spoofer type application is to create a mock
provider. This mock provider is not other than one of the 3 default providers
with its coordinates faked. To fake its coordinates, developers must include the
android.permission.ALLOW_MOCK_LOCATIONS permission in the Android Manifest
ﬁle as well as activate the allow mock locations setting in the device. Then, the
procedure is normally as follows:
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Figure 5.2: Listpermissions application running in a real device.
1. Add a test provider:
1 mgr.addTestProvider(LocationManager.NETWORK_PROVIDER, false, false, false, false, false
, false, false, 0, 10);
2. Enable the test provider:
1 mgr.setTestProviderEnabled(LocationManager.NETWORK_PROVIDER, true);
3. Clear all previous location data:
1 mgr.clearTestProviderEnabled(LocationManager.NETWORK_PROVIDER);
4. Set the status of the provider:
1 mgr.setTestProviderStatus(LocationManager.NETWORK_PROVIDER,
2 LocationProvider.AVAILABLE,null,System.currentTimeMillis());
5. Subscribe to location updates:
1 mgr.requestLocationUpdates(LocationManager.NETWORK_PROVIDER, 0, 0, locationListener);
6. Create a mock location. This is normally done by calling a external method
that generates the fake coordinates:
1 updatedLocation = createLocation(20,20,0);
7. Set the mock location to the provider:
1 mgr.setTestProviderLocation(LocationManager.NETWORK_PROVIDER, updatedLocation);
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LBAs will query for location updates at diﬀerent time intervals depending on
the arguments passed to the getLocationUpdates() method. If LBAs queried for
location updates more frequently than the location coordinates are faked, LBA would
access non-faked data. In order to avoid LBAsobtain with the real location, location
spoofer applications need to push the faked location before the provider does it.
Therefore, location spoofers periodically push the faked location to the provider.
This procedure is normally done in an independent thread which updates the data
at a certain rate.
Location spoofer applications present poor mechanisms for protecting users loca-
tion data. The most complex mechanism used by these applications is the obfuscation
radius. As explained before, location spoofers generate random coordinates within
that interval at a certain rate. For an adversary trying to discern users’ actual
location, the fact that the obfuscation radius is always centred in the user’s actual
location would lead towards the disclosure of her most common locations. Further,
the mechanisms implemented in the applications are easily detectable. Following, we
will present four diﬀerent ways in which the usage of a location spoofer application
can be uncovered. Firstly, location spoofers require the ACCESS_MOCK_LOCATION per-
mission and the allow mock locations setting activated. Due to this fact, a developer
can easily detect whether the allow mock locations setting is activated or not and
query the user to deactivate it previously using the LBA. It is an easy veriﬁcation
with control ﬂow techniques. For instance, a developer can check whether mock
locations are enabled with:
1 if(Settings.Secure.getString(getContentResolver(),Settings.Secure.ALLOW_MOCK_LOCATION).equals
("0")){
2 return false;}
3 else{
4 return true;}
Secondly, a more radical option is to check whether the ALLOW_MOCK_LOCATION
permission is present in the applications’ Android Manifest ﬁle or not and, conse-
quently, query the users to uninstall those applications or at least, not to use them.
Below, it is shown the necessary code to check whether the ALLOW_MOCK_LOCATION
permission is present or not:
1 if (PackageManager.PERMISSION_GRANTED == packageManager.checkPermission(Manifest.permission.
ALLOW_MOCK_LOCATION,pk.
2 packageName)
Thirdly, mock location providers do not send or receive National Marine Elec-
tronics Association (NMEA) data. NMEA is a standard for communicating or
receiving GPS data. Therefore, developers can create a NMEA listener with
addNmeaListener() method and if they do not get any NMEA update but location
is still changed in onLocationChanged(), then they can determine the location has
been faked.
One last option is to remove the test providers, with the LocationManager’s
method removeTestProvider(). In this way, the test provider created by the
location spoofer to fake the location will be removed and, therefore, the location
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coordinates will not be faked.
For all the four previous reasons, implementing applications to protect users’
location is not the best solution. Instead, we should go deeper on the Android stack
and check whether certain mechanisms are feasible to be implemented on the lower
layers.
5.2 Protecting Users’ Location at the Framework Level
As it has been seen in the previous section, location spoofer applications present
several drawbacks. Therefore, we should inspect the Android stack to check whether
implementing LPPMs in the lower levels is possible or not. Basically, two conditions
need to be fulﬁlled to accept the idea of implementing LPPMs at a certain level.
Firstly, they need to be accessible from the user level and, secondly, they need to
be unbounded by the limitations explained before. In this section we will introduce
LPDroid, a novel add-on to the AOSP. This modiﬁcation allows that arbitrary
LPPMs, if implemented, can be transparently used by every mobile application and
therefore provide a strong level of protection. This is achieved by the implementation
of a inter-level communication mechanism that allows LPDroid users to communicate
with the Android location framework and control its behaviour. As a proof of work,
we introduce three diﬀerent basic location obfuscation strategies for protecting users’
location data.
Although by the time this thesis was written the latest available version of
Android was Android 4.4.3, there were no real devices in the market capable of
dealing with that version of Android as no drivers were available. Therefore, LPDroid
was tested directly over Android 4.4.2 in a LG Nexus 5 devices. Further, we ported
LPDroid over TaintDroid 4.3 and check its functionality in an emulator.
5.2.1 Downloading and Building the AOSP
The ﬁrst necessary step before modifying the lower levels of the Android stack is
to download the AOSP. The steps followed to download the source code are well
explained at the AOSP website3. We only needed to specify the version that we
wanted to download:
1 repo init -u https://android.googlesource.com/platform/manifest -b android-4.2.2_r2
After we downloaded the AOSP, we downloaded the drivers for the device. The
necessary drivers4 for the LG Nexus 5 device are:
• NFC, Bluetooth, WiFi:
https://dl.google.com/dl/android/aosp/broadcom-hammerhead-kot49h-a670ed75.tgz
• Camera, Sensors, Audio:
https://dl.google.com/dl/android/aosp/lge-hammerhead-kot49h-e6165a67.tgz
3AOSP oﬃcial website: https://source.android.com/
4https://developers.google.com/android/nexus/drivers
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• Graphics, GSM, Camera, GPS, Sensors, Media, DSP, USB:
https://dl.google.com/dl/android/aosp/qcom-hammerhead-kot49h-518133bf.tgz
We put the drivers in the root directory of the AOSP and extracted them with
the following command:
1 tar -zxvf FILE_NAME
2 ./FILE_NAME.sh # (view the license and then type "I ACCEPT")
At this point, we had everything we needed to start implementing LPDroid.
Before doing that, however, we compiled the source code and run it in the device.
The following procedure, will be also used to compile the modiﬁed AOSP and to port
it to the real device. In order to compile the AOSP, the ﬁrst step consists in initializing
the building environment and choosing the target to build. To initialize the building
environment, the command . build/envsetup.sh needs to be executed and the
target, aosp_hammerhead-userdebug in our case, speciﬁed. The general structure of
the target name is BUILD_NAME-BUILD_TYPE. In the BUILD_NAME ﬁeld, the codename
referring to the particular device is speciﬁed. For instance, aosp_arm is used to
install the AOSP in an ARM emulator or aosp_hammerhead in a LG Nexus 5 device.
In the BUILD_TYPE ﬁeld, one of the three diﬀerent build types can be speciﬁed: (1)
user to have limited access to the device’s internals (suited for mass production), (2)
userdebug to have root access to the device’s internals and (3) eng to have access to
a development conﬁguration with further debugging capabilities. Later, the source
code needs to be compiled with the command make. The make command can handle
parallel tasks with N arguments, and it is common to use a number of tasks N that
is between 1 and 2 times the number of hardware threads on the computer being
used for the build. As we were dealing with CentOS 6.5 Core 2 Quad machine (four
cores) we executed the make -j8 command. Once the building process is ﬁnished,
the boot.img, system.img and userdata.img ﬁles are created.
To allow Linux machines to recognize external devices, certain udev rules need
to be added in the /etc/udev directory. The udev rules allow developers to identify
devices based on their properties, like vendor ID and device ID, dynamically in
a Linux machine. The necessary rule to identify the LG Nexus 5 in the CentOs
machine was:
1 SUBSYSTEM=="usb", ATTR{idVendor}=="18d1", ATTR{idProduct}=="4ee1", ENV{ACL_MANAGE}=="1"
Once the device was correctly identiﬁed we unlocked the bootloader. Literally, a
bootloader is the code that is executed before any OS starts. Every Android phone
has a bootloader that instructs the Linux kernel to boot normally. Bootloaders are
usually locked on Android devices because manufacturers want users to stick to
their Android OS version speciﬁcally designed for the device. However, bootloaders
can be unlocked by executing the fastboot oem unlock command and following
the instructions showed on the device’s screen. Note that unlocking the bootloader
nulliﬁes the guarantee.
Finally, we moved to the out/target/product/hammerhead directory and exe-
cuted the 3 following commands to install the .img ﬁles in our device:
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1. sudo fastboot flash boot boot.img
2. sudo fastboot flash system system.img
3. sudo fastboot flash userdata userdata.img
At this point, we were able to start implementing LPDroid. After a thorough
analysis of the AOSP, we identiﬁed that the LocationManager class from the location
framework needed to be modiﬁed prepare it for the future implementation of LPPMs.
Related work such as the AppFence project [17] has also modiﬁed this class to
implement diﬀerent location obfuscation mechanisms. All the ﬁles we need to
modify are in the <ROOT>/frameworks/base/location/java/android/location
directory. Within this directory we ﬁnd the GPS Manager, the Address Manager,
the Country Manager, the Location and the class of interest: the Location Manager.
The android.location.LocationManager class is the most important class in the
location framework. It provides access to the system location services. These services
allow applications to obtain periodic updates of the device’s geographical location, or
to ﬁre an Intent object when the device enters the proximity of a given geographical
area.
5.2.2 TaintDroid
As commented in the introduction of this chapter, our work was brought over Taint-
Droid in order to extend its functionality by preparing it for the future implementation
of LPPMs. TaintDroid is an extension of Android capable of tracking sensitive data
leakage developed by Enck et al. [16]. However, TaintDorid only covers the Java
part of the Android OS (User level and Framework level) meaning that the C/C++
levels from the Android software stack are not monitored.
What TaintDroid basically does is to monitor how third-party applications handle
users’ data using dynamic taint analysis techniques [35]. Taint analysis is based on
inspecting the source code as it executes being a commonly used technique in the
malware analysis and vulnerabilities discovery. TaintDroid ﬁrstly identiﬁes sensitive
information at a taint source where a taint marking (taint tag), indicating the
information type, is assigned as:
1 int tag = Taint.TAINT_NAME;
2 Taint.addTaintDouble(VARIABLE_TO_TRACK, tag)
Dynamic taint analysis tracks how labelled data impacts other data in a way
that might leak the original sensitive information. This tracking is often performed
at the instruction level and produces only a 14% performance overhead. Finally, the
impacted data is identiﬁed before it leaves the system at a taint sink (usually the
network interface, but can be others).
For downloading and building TaintDroid we followed the instructions in the
Appanalysis website5. However, the necessary procedure to run TaintDroid in an
emulator is not correctly described as one more step is required. Developers need to
5TaintDroid oﬃcial website: http://appanalysis.org/
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add an SD card to the emulator in order to allow taint propagation. Moreover, the
SD card needs to have an EXT2 ﬁle system. The complete procedure is as follows:
1. Create a SD Card Image:
mksdcard -l mySdCardFAT 32M mySdCardFATFile.img
2. Change Filesystem to EXT2:
cp mySdCardFATFile.img myTdCardEXTFile.img
sudo mke2fs myTdCardEXTFile.img
Finally, we run TaintDorid on the emulator the emulator with the SD card by
executing the following command:
emulator -kernel <PATH_TO_THE_KERNEL> -image <PATH_TO_THE_IMAGE> -sdcard <PATH_TO_THE_SDCARD>
As shown in Figure 5.3, TaintDroid correctly worked on the emulator. Image
(b) shows the name of the application that is about to send your sensitive data
(com.facebook.katana), where will it send it (@IP: 173.252.100.27) and the type of
sensitive data (GPS location) amongst others.
(a) (b)
Figure 5.3: Image (a) shows how the Action bar of the emulator notiﬁes a message from TaintDroid.
Image (b) shows the information of the message.
5.2.3 AppFence
AppFence6 [17] is an extension of TaintDroid 2.1 (based on Android 2.1). It imple-
ments two privacy controls that covertly substitute obfuscated data in place of data
that the user wants to keep private and block network transmissions that contain
that private data. Although Android 2.1 was already deprecated when we started
6AppFence oﬃcial website: http://appfence.com/
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the research, AppFence served as a starting point for implementing the LPPMs
in the framework level. In this way, we ﬁrst ported the mechanisms that allowed
AppFence to obfuscate the location data to TaintDroid 4.3. Basically, in AppFence,
the location data is replaced by certain ﬁxed coordinates (-122.084026, 37.421265).
When a new location in received in AppFence, the regular work ﬂow from the
vanilla Android OS is interrupted by a call to the fakeLocation() method. This
method is responsible for replacing the newly received coordinates by the ﬁxed
coordinates described in the previous paragraph. Figure 5.4 shows the described
procedure in the vanilla Android OS and in AppFence.
(a) (b)
Figure 5.4: Image (a) shows the procedure followed every time new location coordinates are
received. Image (b) shows how AppFence interrupts the work ﬂow by calling the fakeLocation()
method.
There is another problem the AppFence team had to deal with. When a new
location is received, it is stored as the last known location before the callback method
onLocationChanged() is triggered. Consequently, even though AppFence obfuscates
the coordinates, if an application makes a call to the getLastKnownLocation()
method to retrieve the last known coordinates, those will not be obfuscated. To ﬁx
this issue, AppFence calls the fakeLocation() method before retrieving the location
data in the getLastKnownLocation() method.
Figure 5.5 shows the correct functionality of the AppFence code brought over
TaintDroid 4.3. In image (a) we can see how the coordinates 25.0 25.0 are emulated
through the geo fix command. Firstly, a telnet connection needs to be stablished.
Normally, the port that connects with the device or the emulator is set to 5554. Hence,
a telnet connection can be stablished with the telnet localhost 5554 command.
Later, with the geo fix command, which allows to set location coordinates emulating
the GPS behaviour, we set the (25.0, 25.0) coordinates which play the role of the
real coordinates. Image (b) shows how the interpreted coordinates by other LBAs
are the faked locations (-122.084026, 37.421265).
Although we took the implementations of AppFence as a basis, we saw that
the implemented mechanism to protect users’ location data was not feasible as it
turns LBAs into useless applications. Further, it is easy for a third-party server to
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(a) (b)
Figure 5.5: Image (a) shows how the telnet session is established and how the (25.00, 25.00)
coordinates are established with the geo fix command. Image (b) shows how Location Bases
Applications interpret the (-122.084026, 37.421265) coordinates
infer that the user’s location is being obfuscated. Therefore, in the next section, we
implement three diﬀerent LPPMs which allow users to protect their location data
while being able to take advantage of LBAs.
5.2.4 LPDroid
So far, we have introduced TaintDroid and AppFence. Basically, we have illustrated
how TaintDroid is capable of tracking users data and how AppFence provides several
mechanisms for obfuscating this data and block it in case of leakage. However,
AppFence is not available in the current version on Android. Furthermore, when
focusing on a concrete type of data, e.g. location data, the obfuscation mechanisms
implemented by AppFence are very limited.
In this section we will introduce LPDroid, a novel add-on to the AOSP. This
modiﬁcation allows that arbitrary LPPMs, if implemented, can be transparently
used by every mobile application and therefore provide a strong level of protection.
This is achieved by the implementation of a inter-level communication mechanism
that allows LPDroid users to communicate with the Android location framework
and control its behaviour. As a proof of work, we introduce three diﬀerent basic
location obfuscation strategies for protecting users’ location data.
User Level
To allow users communicate with the framework, we implemented an inter-level
communication mechanism through an Android application. The layout of the
application was designed to be clear and functional. It consists in a start/stop button
and a RadioGroup object to select the desired level of privacy. Figure 5.6 shows the
application’s layout.
Please note that the three implemented obfuscation strategies are trivial. Our
goal was to demonstrate that implementing LPPMs at the location framework was
feasible. However, the implementation of more sophisticated LPPMs such as the
ones described in Chapter 2 was not feasible in terms of time. We will address this
issue in Chapter 6. Although AppFence demonstrated that it is feasible to implement
LPPMs at the framework level, it was the ﬁrst time an inter-level communication
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mechanism was developed in order to allow LPDroid users to modify the behaviour
of the location framework.
(a) (b)
Figure 5.6: In image (a) we see the state of the application when the LPPMs are stopped. Image
(b) shows how, once the LPPMs are activated, the level of privacy can be selected.
Please remember from Chapter 3 that Android applications are sandboxed.
However, Android provides three diﬀerent mechanisms for allowing applications to
communicate: intents, binders or messengers, and broadcast receivers. Further, a
structured set of data can be shared amongst application using a content provider.
Content providers enable developers to encapsulate diﬀerent types of data, such as
telephone numbers, and provide mechanisms for deﬁning data security. For instance,
a content provider can specify a permission which will be required to access its data.
Establishing a communication process was unnecessary as far as sharing data
was a valid and an easier solution. Consequently, we deﬁned a ﬂag to determine
whether the LPPMs should be activated or not, and another ﬂag to determine the
desired level of privacy. We decided to work with integer type ﬂags. Consequently,
PRIVACY_ACTIVATED = 0 would mean that the LPPMs should not be used while
PRIVACY_ACTIVATED = 1 would activate them. Further, PRIVACY_LEVEL = 1, 2 or 3
would indicate the level of privacy low, medium or high respectively.
At this point we needed to decide whether we would create a new content provider
or use an existent one. One of the characteristics this content provider should have
is that it should be system-wide. As creating a new content provider is a rather
complex task, we decided to modify the Settings Provider, a system-wide content
provider, to include the mentioned ﬂags. Modifying the Settings Provider to include
the two integer-type ﬂags, required modifying the framework level. Hence, we will
address this issue in the Framework level section.
In the application, once the user selects an option, the corresponding ﬂag value
will be appropriately modiﬁed. This can be done by calling the putInt() method
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from the Settings class:
1 android.provider.Settings.System.putInt(getApplicationContext().getContentResolver(), android.
provider.Settings.System.PRIVACY_ACTIVATED, VALUE);
2 android.provider.Settings.System.putInt(getApplicationContext().getContentResolver(), android.
provider.Settings.System.PRIVACY_LEVEL, VALUE);
This code shows how for dealing with content providers we need to create
a ContentResolver object which, at the same time, requires to be aware of the
application’s context. Then, we just need to specify the ﬂag to be modiﬁed and its
new value.
Besides, our application stores the selected options even if the device is switched
oﬀ. So for instance, if a user always wants to have the LPPMs activated at the
highest level of privacy, the application will remember it. Moreover, the default level
of privacy is set to medium when the application is launched for the ﬁrst time. The
medium level was set as a default level for being a fair privacy level.
At the next step, we added the application to the AOSP in order to include it as
a system application. System applications are placed under /system/app folder in
an Android device. As this folder is a read-only folder, system applications cannot
be uninstalled. To include an application as a system application, we ﬁrst deﬁne
the Android.mk ﬁle of the application. Please note that the package name must be
correctly speciﬁed as it will be used in the next step. The .mk needs to be deﬁned as
follows:
LOCAL_PATH := $(call my-dir)
include $(CLEAR_VARS)
LOCAL_SRC_FILES := $(call all-java-ﬁles-under, src)
LOCAL_PACKAGE_NAME := LocationPrivacyProject
include $(BUILD_PACKAGE)
Secondly, we need to create a link inside the <ROOT>/packages/apps directory to
refer to our application folder. This link can be created through the ln-s<PATH\_TO\
_OUR\_APPLICATION\_FOLDER> command. Finally, in <ROOT>/build/target/prod-
uct/core.mk we added the package name of the application in the PRODUCT_PACKAGES
list.
When the application was ﬁnished we started the modiﬁcations at the Framework
level. The ﬁrst necessary modiﬁcation that we needed to do was to ﬁnd a way to
retrieve the values from the Settings provider into the Framework level. Then, once
we knew whether the user wants to use the tool and at which level, we would use the
corresponding obfuscation mechanisms. This will be addressed in the next section.
Framework Level
As explained in the previous sections, the only class from the Location framework
that was modiﬁed to implement LPDroid was the LocationManager class. As every
class, it contains the declaration of the necessary variables, the constructor and
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certain methods. It is important to notice that the constructor includes a Context
object of the LocationManager class. The Context class is an abstract class whose
implementation is provided in the AOSP. It allows access to application-speciﬁc
resources and classes, as well as up-calls for application-level operations such as
launching activities, broadcasting and receiving intents, etc. Although a Context is
normally related to applications, it can also be deﬁned for classes in the framework.
This point was crucial by the time of developing an inter-level communication
application. Without a Context, an instance of the ContentResolver class cannot be
created and, therefore, the ContentProviders’ content cannot be accessed.
Before implementing the mechanisms to access the Settings provider, we mod-
iﬁed it to incorporate the explained ﬂags. The Settings provider is located in
<ROOT>/frameworks/base/core/java/android/provider where we added the PRI-
VACY_ACTIVATED and the PRIVACY_LEVEL ﬂags.
Then, we proceeded to implement three diﬀerent obfuscation strategies. For the
lowest level we implemented a strategy that replaces the actual location by rounded
coordinates. For the medium level, the strategy replaces the coordinates by a ﬁxed
ones. Finally, for the highest level, the implemented strategy replaces the location
data by randomly generated coordinates.
The diﬀerent strategies were all implemented within the fakeLocation() method.
This method reads the ﬂags from the settings provider and determines whether it
should use a LPPM, if implemented, and, if yes, which one. To implement the
strategy in the lowest case, we simply cast the current location to convert it into
an integer value. The strategy from the medium was implemented by setting a
ﬁxed longitude and latitude values. Concretely, the ESAT department’s coordinates
(50.862346, 4.686362) were selected. Implementing this tool required 2 diﬀerent
steps. Firstly, we declare the ﬁxed coordinates. Secondly, we make a call to a
method for setting the ﬁxed coordinates as the actual coordinates. Finally, the
obfuscation strategy that generates random coordinates makes use of the a method
to generate random values for the latitude and the longitude. Please notice that to
check whether the LPPMs, if implemented, should be activated and which LPPM
should be used, the checkPrivacy() and checkPrivacyLevel() methods are used
to read the content provider’s ﬂags set from the application. We provide the source
code of the fakeLocation() method in the Appendix B.2.
We brought LPDroid ﬁrstly over TaintDroid and run it on an emulator. As a
proof of work, Figure 5.7 shows how the lowest level strategy works: when coordinates
(30.11, 30.11) are set, it only shows (30, 30).
As far as we wanted to test the obfuscation strategies in a real device, we brought
LPDroid directly over the vanilla Android 4.4.2. We check the correct functionality
of the three strategies using the OpenPaths application. Figure 5.8 shows the diﬀerent
eﬀects regarding to each one of the implemented obfuscation strategies. Image (a)
was taken as the reference path. Images (b), (c) and (d) show the coordinates that
were captured by the OpenPaths application when going over the same path with
the diﬀerent strategies activated. With the lowest level there is only one coordinate
shown as the path was not long enough to imply a change in the order of the units.
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(a) (b)
Figure 5.7: Lowest level obfuscation strategy working on the emulator. Image (a) shows how the
telnet connection is established and how the (30.11, 30.11) coordinates are set with the geo fix
command. Image (b) shows the coordinates read by the LBA.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 5.8: Diﬀerent obfuscation strategies working on the LG Nexus 5 device. Image (a) shows
the followed path. Image (b) shows the captured coordinates when following the same path with the
lowest level obfuscation strategy activated. Image (c) shows the captured coordinates when following
the same path with the medium level obfuscation strategy activated. Image (d) shows the captured
coordinates when following the same path with the high level obfuscation strategy activated
5.2.5 Conclusions
At this point of our research, we developed a novel add-on to the AOSP that paves
the way for future developers to implement arbitrary LPPMs and transparently
use them by any application. Although the obfuscation strategies implemented
are trivial, it shows how location data can be obfuscated preventing it from all
the mechanisms described in Section 5.4.1 to check whether the location has been
faked or not. Once the LPPMs are implemented in LPDroid, it is not necessary to
activate the "Allow mock locations" option in the Settings menu nor it is necessary
to declare the ALLOW_MOCK_LOCATIONS in the LPDroid application. Moreover, we
are not using Test providers and therefore the NMEA data remains as part of the
location meta-data.
Our work extends AppFence in the way that it provides a inter-level communica-
55
5. LPDroid: Application Transparent Protection of Location Data
tion mechanism which allows users communicate with the framework level and modify
its behaviour. Users could make use of our extended framework when TaintDroid
notiﬁes them of a location data leakage. Suppose that TaintDroid notiﬁes a user
that her location data is going to be sent towards a third-party server. Hence, the
user could decide to activate our LPPMs. Please notice that, in last instance, we are
relaying on TaintDroid to know whether our sensitive data is being leaked or not.
5.3 Lower Levels of the AOSP
So far, we know that TaintDroid can monitor every data leakage that occurs at the
Java level. This means that it can track not only third party applications but also the
Java portion of the Android OS. This means that if any mechanisms to steal sensitive
data were implemented in the lower levels (C/C++ coded levels), TaintDroid would
not be aware of them. According to Enk et al. [16], the the Android OS can be
trusted and therefore, no mechanisms that could steal sensitive data from the users
could be found in its basis.
In this work, we considered this assumption as dangerous and we studied what
happens at the lower levels. Hence, as described before, there remain two sections to
be analyzed: the Linux Kernel and the Hardware Support.
5.3.1 The Kernel and the HAL Layers
At the lowest level, the Android platform provides the security of the Linux kernel.
The Linux kernel itself has been in widespread use for years, and is used in millions of
environments. Through its history of constantly being enhanced, attacked, and ﬁxed
by thousands of developers, Linux has become a stable and secure kernel trusted
by many corporations and security professionals. Therefore, we can assume that
the Kernel is free from code that steals sensitive data from the users even with the
added "androidizms".
As explained in Chapter 3, the Android stack typically relies on drives provided by
manufacturers to interact with the hardware. This fact seriously limits our research:
a device manufacturer can create a basic driver that implements the minimum
mechanisms to control a certain component and make that driver available under
the General Public License (GPL). However, enhanced functionalities would be
implemented within a proprietary driver in the user space and will not be available
publicly. Consequently, sensitive data security threads could be implemented at this
point by the vendor and we would remain unaware. Investigating this issue would
require a lot of time as we should ﬁrst ﬁnd a way to access all the vendors’ drivers
and then analyse them. We will leave this analysis for the future work.
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Future Work
6.1 Improving 3Ov
3Ov is a static analysis tool capable of identifying over-privileges, studying the
increase of permissions due to the presence of third-party libraries and identifying
missing and mistaken permissions in Android applications. As seen in Chapter 4,
3Ov provides an upper and a lower bound for the number of over-privileges an
application has. When a certain permission (not required by the Application but
present in the manifest) is required by more than one third-party library and is
assumed as an over-privilege, it deﬁnes the upper bound. When it is not assumed as
an over-privilege, it deﬁnes the lower bound.
There is a way in which we could determine the exact number of over-privileges an
application has. To this end, we should evaluate each third-party library separately
and map its methods to certain Android permissions. In the end, we propose an
extension of the PScout tool capable of mapping third-party libraries rather than only
the AOSP. The implementation of this tool would require an extensive knowledge
of the diﬀerent third-party libraries. This fact rises several diﬃculties. Firstly, we
should be aware of all the third-party libraries present on the applications she is
about to analyse. This ﬁrst issue can be solved with the bash script provided with
3Ov (find3PLs.sh). Secondly, we should deﬁne a parser that searched for method
calls in the third-party libraries. Once a method call was identiﬁed, the parser
program should identify the Android API calls within that method. Hence, the
parser would be able to relate the method call with certain Android permissions. In
the end, the parser would come up with a list containing all the methods found in
the third-party library and their required permissions. Once we had a map between
all the third-party libraries’ methods and the Android permissions, we would create
method arrays to later identify those arrays within the application. In this way,
we would solve the problem of knowing whether an application will use one of the
methods from the third-party libraries that require a certain permission or not.
Finally, we would like to improve 3Ov to avoid it being so limited when analysing
obfuscated libraries. To this end, we should thoroughly study all the diﬀerent
obfuscation tools aimed to obfuscate Android applications. Therefore, we would
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know what is really happening under the hood when application developers obfuscate
their applications. Consequently, we would maybe be able to programmatically
classify the obfuscated libraries into one third-party library category.
6.2 Improving LPDroid
As mentioned in Chapter 5, the LPPMs implemented in the LPDroid framework
are trivial. Due to time constrains, we limited our research to demonstrate that the
implementation of LPPMs at the framework level is feasible. In future work, we
would like to enhance the LPPMs implemented in LPDroid. As described in Chapter
2, obfuscation-based LPPMs lower the quality of the location information. In order
to avoid that, LPPMs based on cryptographic primitives have been proposed in
the literature. However, we cannot rely on these crypto LPPMs as their require
a trusted service provider. Therefore, we would like to extend LPDroid with the
formal implementation of a diﬀerential privacy based LPPM. Such LPPMs appears
appear to be particularly suited, because they impose a rather small computational
overhead.
At this point, we would like to provide LPDroid with a former implementation of
a mechanism κ to achieve Geo-indistinguishability. In [36], Andres et al. introduce
this concept for the ﬁrst time. They propose a model where χ is a set of Points Of
Interests (POIs) and Z a set of possible reported values (for instance, values sent
through the network). Also, they assume an operational scenario of a user located at
x ∈ χ and communicating to the attacker a randomly selected location z ∈ Z. The
attacker’s side information can be modelled by a prior distribution π on χ, where
π(χ) is the probability assigned to the location x. Our mechanism κ should then be
a function for assigning to each location x ∈ χ a probability distribution on Z. This
mechanism κ satisﬁes -geo-indistinguishability iﬀ for all x, x′:
dP (κ(x), κ(x′)) ≤ d(x, x′) (6.1)
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Conclusion
As of May 2014, Android is the most popular smart-phone OS in the world being
present in the 79% of them. With Android an ever growing number of Android
applications have become essential for individuals’ daily life. These applications rely
on the usage of third-party libraries that extend the basic functionalities included in
the Android APIs. The usage of these third-party libraries leads Android developers
towards the necessity of declaring further permissions in the application’ manifest ﬁle.
Some of these permissions grant the applications with certain permissions to access
users’ sensitive data. The aim of this work was to show that Android applications
are over-privileged and, furthermore, illustrate how the usage of diﬀerent third-party
libraries leads towards the necessity of declaring diﬀerent permissions which can be
likelier to become an over-privilege under diﬀerent circumstances. If applications
were shown to be over-privileged, we needed to implement further mechanisms that
would allow Android users to protect their sensitive data.
In this work we have introduced 3Ov and LPDroid. The former is a static analysis
tool that inspects the increase of permissions due to the usage of third-party libraries
and the tendency to over-privilege applications. Further, it identiﬁes mistaken
permissions in Android applications and missing permissions in the manifest ﬁle. The
latter is a novel add-on to the AOSP which paves the way for future implementations
of LPPMs in Android systems.
We analysed a set A of 1126 Android applications and a subset B of 89 applications
with 3Ov. By inspecting the set A we identiﬁed the presence of 76 third-party libraries
not included in the Appbrain lists. Two libraries out of the 76 were Advertising
libraries while the other 74 were Development tools libraries. Further, we provided an
overview of the usage of third-party libraries in Android applications as of May 2014
observing that Facebook, Android supporting libraries and Goolge/Ads were the
most popular Social SDK, Development tools and Advertising libraries respectively.
By analysing set B we considered the deﬁnition of ﬁve diﬀerent heuristics to deﬁne the
term over-privilege. In all the situations, 3Ov identiﬁes the presence of over-privileges
in the analyzed applications.
In front of the results showed by 3Ov and the previous work stating the leakage
of data [10, 11], we implemented LPDroid. It is a novel add-on to the AOSP which
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allows arbitrary LPPMs, if implemented, to be transparently used by every mobile
application and therefore provide a strong level of protection. This is achieved by the
implementation of a inter-level communication mechanism that allows LPDroid users
to communicate with the Android location framework and control its behaviour. As
a proof of work, we introduce three diﬀerent basic location obfuscation strategies for
protecting users’ location data.
With this work we have shown the existence of over-privileges in Android applica-
tions that guarantee third-party libraries with access to users’ sensitive data. To the
best of our knowledge, it has been the ﬁrst time that the presence of over-privileges
has been analysed regarding the three diﬀerent third-party libraries categories. Fur-
ther, we have provided an overview of the most popular third-party libraries as of
May 2014. Also, we have studied the implications the usage of these libraries have in
terms of the declared permissions in the manifest ﬁle. Finally, we have shown that
the correct place to implement LPPMs is the location framework rather than with
applications and we have provided an add-on to the AOSP that sets the necessary
tools for doing that.
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Appendix A
Source Code of 3Ov
A.1 Crawling the applications
Following, we provide the modiﬁed version of Singh’s code for crawling the Google
Play market.
1 ’’’
2 Created on Aug 28, 2013
3 Modified on Feb 23, 2014
4
5 @author: anuvrat
6 @adaptation: roger_ribas
7
8 This script has been modified to only download information
9 for the current free applications in the Google Play market.
10
11 A part from that, it has been modified in order to work
12 with current applications information format.
13
14 ’’’
15
16 from bs4 import BeautifulSoup
17 import urllib.request
18 import urllib.parse
19 import codecs
20 import json
21 import pickle
22 from datetime import datetime
23
24 def loadState():
25 try:
26 state_file = open( "state_dump", "rb" )
27 apps_discovered = pickle.load( state_file )
28 apps_pending = pickle.load( state_file )
29 #apps_count = pickle.load( state_file )
30 state_file.close()
31 print( "Pending = ", len( apps_pending ), " Discovered = ", len( apps_discovered ) )
32 return apps_discovered, apps_pending
33 except IOError:
34 print( "A fresh start ..." )
35 return [], []
36
37 character_encoding = ’utf-8’
38 apps_discovered, apps_pending = loadState()
63
A. Source Code of 3Ov
39 count_offset = len( apps_discovered )
40
41 start_time = datetime.now()
42
43 def getPageAsSoup( url, post_values ):
44 if post_values:
45 data = urllib.parse.urlencode( post_values )
46 data = data.encode( character_encoding )
47 req = urllib.request.Request( url, data )
48 else:
49 req = url
50 try:
51 response = urllib.request.urlopen( req )
52 except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
53 print( "HTTPError with: ", url, "\t", e )
54 return None
55 the_page = response.read()
56 soup = BeautifulSoup( the_page )
57
58 return soup
59
60 def openResultFiles(all_categories):
61 fileHandlers = {}
62 for category in all_categories:
63 fileHandler = codecs.open( ’_’.join( ["apps", category.lower()] ), ’ab’,
character_encoding, buffering = 0 )
64 fileHandlers[category] = fileHandler
65 return fileHandlers
66
67 def closeResultFiles(fileHandlers):
68 for v in fileHandlers.values():
69 v.close()
70
71 def reportProgress():
72 current_time = datetime.now()
73 elapsed = current_time - start_time
74 v = ( ( len( apps_discovered ) - count_offset ) / elapsed.seconds ) * 60
75 t = len( apps_pending ) / v if v > 0 else 0
76 print( "Pending = ", len( apps_pending ), " Discovered = ", len( apps_discovered ), "
Velocity = ", str( v ), " apps per minute and time remaining in minutes = ", str( t )
)
77
78 def saveState():
79 state_file = open( "state_dump", "wb" )
80 pickle.dump( apps_discovered, state_file )
81 pickle.dump( apps_pending, state_file )
82 state_file.close()
83 reportProgress()
84
85 def getAppDetails(app_url):
86 if app_url in apps_discovered:
87 print( "Skip because already parsed: ", app_url )
88 return None
89
90 g_app_url = ’https://play.google.com’ + app_url
91 app_details = {}
92
93 app_details[’app_url’] = g_app_url
94
95 soup = getPageAsSoup( g_app_url, None )
96 if not soup: return None
97
98 apps_discovered.append( app_url )
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99
100 print( g_app_url )
101 print( "HOLA ESTIC A 3" )
102 title_div = soup.find( ’div’, {’class’:’document-title’} )
103 app_details[’title’] = title_div.find( ’div’ ).get_text().strip()
104
105 subtitle = soup.find( ’a’, {’class’ : ’document-subtitle primary’} )
106 app_details[’developer’] = subtitle.get_text().strip()
107 app_details[’developer_link’] = subtitle.get( ’href’ ).strip()
108
109 ###################MODIFICATION#################
110
111 # The code used to get stuck at this point, after removing it the code works
112
113 #price_buy_span = soup.find( ’span’, {’class’ : ’price buy’} )
114 #price = price_buy_span.find_all( ’span’ )[-1].get_text().strip()
115 #price = price[:-4].strip() if price != ’Install’ else ’Free’
116 #app_details[’price’] = price
117
118 rating_value_meta = soup.find( ’meta’, {’itemprop’ : ’ratingValue’} )
119 app_details[’rating’] = rating_value_meta.get( ’content’ ).strip()
120
121 reviewers_count_meta = soup.find( ’meta’, {’itemprop’ : ’ratingCount’} )
122 app_details[’reviewers’] = reviewers_count_meta.get( ’content’ ).strip()
123
124 num_downloads_div = soup.find( ’div’, {’itemprop’ : ’numDownloads’} )
125 if num_downloads_div: app_details[’downloads’] = num_downloads_div.get_text().strip()
126
127 date_published_div = soup.find( ’div’, {’itemprop’ : ’datePublished’} )
128 app_details[’date_published’] = date_published_div.get_text().strip()
129
130 operating_systems_div = soup.find( ’div’, {’itemprop’ : ’operatingSystems’} )
131 app_details[’operating_system’] = operating_systems_div.get_text().strip()
132
133 content_rating_div = soup.find( ’div’, {’itemprop’ : ’contentRating’} )
134 app_details[’content_rating’] = content_rating_div.get_text().strip()
135
136 category_span = soup.find( ’span’, {’itemprop’ : ’genre’} )
137 app_details[’category’] = category_span.get_text()
138
139 for dev_link in soup.find_all( ’a’, {’class’ : ’dev-link’} ):
140 if dev_link.get_text().strip() == "Email Developer":
141 app_details[’email’] = dev_link.get( ’href’ ).strip()[7:]
142 elif dev_link.get_text().strip() == "Visit Developer’s Website":
143 app_details[’dev_website’] = dev_link.get( ’href’ ).strip()
144
145 badge_span = soup.find( ’span’, {’class’ : ’badge-title’} )
146 if badge_span: app_details[’badge’] = badge_span.get_text().strip()
147
148 for more_apps in soup.find_all( ’div’, {’data-short-classes’ : ’card apps square-cover
tiny no-rationale’} ):
149 more_app_url = more_apps.find( ’a’, {’class’ : ’card-click-target’} ).get( ’href’ )
150 if more_app_url not in apps_discovered and more_app_url not in apps_pending:
apps_pending.append( more_app_url )
151 print( "DONE IT" )
152 return app_details
153
154 def getTopAppsData( url, start, num, app_type ):
155 values = {’start’ : start,
156 ’num’: num,
157 ’numChildren’:’0’,
158 ’ipf’: ’1’,
159 ’xhr’: ’1’}
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160 soup = getPageAsSoup( url, values )
161 if not soup: return [], []
162
163 apps = []
164 skipped_apps = []
165
166 ###################MODIFICATION#################
167
168 # If we don’t reference app_details in here we would get an error
169 app_details = {}
170 for div in soup.findAll( ’div’, {’class’ : ’details’} ):
171 title = div.find( ’a’, {’class’:’title’} )
172 try:
173 app_details = getAppDetails( title.get( ’href’ ) )
174 except AttributeError:
175 pass
176 if app_details: apps.append( app_details )
177 else: skipped_apps.append( title.get( ’href’ ) )
178
179 return apps, skipped_apps
180
181 def getApps( url ):
182 previous_apps = []
183 previous_skipped_apps = []
184 start_idx = 0
185 size = 100
186 while(True):
187 apps, skipped_apps = getTopAppsData( url, start_idx, size, app_type )
188 if apps == previous_apps and skipped_apps == previous_skipped_apps: break
189 for app in apps:
190 if app[’category’].upper() not in fileHandlers:
191 fileHandlers[app[’category’].upper()] = codecs.open( ’_’.join( ["apps", app[’
category’].lower()] ), ’ab’, character_encoding, buffering = 0 )
192 fileHandler = fileHandlers[app[’category’].upper()]
193 try:
194 fileHandler.write( json.dumps( app ) + "\n" )
195 except Exception as e:
196 print( e )
197 previous_apps = apps
198 previous_skipped_apps = skipped_apps
199 start_idx += size
200 saveState()
201
202 categories = [’BOOKS_AND_REFERENCE’, ’BUSINESS’, ’COMICS’, ’COMMUNICATION’, ’EDUCATION’, ’
ENTERTAINMENT’, ’FINANCE’, ’HEALTH_AND_FITNESS’, ’LIBRARIES_AND_DEMO’, ’LIFESTYLE’, ’
APP_WALLPAPER’, ’MEDIA_AND_VIDEO’, ’MEDICAL’, ’MUSIC_AND_AUDIO’, ’NEWS_AND_MAGAZINES’, ’
PERSONALIZATION’, ’PHOTOGRAPHY’, ’PRODUCTIVITY’, ’SHOPPING’, ’SOCIAL’, ’SPORTS’, ’TOOLS’,
’TRANSPORTATION’, ’TRAVEL_AND_LOCAL’, ’WEATHER’, ’ARCADE’, ’BRAIN’, ’CARDS’, ’CASUAL’, ’
GAME_WALLPAPER’, ’RACING’, ’SPORTS_GAMES’, ’GAME_WIDGETS’]
203
204 ###################MODIFICATION#################
205
206 #app_types = [’free’, ’paid’]
207
208 # We just want to take into account the free ones
209 app_types = [’free’]
210
211 fileHandlers = openResultFiles( categories )
212
213 for category, app_type in [( x, y ) for x in categories for y in app_types]:
214 print( "Type = ", app_type, " Cateory = ", category )
215 url = ’https://play.google.com/store/apps/category/’ + category + ’/collection/topselling_
’ + app_type
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216 getApps( url )
217
218 ###################MODIFICATION#################
219
220 #top_urls = [’https://play.google.com/store/apps/collection/topselling_paid_game’,
221 # ’https://play.google.com/store/apps/collection/topselling_free’,
222 # ’https://play.google.com/store/apps/collection/topselling_paid’,
223 # ’https://play.google.com/store/apps/collection/topgrossing’,
224 # ’https://play.google.com/store/apps/collection/topselling_new_paid_game’,
225 # ’https://play.google.com/store/apps/collection/topselling_new_free’,
226 # ’https://play.google.com/store/apps/collection/topselling_new_paid’]
227
228 # We just one to take into account the free ones
229 top_urls = [’https://play.google.com/store/apps/collection/topselling_free’,
230 ’https://play.google.com/store/apps/collection/topselling_new_free’,
231 ’https://play.google.com/store/apps/collection/topgrossing’]
232
233 for url in top_urls:
234 print( "Crawl collection - ", url )
235 getApps( url )
236
237 errorUrls = codecs.open(’_’.join(["apps", "error"]), ’ab’, character_encoding, buffering = 0)
238 count = 100
239 while apps_pending:
240 if count == 0:
241 saveState()
242 count = 100
243 count = count - 1
244
245 app = apps_pending.pop()
246 try:
247 app_data = getAppDetails( app )
248 except AttributeError:
249 pass
250 if not app_data:
251 continue
252 if app_data[’category’].upper() not in fileHandlers:
253 fileHandlers[app_data[’category’].upper()] = codecs.open( ’_’.join( ["apps", app_data[
’category’].lower()] ), ’ab’, character_encoding, buffering = 0 )
254 fileHandler = fileHandlers[app_data[’category’].upper()]
255 try:
256 fileHandler.write( json.dumps( app_data ) + "\n" )
257 except Exception as e:
258 print( e )
259
260 errorUrls.close()
261 print( ’Complete’ )
262 closeResultFiles( fileHandlers )
A.2 Downloading the applications
Once we had the list containing the 19 335 urls from the applications, we developed
the following Python-coded program to download the .apk ﬁles using the modi-
ﬁed Apkdownloader.crx extension. Notice that an email address (Gmail) and its
password must be added. Further, the phone’s ID number must also be speciﬁed.
Applications such as Device ID can be used to this end.
The code has been tested in a 10 Mbps internet connection. Hence, we set an
idle time of 1 minute every 5 downloads to avoid overtaking the limit number of
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simultaneous downloads. The idle time was empirically tested and set.
1 ’’’
2 Roger Ribas
3 roger.ribas90@gmail.com
4 Mar 27, 2014
5
6 This program automates the download of the 19335 application whose URLs
7 are stored in the file urls.txt
8
9 ’’’
10
11 from selenium import webdriver
12 from selenium.common.exceptions import TimeoutException
13 from selenium.webdriver.support.ui import WebDriverWait # available since 2.4.0
14 from selenium.webdriver.chrome.options import Options
15 import time
16
17 # Create an options object
18 chrome_options = Options()
19 # Create an option with our modified version of the APK downloader extension
20 chrome_options.add_extension("./apk-downloader-2 .0-test.crx")
21 # Create a new instance of the Chromium driver
22 driver = webdriver.Chrome(executable_path="./chromedriver",chrome_options=chrome_options)
23
24 # Setting the preferences of the APK downloader extension
25 print("Setting the preferences...")
26 driver.get("chrome-extension://kdlcoedfnbhajfpbiafnnkfojgipmlje/options.html")
27 inputElement1 = driver.find_element_by_id("user_email")
28 inputElement1.send_keys("YOUR_EMAIL")
29 inputElement2 = driver.find_element_by_id("user_password")
30 inputElement2.send_keys("YOUR_EMAIL_PASSWORD")
31 inputElement3 = driver.find_element_by_id("user_device_id")
32 inputElement3.send_keys("YOUR_PHONE_ID")
33
34 buttonElement = driver.find_element_by_id("btn_login")
35 buttonElement.click()
36 time.sleep(5)
37
38 #Bucle that iterates over the URLs file
39 print("Starting the downloading process")
40 downloadsCounter = 0
41 total = 17231
42 i = 0
43 f = open(’urls.txt’, ’rU’)
44 for line in f.readlines():
45 driver.get(line)
46 downloadsCounter = downloadsCounter + 1
47 i = i + 1
48 #we have to give some time to start the download
49 time.sleep(5)
50 #as the number of simultaneous downloads is limited we give 1 minute of time every 5
simultaneous downloads
51 if(i > 4):
52 print("Downloads: " + str(downloadsCounter) + ", Remaining: " + str(total -
downloadsCounter) + ", Percentage: " + str(downloadsCounter/total*100) + "%" )
53 time.sleep(60)
54 i = 0
55
56 if(downloadsCounter == total):
57 print( "All the apks have been downloaded: " + str(downloadsCounter))
58 else:
59 print( "Download finished with some missing applications. There should be: " + str(total) +
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", and there are: " + str(downloadsCounter))
60 driver.quit()
A.3 Parsing AOSP’s permissions
The following bash script parses the AOSP’s permissions ﬁles generated with
PScout. It generates a text ﬁle for each permission in which we can ﬁnd all the
method arrays from the methods that require the mentioned permission. Please
notice how the script includes the partial results within the methodpermissions
(method names), commaspermissions (number of variables), classpermissions
(class names), rtypepermissions (return type) and vtypepermissions (variables
type) directories. It displays the ﬁrst two method arrays for the ﬁrst two entries
from each permission.
1 #!/bin/bash
2
3 #
4 # Roger Ribas
5 # roger.ribas90@gmail.com
6 # 15th of April 2014
7 #
8 # In this script we are going to parse the output files from the
9 # PScout tool. Hence, we will create arrays containing 5 fields
10 # which will work as unique identifiers of a method.
11 #
12 # We are going to consider 5 heuristics:
13 # 1) The name of the method
14 # 2) The name of the class to which the method belongs
15 # 3) The number of arguments that are passed to the method
16 # 4) The type of variables that are passed to the method
17 # 5) The return type of the method
18 #
19
20 i=0
21 z=0
22 limit=0
23 methodcounter=0
24
25 mkdir ./permissions
26
27 for permission in ‘find /volume1/scratch/r0442265/pscout4.4/pscout_android_4_4_output/
Permissions_slashed -type f -name ’*.txt’‘
28 do
29 echo "Parsing $permission ..."
30 permissionname=‘echo $permission | awk -F"/" ’{print $NF}’‘
31 permissionnamewithouttxt=‘echo $permissionname | awk -F"." ’{print $1}’ ‘
32
33 mkdir ./permissions/$permissionnamewithouttxt
34 cd ./permissions/$permissionnamewithouttxt
35 mkdir methodspermissions
36 mkdir commaspermissions
37 mkdir classpermissions
38 mkdir rtypepermissions
39 mkdir vtypepermission
40 mkdir resultspermission
41
42
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43 # Gets the method name from the Permissions file
44 for line in ‘cat $permission | awk ’{print $3}’ | awk -F"(" ’{print $1}’‘
45 do
46 method=$line
47 methodsv[i]=$line
48 i=‘expr $i + 1‘
49 methodcounter=‘expr $methodcounter + 1‘
50 done
51 echo ${methodsv[@]} >> methodspermissions/methodspermissions.${permissionname}
52 i=0
53
54 # Gets the number of variables per method and gets the type of variables the longest
method has 16 variables so we we’ll check them all
55 IFS=$’\n’
56 for line in ‘cat $permission‘
57 do
58 wordcount=‘echo $line | awk -F"(" ’{print $2}’ | awk -F")" ’{print $1}’ | wc -w‘
59 if [ "$wordcount" -gt "$limit" ]; then
60 commas=‘echo $line | tr -cd "," | wc -c‘
61 commas=‘expr $commas + 1‘
62
63 arr=‘echo $line | awk -F"(" ’{print $2}’ | awk -F")" ’{print $1}’ | tr "," "\n"‘
64 for z in $arr
65 do
66 z=‘echo $z | awk -F"/" ’{print $NF}’‘
67 vtypev[i]+=" $z"
68 done
69 else
70 commas=0
71 fi
72 commasv[i]=$commas
73 i=‘expr $i + 1‘
74 done
75 echo ${commasv[@]} >> commaspermissions/commaspermissions.${permissionname}
76 echo ${vtypev[@]} >> vtypepermission/vtypetypespermission.${permissionname}
77 i=0
78 i=0
79
80 # Gets the class name where the method belongs
81 for line in ‘cat $permission | awk ’{print $1}’ | awk -F":" ’{print $1}’ | awk -F"<" ’{
print $2}’‘
82 do
83 class=$line
84 classv[i]=$class
85 i=‘expr $i + 1‘
86 done
87 echo ${classv[@]} >> classpermissions/classpermissions.${permissionname}
88 i=0
89
90 # Gets the return type of the method
91 for line in ‘cat $permission | awk ’{print $2}’ | awk -F"/" ’{print $NF}’‘
92 do
93 rtype=$line
94 rtypev[i]=$rtype
95 i=‘expr $i + 1‘
96 done
97 echo ${rtypev[@]} >> rtypepermissions/rtypepermissions.${permissionname}
98 i=0
99
100 methodcounter=‘expr $methodcounter - 1‘
101
102 while [[ $i -lt $methodcounter ]]
103 do
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104 echo "${methodsv[$i]} ${commasv[$i]} ${classv[$i]} ${rtypev[$i]} ${vtypev[$i]}" >>
resultspermission/resultspermission.${permissionname}
105 i=‘expr $i + 1‘
106 done
107 i=0
108 methodcounter=0
109
110 cd ..
111 cd ..
112
113 echo "
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
"
114 echo "${methodsv[0]} ${commasv[0]} ${classv[0]} ${rtypev[0]} ${vtypev[0]}"
115 echo "${methodsv[1]} ${commasv[1]} ${classv[1]} ${rtypev[1]} ${vtypev[1]}"
116 echo "
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
"
117
118 methodsv=()
119 commasv=()
120 classv=()
121 rtypev=()
122 vtypev=()
123
124 echo "done"
125 done
A.4 Reverse-engineering the applications
We developed a bash scrip program to automate the reverse-engineering process.
Further, it parses the permissions declared en each application’s Android Manifest
ﬁle. The scrip uses the Apktool to reverse-engineer the applications and then parses
the AndroidManifest.xml ﬁle looking for the <uses-permission> tag in order to
identify the permissions.
1 #!/bin/sh
2
3 #
4 # Roger Ribas
5 # roger.ribas90@gmail.com
6 # 7th of April 2014
7 #
8 # This script proceeds to reverse engineer each apk file found
9 # in the current directory. In order to do that we use the apktool
10 # which output the java files of the application in a readable smali
11 # format.
12 #
13 # Further, we analyze each app’s AndroidManifest.xml file to extract
14 # the permission this app requires at the installation time. The
15 # permissions shown in the output file are only those permissions
16 # defined in the Android API. Hence, we do not consider any permission
17 # defined by the user or by 3rdPLs.
18 #
19
20 counter1=0
21 counter2=0
22
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23 mkdir ./apktool/output
24
25 for file in *.apk
26 do
27 echo "Reverse engineering $file"
28 filename=‘echo $file | awk -F".apk" ’{print $1}’‘
29 java -jar /volume1/scratch/r0442265/Analysis/apktool.jar decode "$file" apktool/output/"
$filename"
30 counter1=‘expr $counter1 + 1‘
31 done
32 echo "Total number of apps reversed: $counter1"
33
34 cd ./apktool/output
35
36 for dir in ‘find -maxdepth 1 -type d‘
37 do
38 if [ "$dir" = "." ] || [ "$dir" = ./manifest ];then
39 continue
40 fi
41
42 filename=‘echo $dir | awk -F"/" ’{print $2}’‘
43
44 cd $dir
45
46 cat "AndroidManifest.xml" | grep "uses-permission" | grep "android.permission" | awk -F’"’
’{print $2}’ > AndroidManifest.txt
47 sort AndroidManifest.txt -o AndroidManifest.txt
48 counter2=‘expr $counter2 + 1‘
49
50 cd ..
51 done
52
53 echo "Total number of manifests analyzed: $counter2"
54
55 if [ "$counter1" -eq "$counter2" ];then
56 echo "All manifests parsed correctly"
57 else
58 echo "Not all the manifests were parsed correctly"
59 fi
A.5 Find third-party libraries
We analyzed the applications looking for third-party libraries that were not included
in the Appbrain lists. The following table shows the libraries we found. In some cases,
no further information about their purpose was found. Although they were seldom
used by the applications, we found that the Air library was used by 17 applications.
Name # Purpose Category
Acme/Serve 1 Java web server Development tools
afzkl/development 2 Color picker component for Android Development tools
air 17 In-app billing Adobe extension Development tools
amerisoft 1 Mobile applications development com-
pany
Development tools
anywheresoftware/b4a 1 Development environment for Android Development tools
balofo 1 Mobile applications development com-
pany
Development tools
biz/source_code 1 Base64 encoder/decoder class. There
is no Base64 encoder/decoder in the
standard Java SDK
Development tools
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BusinessObjects 1 Mobile applications development com-
pany
Development tools
com/ansca 1 Cross-platform development environ-
ment
Development tools
com/arthisoft 1 Mobile applications development com-
pany
Development tools
com/chenlb 1 General development tools Development tools
com/dexati 2 Mobile applications development com-
pany
Development tools
com/directtap 1 Development tools
com/doitﬂash 1 Android application builder Development tools
com/ﬀmpeg 1 FFmpeg support for Android Development tools
com/freshplanet 5 In-app purchase Development tools
com/github 1 Github support for Android Development tools
com/handlerexploit 1 Mobile applications development com-
pany
Development tools
com/ice 1 Ice for Android oﬀers support for de-
signing networked applications
Development tools
com/ironsource 2 Development environment for Android Development tools
com/isgmqlqdubhodykn 1 Development tools
com/jirbo 1 Mobile applications development com-
pany
Development tools
com/koushikdutta 1 Cyanogen’s developer own library Development tools
com/lsgvgames 1 Mobile applications development com-
pany
Development tools
com/madelephantstudios 1 Mobile applications development com-
pany
Development tools
com/magnetjoy 1 Mobile applications development com-
pany
Development tools
com/millennialmedia 1 Development environment for Android Development tools
com/mysql 1 SQLite support for Android Development tools
com/omniture 1 Adobe applications analysis and mar-
keting platform
Development tools
com/ormma 1 Open Rich Media Mobile Advertising
is an advertising library
Advertisement library
com/poqop 1 Unknown Android developer own li-
brary
Development tools
com/purplebrain 1 Mobile applications development com-
pany
Development tools
com/rabbit 3 Mobile applications development com-
pany
Development tools
com/rootsoft 1 Mobile applications development com-
pany
Development tools
com/samsungapps 1 Mobile applications development com-
pany
Development tools
com/smilerlee 1 Mobile applications development com-
pany
Development tools
com/soundtouch 2 SoundTouch source code package com-
piles SoundTouch source codes into An-
droid native library
Development tools
com/tinidream 1 Mobile applications development com-
pany
com/vtvcj 1 Development tools
com/wenbin 1 Unknown Android developer own li-
brary
Development tools
com/ylvwpqe 4 Development tools
com/zemariamm 1 Mobile applications development com-
pany
Development tools
com/pcsoft 1 Development environment for Android Development tools
com/mobi 1 Cross platform push messaging, appli-
cation promotion, in-application pur-
chasing and integrated analytics tools
Development tools
org/anddev 1 Android development community
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org/haxe 1 Cross-platform UI components Development tools
org/teleal 1 UPnP-compatible software stack for
Java environments
Development tools
ramadan 1 Development tools
androi 1 Mobile applications development com-
pany
Development tools
AndroView 1 Mobile applications development com-
pany
Development tools
aurelienribon 3 Aurelien Ribon’s own library Development tools
cmn 8 Mobile applications development com-
pany
Development tools
com/appboy 1 Development environment for Android Development tools
com/appﬂood 3 Development environment for Android Development tools
com/badlogic 4 Mobile applications development com-
pany
Development tools
com/coﬀrsra 2
com/eightbitmage 5 Development environment for Android Development tools
com/gamexc 1 Virus!
com/gblzllib 1 C/C++ support library Development tools
com/googlecode 1 It is a project to port Android open
source project to x86 platforms
Development tools
com/ivasionsoft 1 Mobile applications development com-
pany
Development tools
com/lyx 1 Mobile applications development com-
pany
Development tools
com/MASTAdView 1 Advertising library embedded in the
mOcean SDK for Android
Advertising libraries
com/planarsoft 1 Mobile applications development com-
pany
Development tools
com/playnomics 1 Development environment for Android Development tools
com/pleaserateus 1 Support library for rate-me-type dialog Development tools
com/squareup 1 Support libraries for Square Up devices Development tools
com/sun 1 Sun/Oracle support libraries Development tools
com/tremorvideo 1 Mobile applications development com-
pany
Development tools
imoblife 1 Mobile applications development com-
pany
Development tools
javax 1 JavaX support for Android devices Development tools
nanoxml 1 NanoXML support library for Android
devices
Development tools
net/rbgrn 1 Robert Green’s own library Development tools
org/libsdl 1 SDL support for Android devices Development tools
Table A.1: Shows the name of the found third-party libraries, the number of applications which
made use of these libraries, their aim and their category.
The following bash script analyzes the applications seeking for new third-party
libraries which are not present in the Appbrain lists.
1 #!/bin/sh
2
3 #
4 # Roger Ribas
5 # roger.ribas90@gmail.com
6 # 5th of May 2014
7 #
8 # This script finds all the 3rdPLs present in all the downloaded
9 # applications from the Google Play.
10 #
11
12 i=0
13 j=0
14 limit=0
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15 methodcounter=0
16 counter=0
17
18 IFS=$’\n’
19
20 for app in ‘find * -maxdepth 0 -type d‘
21 do
22 if [ "$app" = "manifest" ];then
23 continue
24 fi
25
26 cd $app
27
28 nameapp=‘pwd | awk -F"/" ’{print $NF}’‘
29 tmp1=‘echo $nameapp | awk -F"." ’{print $1,"/",$2}’‘
30 dirapp=‘echo $tmp1 | tr -d " "‘
31 echo $nameapp
32
33 cd smali
34
35 for dir in ‘find * -maxdepth 1 -type d‘
36 do
37 if [ "$dir" = "$dirapp" ];then
38 continue
39 fi
40
41 dirname="Directory: $dir"
42 echo $dirname >> /volume1/scratch/r0442265/Analysis/apktool/output/$nameapp/results3pls.
txt
43
44 for pl in ‘cat /volume1/scratch/r0442265/Analysis/apktool/adlibraries.txt‘
45 do
46 tmp=‘echo "$dir" | grep -c -i -F "$pl"‘
47 counterpartial1=‘expr $counterpartial1 + $tmp‘
48 counter1=‘expr $counter1 + $tmp‘
49 tmp=0
50 done
51
52 for pl in ‘cat /volume1/scratch/r0442265/Analysis/apktool/developmenttools.txt‘
53 do
54 tmp=‘echo "$dir" | grep -c -i -F "$pl"‘
55 counterpartial2=‘expr $counterpartial2 + $tmp‘
56 counter2=‘expr $counter2 + $tmp‘
57 tmp=0
58 done
59
60 for pl in ‘cat /volume1/scratch/r0442265/Analysis/apktool/socialsdks.txt‘
61 do
62 tmp=‘echo "$dir" | grep -c -i -F "$pl"‘
63 counterpartial3=‘expr $counterpartial3 + $tmp‘
64 counter3=‘expr $counter3 + $tmp‘
65 tmp=0
66 done
67
68 if [ $counterpartial1 -eq 0 ] || [ $counterpartial2 -eq 0 ] || [ $counterpartial3 -eq 0
];then
69 echo $dirname >> /volume1/scratch/r0442265/Analysis/apktool/output/new3PLs.txt
70 fi
71 done
72
73 echo "Number of AdLibraries found: $counterpartial1" >> /volume1/scratch/r0442265/Analysis/
apktool/output/$nameapp/results3pls.txt
74 echo "Number of Support Libraries found: $counterpartial2" >> /volume1/scratch/r0442265/
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Analysis/apktool/output/$nameapp/results3pls.txt
75 echo "Number of Social sdks found: $counterpartial3" >> /volume1/scratch/r0442265/Analysis/
apktool/output/$nameapp/results3pls.txt
76
77 counterpartial1=0
78 counterpartial2=0
79 counterpartial3=0
80
81 cd ..
82 cd ..
83 done
84
85 echo "Number of AdLibraries found: $counter1" >> /volume1/scratch/r0442265/Analysis/
apktool/output/results3pls.txt
86 echo "Number of Support Libraries found: $counter2" >> /volume1/scratch/r0442265/Analysis/
apktool/output/results3pls.txt
87 echo "Number of Social sdks found: $counter3" >> /volume1/scratch/r0442265/Analysis/
apktool/output/results3pls.txt
A.6 Parsing and analyzing the applications
The following bash script parses the .smali ﬁles from the reverse-engineered applica-
tions and creates the method arrays. This method arrays will be stored in text ﬁles
which will be classiﬁed depending on their category. Notice how the translation of
the return variables type and the argument variables type into the standard format
is done here.
1 #!/bin/bash
2
3 #
4 # Roger Ribas
5 # roger.ribas90@gmail.com
6 # 15th of April 2014
7 #
8 # This script parses the smali files of each application and
9 # creates vectors containing the 5 heuristics. Then, we will
10 # try to find for equivalences between the vectors from the
11 # permission files and the ones created here. If there is a
12 # matching, it will mean that this application needs that
13 # permission.
14 #
15 # We are going to consider 5 heuristics:
16 # 1) The name of the method
17 # 2) The name of the class to which the method belongs
18 # 3) The number of arguments that are passed to the method
19 # 4) The type of variables that are passed to the method
20 # 5) The return type of the method
21 #
22
23 i=0
24 j=0
25 limit=0
26 methodcounter=0
27 counter=0
28
29 IFS=$’\n’
30
31 for app in ‘find ./output -maxdepth 1 -type d‘
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32 do
33 if [ "$app" = "./output/manifest" ] || [ "$app" = "./output" ];then
34 continue
35 fi
36
37 cd $app
38
39 nameapp=‘pwd | awk -F"/" ’{print $NF}’‘
40 tmp1=‘echo $nameapp | awk -F"." ’{print $1,"/",$2}’‘
41 dirapp=‘echo $tmp1 | tr -d " "‘
42
43 mkdir resultssmaliapp
44 mkdir resultssmaliadlibraries
45 mkdir resultssmalidevelopmenttools
46 mkdir resultssmalisocialsdks
47 mkdir resultssmaliothers
48
49 for smali in ‘find * -type f -name ’*.smali’‘
50 do
51 tmp2=‘echo $smali | awk -F"smali/" ’{print $2}’ | awk -F"/" ’{print $1,"/",$2}’‘
52 currentdir=‘echo $tmp2 | tr -d " "‘
53 echo $currentdir
54 echo $dirapp
55 echo "Parsing $smali ..."
56 smaliname=‘echo $smali | awk -F"/" ’{print $NF}’‘
57 smalinamewithoutsmali=‘echo $smaliname | awk -F"." ’{print $1}’ ‘
58
59 # Gets the method name from the Smali file
60 for line in ‘cat $smali | grep "invoke" | awk -F"->" ’{print $2}’ |awk -F"(" ’{print $1
}’‘
61 do
62 name=$line
63 methodsv[i]=$line
64 i=‘expr $i + 1‘
65 methodcounter=‘expr $methodcounter + 1‘
66 done
67 i=0
68
69 # Gets the number of variables per method and the package type of variables
70 for line in ‘cat $smali | grep "invoke"‘
71 do
72 wordcount=‘echo $line | awk -F"(" ’{print $2}’ | awk -F")" ’{print $1}’ | wc -w‘
73 if [ "$wordcount" -gt "$limit" ];then
74 semicolumn=‘echo $line | awk -F"(" ’{print $2}’ | awk -F")" ’{print $1}’ | tr -cd
";" | wc -c‘
75 if [ "$semicolumn" -eq "$limit" ];then
76 uppercaseletters=‘echo $line | awk -F"(" ’{print $2}’ | awk -F")" ’{print $1}’ |
tr -cd "[:upper:]" | wc -c‘
77 semicolumn=$uppercaseletters
78 fi
79
80 arr=‘echo $line | awk -F"(" ’{print $2}’ | awk -F")" ’{print $1}’ | tr ";" "\n"‘
81 for z in $arr
82 do
83 if [ "$z" = "V" ];then
84 z="void"
85 semicolumn=‘expr $semicolumn + 1‘
86 elif [ "$z" = "I" ];then
87 z="int"
88 semicolumn=‘expr $semicolumn + 1‘
89 elif [ "$z" = "C" ];then
90 z="char"
91 semicolumn=‘expr $semicolumn + 1‘
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92 elif [ "$z" = "Z" ];then
93 z="boolean"
94 semicolumn=‘expr $semicolumn + 1‘
95 elif [ "$z" = "B" ];then
96 z="byte"
97 semicolumn=‘expr $semicolumn + 1‘
98 elif [ "$z" = "S" ];then
99 z="short"
100 semicolumn=‘expr $semicolumn + 1‘
101 elif [ "$z" = "J" ];then
102 z="long"
103 semicolumn=‘expr $semicolumn + 1‘
104 elif [ "$z" = "F" ];then
105 z="float"
106 semicolumn=‘expr $semicolumn + 1‘
107 elif [ "$z" = "D" ];then
108 z="double"
109 semicolumn=‘expr $semicolumn + 1‘
110 elif [ "$z" = "VV" ];then
111 z="void void"
112 semicolumn=‘expr $semicolumn + 1‘
113 elif [ "$z" = "II" ];then
114 z="int int"
115 elif [ "$z" = "CC" ];then
116 z="char char"
117 elif [ "$z" = "ZZ" ];then
118 z="boolean boolean"
119 elif [ "$z" = "BB" ];then
120 z="byte byte"
121 elif [ "$z" = "SS" ];then
122 z="short short"
123 elif [ "$z" = "JJ" ];then
124 z="long long"
125 elif [ "$z" = "FF" ];then
126 z="float float"
127 elif [ "$z" = "DD" ];then
128 z="double double"
129 fi
130 z=‘echo $z | awk -F"/" ’{print $NF}’‘
131 vtypev[i]+=" $z"
132 done
133
134 else
135 semicolumn=0
136 fi
137 commasv[i]=$semicolumn
138 i=‘expr $i + 1‘
139 done
140 i=0
141
142 # Gets the class package name where the method belongs
143 for line in ‘cat $smali | grep "invoke" | awk -F"," ’{print $NF}’ | awk -F";" ’{print $1
}’ | awk -F" L" ’{print $2}’‘
144 do
145 classes=$line
146 classv[i]=$classes
147 i=‘expr $i + 1‘
148 done
149 i=0
150
151 # Gets the return type package of the method
152 for line in ‘cat $smali | grep "invoke" | awk -F")" ’{print $2}’ | awk -F";" ’{print $1
}’‘
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153 do
154 types=$line
155 if [ "$types" = "V" ];then
156 types="void"
157 elif [ "$types" = "I" ];then
158 types="int"
159 elif [ "$types" = "C" ];then
160 types="char"
161 elif [ "$types" = "Z" ];then
162 types="boolean"
163 elif [ "$types" = "B" ];then
164 types="byte"
165 elif [ "$types" = "S" ];then
166 types="short"
167 elif [ "$types" = "J" ];then
168 types="long"
169 elif [ "$types" = "F" ];then
170 types="float"
171 elif [ "$types" = "D" ];then
172 types="double"
173 else
174 types=‘echo $line | awk -F"/" ’{print $NF}’‘
175 fi
176 rtypev[i]=$types
177 i=‘expr $i + 1‘
178 done
179 i=0
180
181 # Decides whether it is a support library file, a social network library file or an
AdLibrary file
182 filename="adlibraries"
183 for pl in ‘cat /volume1/scratch/r0442265/Analysis/apktool/adlibraries.txt‘
184 do
185 tmp=‘echo "$currentdir" | grep -c -i -F "$pl"‘
186 counter1=‘expr $counter1 + $tmp‘
187 tmp=0
188 done
189 if [ $counter1 -gt 0 ];then
190 outdir=$filename
191 fi
192
193 filename="developmenttools"
194 for pl in ‘cat /volume1/scratch/r0442265/Analysis/apktool/developmenttools.txt‘
195 do
196 tmp=‘echo "$currentdir" | grep -c -i -F "$pl"‘
197 counter2=‘expr $counter2 + $tmp‘
198 tmp=0
199 done
200 if [ $counter2 -gt 0 ];then
201 outdir=$filename
202 fi
203
204 filename="socialsdks"
205 for pl in ‘cat /volume1/scratch/r0442265/Analysis/apktool/socialsdks.txt‘
206 do
207 tmp=‘echo "$currentdir" | grep -c -i -F "$pl"‘
208 counter3=‘expr $counter3 + $tmp‘
209 tmp=0
210 done
211 if [ $counter3 -gt 0 ];then
212 outdir=$filename
213 fi
214
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215 if [ $counter1 -eq 0 ] && [ $counter2 -eq 0 ] && [ $counter3 -eq 0 ];then
216 outdir="others"
217 fi
218 counter1=0
219 counter2=0
220 counter3=0
221
222 while [[ $i -lt $methodcounter ]]
223 do
224 if [ "$currentdir" = "$dirapp" ];then
225 echo "${methodsv[$i]} ${commasv[$i]} ${classv[$i]} ${rtypev[$i]} ${vtypev[$i]}" >>
./resultssmaliapp/resultssmaliapp.${smalinamewithoutsmali}.txt
226 else
227 echo "${methodsv[$i]} ${commasv[$i]} ${classv[$i]} ${rtypev[$i]} ${vtypev[$i]}" >>
./resultssmali$outdir/resultssmali3rd.${smalinamewithoutsmali}.txt
228 fi
229 i=‘expr $i + 1‘
230 done
231 i=0
232 methodcounter=0
233
234 echo "
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
"
235 echo "${methodsv[0]} ${commasv[0]} ${classv[0]} ${rtypev[0]} ${vtypev[0]}"
236 echo "${methodsv[1]} ${commasv[1]} ${classv[1]} ${rtypev[1]} ${vtypev[1]}"
237 echo "
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
"
238
239 methodsv=()
240 commasv=()
241 classv=()
242 rtypev=()
243 vtypev=()
244
245 echo "done"
246 echo ""
247 done
248
249 cd ..
250 cd ..
251 done
A.7 Generating the Android Manifest ﬁles
Next, we introduce the script used to compare the method arrays from the applications
with the method arrays from the permissions. Notice how we excluded the R-type
ﬁles from the applications to avoid analyzing them. R-type ﬁles, such as R$layout
or R$menu, are automatically generated by the builder and they do not belong to the
application.
1 #!/bin/bash
2
3 #
4 # Roger Ribas
5 # roger.ribas@gmail.com
6 # 28th April 2014
80
A.7. Generating the Android Manifest ﬁles
7 #
8 # This script tries to find each method in the permission
9 # files in the application.
10 #
11 # We will distinguish between the code which belongs to the application
12 # itself and the code that belongs to the added 3rdPLs: AdLibraries,
13 # Development Tools, Social SDKs and Others.
14 #
15 # Finally it generates a GeneratedManifest file for each category: The
16 # 3rdPLs and the Application.
17 #
18
19 counter1=0
20 counter2=0
21 counter3=0
22 counter4=0
23 counter5=0
24
25
26 IFS=$’\n’
27
28 for app in ‘find * -maxdepth 0 -type d‘
29 do
30 echo "Application: $app"
31 if [ "$app" = "manifest" ];then
32 continue
33 fi
34
35 for permission in ‘find /dev/shm/Analysis/apktool/permissions -type f -name ’
resultspermission.*.txt’‘
36 do
37 echo "Checking $permission ..."
38 permissionname=‘echo $permission | awk -F"/" ’{print $NF}’‘
39 permissionnamewithouttxt=‘echo $permissionname | awk -F"." ’{print $2}’‘
40
41 IFS=$’\n’
42 for line in ‘cat $permission‘
43 do
44 echo "Looking for $line in App files from $app"
45 for smali in ‘find /dev/shm/Analysis/apktool/output/$app/resultssmaliapp -type f -
name "*.txt"‘
46 do
47 smaliname=‘echo $smali | awk -F".txt" ’{print $1}’ | awk -F"." ’{print $NF}’‘
48 if [ $smaliname = ’R$attr’ ] || [ $smaliname = ’R$bool’ ] || [ $smaliname = ’
R$dimen’ ] || [ $smaliname = ’R$drawable’ ] || [ $smaliname = ’R$id’ ] || [
$smaliname = ’R$layout’ ] || [ $smaliname = ’R$menu’ ] || [ $smaliname = ’
R$string’ ] || [ $smaliname = ’R$style’ ];then
49 continue
50 fi
51 tmp1=‘grep -i -c -F "$line" $smali‘
52 counter1=‘expr $counter1 + $tmp1‘
53 tmp1=0
54 grep -i -F "$line" $smali >> ./$app/methodsresultapp.txt
55 done
56
57 echo "Looking for $line in AdLibraries files from $app"
58 for smali in ‘find /dev/shm/Analysis/apktool/output/$app/resultssmaliadlibraries -
type f -name "*.txt"‘
59 do
60 tmp2=‘grep -i -c -F "$line" $smali‘
61 counter2=‘expr $counter2 + $tmp2‘
62 tmp2=0
63 grep -i -F "$line" $smali >> ./$app/methodsresultadlibraries.txt
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64 done
65
66 echo "Looking for $line in SupportLibraries files from $app"
67 for smali in ‘find /dev/shm/Analysis/apktool/output/$app/resultssmalidevelopmenttools
-type f -name "*.txt"‘
68 do
69 tmp3=‘grep -i -c -F "$line" $smali‘
70 counter3=‘expr $counter3 + $tmp3‘
71 tmp3=0
72 grep -i -F "$line" $smali >> ./$app/methodsresultdevelopmenttools.txt
73 done
74
75 echo "Looking for $line in SocialLibraries files from $app"
76 for smali in ‘find /dev/shm/Analysis/apktool/output/$app/resultssmalisocialsdks -type
f -name "*.txt"‘
77 do
78 tmp4=‘grep -i -c -F "$line" $smali‘
79 counter4=‘expr $counter4 + $tmp4‘
80 tmp4=0
81 grep -i -F "$line" $smali >> ./$app/methodsresultsocialsdks.txt
82 done
83
84 echo "Looking for $line in Others files from $app"
85 for smali in ‘find /dev/shm/Analysis/apktool/output/$app/resultssmaliothers -type f -
name "*.txt"‘
86 do
87 tmp5=‘grep -i -c -F "$line" $smali‘
88 counter5=‘expr $counter5 + $tmp5‘
89 tmp5=0
90 grep -i -F "$line" $smali >> ./$app/methodsresultothers.txt
91 done
92 done
93
94 echo $counter1
95 echo $counter2
96 echo $counter3
97 echo $counter4
98 echo $counter5
99
100 echo "" >> ./$app/GeneratedManifestApp.txt
101 echo "" >> ./$app/GeneratedManifestadlibraries.txt
102 echo "" >> ./$app/GeneratedManifestdevelopmenttools.txt
103 echo "" >> ./$app/GeneratedManifestsocialsdks.txt
104 echo "" >> ./$app/GeneratedManifestothers.txt
105
106 if [ $counter1 -gt 0 ];then
107 echo "android.permission.$permissionnamewithouttxt" >> ./$app/GeneratedManifestApp.
txt
108 fi
109 counter1=0
110
111 if [ $counter2 -gt 0 ];then
112 echo "android.permission.$permissionnamewithouttxt" >> ./$app/
GeneratedManifestadlibraries.txt
113 fi
114 counter2=0
115
116 if [ $counter3 -gt 0 ];then
117 echo "android.permission.$permissionnamewithouttxt" >> ./$app/
GeneratedManifestdevelopmenttools.txt
118 fi
119 counter3=0
120
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121 if [ $counter4 -gt 0 ];then
122 echo "android.permission.$permissionnamewithouttxt" >> ./$app/
GeneratedManifestsocialsdks.txt
123 fi
124 counter4=0
125 if [ $counter5 -gt 0 ];then
126 echo "android.permission.$permissionnamewithouttxt" >> ./$app/GeneratedManifestothers.
txt
127 fi
128 counter5=0
129 done
130
131 echo "All permissions correctly analyzed"
132 echo "--------------------------------------"
133 done
A.8 Discussion
The following bash script was used to analyze the Generated Manifest ﬁles. It outputs
the unnecessary permissions present in each application as well as its over-privileges.
Finally, it presents the total number of unnecessary permissions and over-privileges
found in all the applications.
1 #!/bin/bash
2 #
3 # Roger Ribas
4 # roger.ribas90@gmail.com
5 # 6th of May 2014
6 #
7 # This script analyses the output results of the Compare script.
8 # It counts the number of Over-privileges as well as the number
9 # of Unecessary permissions.
10 #
11
12 IFS=$’\n’
13
14 counter=0
15 counter2=0
16 counter3=0
17 counter4=0
18 tmp=0
19
20 echo "" > ResultsNameUnecessary.txt
21 echo "" > ResultsNumbersUnecessary.txt
22
23 echo "" > ResultsNameMissing.txt
24 echo "" > ResultsNumbersMissing.txt
25
26 echo "" > ResultsNameOverLowDev.txt
27 echo "" > ResultsNameOverUpDev.txt
28 echo "" > ResultsNumbersOverLowDev.txt
29 echo "" > ResultsNumbersOverUpDev.txt
30
31 echo "" > ResultsNameOverLowAd.txt
32 echo "" > ResultsNameOverUpAd.txt
33 echo "" > ResultsNumbersOverLowAd.txt
34 echo "" > ResultsNumbersOverUpAd.txt
35
36 echo "" > ResultsNameOverLowSoc.txt
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37 echo "" > ResultsNameOverUpSoc.txt
38 echo "" > ResultsNumbersOverLowSoc.txt
39 echo "" > ResultsNumbersOverUpSoc.txt
40
41 echo "" > ResultsNameAllThirdParty.txt
42 echo "" > ResultsNumbersAllThirdParty.txt
43
44 for dir in ‘find -maxdepth 1 -type d‘
45 do
46 if [ "$dir" = "." ] || [ "$dir" = ./manifest ];then
47 continue
48 fi
49
50 cd $dir
51
52 # Joins the AdLibraries’ permissions with the Social SDKs
53 # permissions.
54 cat GeneratedManifestadlibraries.txt >> tmp.txt
55 cat GeneratedManifestsocialsdks.txt >> tmp.txt
56 awk ’!x[$0]++’ tmp.txt > Ad_SocialSdks.txt
57 rm tmp.txt
58 sort Ad_SocialSdks.txt -o Ad_SocialSdks.txt
59 sed ’/^$/d’ Ad_SocialSdks.txt > Ad_SocialSdksDef.txt
60 rm Ad_SocialSdks.txt
61
62 # Joins the DevLibraries’ permissions with the Social SDKs
63 # permissions.
64 cat GeneratedManifestdevelopmenttools.txt >> tmp.txt
65 cat GeneratedManifestsocialsdks.txt >> tmp.txt
66 awk ’!x[$0]++’ tmp.txt > Dev_SocialSdks.txt
67 rm tmp.txt
68 sort Dev_SocialSdks.txt -o Dev_SocialSdks.txt
69 sed ’/^$/d’ Dev_SocialSdks.txt > Dev_SocialSdksDef.txt
70 rm Dev_SocialSdks.txt
71
72 # Joins the DevLibraries’ permissions with the AdLibraries’s
73 # permissions.
74 cat GeneratedManifestdevelopmenttools.txt >> tmp.txt
75 cat GeneratedManifestadlibraries.txt >> tmp.txt
76 awk ’!x[$0]++’ tmp.txt > Dev_Ad.txt
77 rm tmp.txt
78 sort Dev_Ad.txt -o Dev_Ad.txt
79 sed ’/^$/d’ Dev_Ad.txt > Dev_AdDef.txt
80 rm Dev_Ad.txt
81
82 # Joins all the third party libraries
83 cat GeneratedManifestdevelopmenttools.txt >> tmp.txt
84 cat GeneratedManifestadlibraries.txt >> tmp.txt
85 cat GeneratedManifestsocialsdks.txt >> tmp.txt
86 cat GeneratedManifestothers.txt >> tmp.txt
87 awk ’!x[$0]++’ tmp.txt > allthird.txt
88 rm tmp.txt
89 sort allthird.txt -o allthird.txt
90 sed ’/^$/d’ allthird.txt > allthirdDef.txt
91 rm allthird.txt
92
93 echo "" > ResultsUnecessary.txt
94 echo "" > ResultsMissing.txt
95 echo "" > ResultsOverLowDev.txt
96 echo "" > ResultsOverUpDev.txt
97 echo "" > ResultsOverLowAd.txt
98 echo "" > ResultsOverUpAd.txt
99 echo "" > ResultsOverLowSoc.txt
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100 echo "" > ResultsOverUpSoc.txt
101 echo "" > ResultsAllThirdParty.txt
102
103 # If a permission required by the application is not present
104 # in the manifest we have a missing permission.
105 for line in ‘cat GeneratedManifestApp.txt‘
106 do
107 counter1=‘cat AndroidManifest.txt | grep -i -c "$line"‘
108
109 if [ $counter1 -eq 0 ];then
110 echo "Missing permission: $line" >> ResultsMissing.txt
111 fi
112 done
113
114 counter1=0
115
116 # A permission present in Dev
117 for line in ‘cat GeneratedManifestdevelopmenttools.txt‘
118 do
119 counter2=‘cat AndroidManifest.txt | grep -i -c "$line"‘
120 if [ $counter2 -gt 0 ];then
121 counter3=‘cat GeneratedManifestApp.txt | grep -i -c "$line"‘
122 if [ $counter3 -eq 0 ];then
123 counter4=‘cat Ad_SocialSdksDef.txt | grep -i -c "$line"‘
124 if [ $counter4 -eq 0 ];then
125 echo "OverLow: $line" >> ResultsOverLowDev.txt
126 else
127 echo "OverUp: $line" >> ResultsOverUpDev.txt
128 fi
129 fi
130 fi
131 done
132 counter2=0
133 counter3=0
134 counter4=0
135
136 # A permission present in Ad
137 for line in ‘cat GeneratedManifestadlibraries.txt‘
138 do
139 counter2=‘cat AndroidManifest.txt | grep -i -c "$line"‘
140 if [ $counter2 -gt 0 ];then
141 counter3=‘cat GeneratedManifestApp.txt | grep -i -c "$line"‘
142 if [ $counter3 -eq 0 ];then
143 counter4=‘cat Dev_SocialSdksDef.txt | grep -i -c "$line"‘
144 if [ $counter4 -eq 0 ];then
145 echo "OverLow: $line" >> ResultsOverLowAd.txt
146 else
147 echo "OverUp: $line" >> ResultsOverUpAd.txt
148 fi
149 fi
150 fi
151 done
152 counter2=0
153 counter3=0
154 counter4=0
155
156 # A permission present in Soc
157 for line in ‘cat GeneratedManifestsocialsdks.txt‘
158 do
159 counter2=‘cat AndroidManifest.txt | grep -i -c "$line"‘
160 if [ $counter2 -gt 0 ];then
161 counter3=‘cat GeneratedManifestApp.txt | grep -i -c "$line"‘
162 if [ $counter3 -eq 0 ];then
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163 counter4=‘cat Dev_AdDef.txt | grep -i -c "$line"‘
164 if [ $counter4 -eq 0 ];then
165 echo "OverLow: $line" >> ResultsOverLowSoc.txt
166 else
167 echo "OverUp: $line" >> ResultsOverLowSoc.txt
168 fi
169 fi
170 fi
171 done
172 counter2=0
173 counter3=0
174 counter4=0
175
176 # A permission present in total
177 for line in ‘cat allthirdDef.txt‘
178 do
179 counter2=‘cat AndroidManifest.txt | grep -i -c "$line"‘
180 if [ $counter2 -gt 0 ];then
181 counter3=‘cat GeneratedManifestApp.txt | grep -i -c "$line"‘
182 if [ $counter3 -eq 0 ];then
183 echo "Over: $line" >> ResultsAllThirdParty.txt
184 fi
185 fi
186 done
187 counter2=0
188 counter3=0
189 counter4=0
190
191 sort ResultsUnecessary.txt -o ResultsUnecessary.txt
192 sort ResultsMissing.txt -o ResultsMissing.txt
193
194 sort ResultsAllThirdParty.txt -o ResultsAllThirdParty.txt
195
196 sort ResultsOverLowDev.txt -o ResultsOverLowDev.txt
197 cat ResultsOverLowDev.txt >> ResultsOverUpDev.txt
198 sort ResultsOverUpDev.txt -o ResultsOverUpDev.txt
199
200 sort ResultsOverLowAd.txt -o ResultsOverLowAd.txt
201 cat ResultsOverLowAd.txt >> ResultsOverUpAd.txt
202 sort ResultsOverUpAd.txt -o ResultsOverUpAd.txt
203
204 sort ResultsOverLowSoc.txt -o ResultsOverLowSoc.txt
205 cat ResultsOverLowSoc.txt >> ResultsOverUpSoc.txt
206 sort ResultsOverUpSoc.txt -o ResultsOverUpSoc.txt
207
208
209 for ln in ‘cat ResultsUnecessary.txt‘
210 do
211 echo $ln >> ../ResultsNameUnecessary.txt
212 tmp=‘echo $ln | grep -c "Unecessary"‘
213 counter5=‘expr $counter5 + $tmp‘
214 tmp=0
215 done
216
217 for ln in ‘cat ResultsMissing.txt‘
218 do
219 echo $ln >> ../ResultsNameMissing.txt
220 tmp=‘echo $ln | grep -c "Missing"‘
221 counter6=‘expr $counter6 + $tmp‘
222 tmp=0
223 done
224
225 for ln in ‘cat ResultsOverLowDev.txt‘
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226 do
227 echo $ln >> ../ResultsNameOverLowDev.txt
228 tmp=‘echo $ln | grep -c "OverLow"‘
229 counter7=‘expr $counter7 + $tmp‘
230 tmp=0
231 done
232
233 for ln in ‘cat ResultsOverUpDev.txt‘
234 do
235 echo $ln >> ../ResultsNameOverUpDev.txt
236 tmp=‘echo $ln | grep -c "OverUp"‘
237 counter8=‘expr $counter8 + $tmp‘
238 tmp=0
239 done
240
241 for ln in ‘cat ResultsOverLowAd.txt‘
242 do
243 echo $ln >> ../ResultsNameOverLowAd.txt
244 tmp=‘echo $ln | grep -c "OverLow"‘
245 counter9=‘expr $counter9 + $tmp‘
246 tmp=0
247 done
248
249 for ln in ‘cat ResultsOverUpAd.txt‘
250 do
251 echo $ln >> ../ResultsNameOverUpAd.txt
252 tmp=‘echo $ln | grep -c "OverUp"‘
253 counter10=‘expr $counter10 + $tmp‘
254 tmp=0
255 done
256
257 for ln in ‘cat ResultsOverLowSoc.txt‘
258 do
259 echo $ln >> ../ResultsNameOverLowSoc.txt
260 tmp=‘echo $ln | grep -c "OverLow"‘
261 counter11=‘expr $counter11 + $tmp‘
262 tmp=0
263 done
264
265 for ln in ‘cat ResultsOverUpSoc.txt‘
266 do
267 echo $ln >> ../ResultsNameOverUpSoc.txt
268 tmp=‘echo $ln | grep -c "OverUp"‘
269 counter12=‘expr $counter12 + $tmp‘
270 tmp=0
271 done
272
273 for ln in ‘cat ResultsAllThirdParty.txt‘
274 do
275 echo $ln >> ../ResultsNameAllThirdParty.txt
276 tmp=‘echo $ln | grep -c "Over"‘
277 counter13=‘expr $counter13 + $tmp‘
278 tmp=0
279 done
280
281 #Total number of unecessary permissions.
282 echo "$counter5" >> ../ResultsNumbersUnecessary.txt
283
284 #Total number of missing permissions.
285 echo "$counter6" >> ../ResultsNumbersMissing.txt
286
287 #Total number of over-privilege lower bound permissions due to Dev.
288 echo "$counter7" >> ../ResultsNumbersOverLowDev.txt
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289 #Total number of over-privilege upper bound permissions due to Dev.
290 echo "$counter8" >> ../ResultsNumbersOverUpDev.txt
291
292 #Total number of over-privilege lower bound permissions due to Ad.
293 echo "$counter9" >> ../ResultsNumbersOverLowAd.txt
294 #Total number of over-privilege upper bound permissions due to Ad.
295 echo "$counter10" >> ../ResultsNumbersOverUpAd.txt
296
297 #Total number of over-privilege lower bound permissions due to Soc.
298 echo "$counter11" >> ../ResultsNumbersOverLowSoc.txt
299 #Total number of over-privilege upper bound permissions due to Soc.
300 echo "$counter12" >> ../ResultsNumbersOverUpSoc.txt
301
302 #Total number of over-privileges due to all third party.
303 echo "$counter13" >> ../ResultsNumbersAllThirdParty.txt
304
305 counter5=0
306 counter6=0
307 counter7=0
308 counter8=0
309 counter9=0
310 counter10=0
311 counter11=0
312 counter12=0
313 counter13=0
314
315 cd ..
316
317 done
318
319 sort ResultsNameUnecessary.txt -o ResultsNameUnecessary.txt
320 sed ’/^$/d’ ResultsNameUnecessary.txt > ResultsNameUnecessaryDef.txt
321 rm ResultsNameUnecessary.txt
322
323 sort ResultsNameMissing.txt -o ResultsNameMissing.txt
324 sed ’/^$/d’ ResultsNameMissing.txt > ResultsNameMissingDef.txt
325 rm ResultsNameMissing.txt
326
327 sort ResultsNameOverLowDev.txt -o ResultsNameOverLowDev.txt
328 sed ’/^$/d’ ResultsNameOverLowDev.txt > ResultsNameOverLowDevDef.txt
329 rm ResultsNameOverLowDev.txt
330
331 sort ResultsNameOverUpDev.txt -o ResultsNameOverUpDev.txt
332 sed ’/^$/d’ ResultsNameOverUpDev.txt > ResultsNameOverUpDevDef.txt
333 rm ResultsNameOverUpDev.txt
334
335 sort ResultsNameOverLowAd.txt -o ResultsNameOverLowAd.txt
336 sed ’/^$/d’ ResultsNameOverLowAd.txt > ResultsNameOverLowAdDef.txt
337 rm ResultsNameOverLowAd.txt
338
339 sort ResultsNameOverUpAd.txt -o ResultsNameOverUpAd.txt
340 sed ’/^$/d’ ResultsNameOverUpAd.txt > ResultsNameOverUpAdDef.txt
341 rm ResultsNameOverUpAd.txt
342
343 sort ResultsNameOverLowSoc.txt -o ResultsNameOverLowSoc.txt
344 sed ’/^$/d’ ResultsNameOverLowSoc.txt > ResultsNameOverLowSocDef.txt
345 rm ResultsNameOverLowSoc.txt
346
347 sort ResultsNameOverUpSoc.txt -o ResultsNameOverUpSoc.txt
348 sed ’/^$/d’ ResultsNameOverUpSoc.txt > ResultsNameOverUpSocDef.txt
349 rm ResultsNameOverUpSoc.txt
350
351 sort ResultsNameAllThirdParty.txt -o ResultsNameAllThirdParty.txt
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352 sed ’/^$/d’ ResultsNameAllThirdParty.txt > ResultsNameAllThirdPartyDef.txt
353 rm ResultsNameAllThirdParty.txt
354
355 # Counts the number of Over-privileges as well as the number of Unecessary permissions.
356 awk ’{ sum += $1 } END { print sum }’ ResultsNumbersUnecessary.txt >> totalUnecessary.txt
357 awk ’{ sum += $1 } END { print sum }’ ResultsNumbersMissing.txt >> totalMissing.txt
358 awk ’{ sum += $1 } END { print sum }’ ResultsNumbersOverLowDev.txt >> totalOverLowDev.txt
359 awk ’{ sum += $1 } END { print sum }’ ResultsNumbersOverUpDev.txt >> totalOverUpDev.txt
360 awk ’{ sum += $1 } END { print sum }’ ResultsNumbersOverLowAd.txt >> totalOverLowAd.txt
361 awk ’{ sum += $1 } END { print sum }’ ResultsNumbersOverUpAd.txt >> totalOverUpAd.txt
362 awk ’{ sum += $1 } END { print sum }’ ResultsNumbersOverLowSoc.txt >> totalOverLowSoc.txt
363 awk ’{ sum += $1 } END { print sum }’ ResultsNumbersOverUpSoc.txt >> totalOverUpSoc.txt
364 awk ’{ sum += $1 } END { print sum }’ ResultsNumbersAllThirdParty.txt >> totalAllThirdParty.
txt
Further, we developed a bash script to inspect the increase of granted permissions
due to the presence of third-party libraries.
1 #!/bin/bash
2
3 #
4 # Roger Ribas
5 # roger.ribas90@gmail.com
6 # 6th of May 2014
7 #
8 # This script analyses the output results of the Compare script.
9 # It counts the number of Over-privileges as well as the number
10 # of Unecessary permissions.
11 #
12
13 IFS=$’\n’
14
15 counter=0
16 counter2=0
17 counter3=0
18 counter4=0
19 tmp=0
20
21 echo "" > ResultsNameUnecessary.txt
22 echo "" > ResultsNumbersUnecessary.txt
23 echo "" > ResultsNameMissing.txt
24 echo "" > ResultsNameUnecessary.txt
25 for dir in ‘find -maxdepth 1 -type d‘
26 do
27 if [ "$dir" = "." ] || [ "$dir" = ./manifest ];then
28 continue
29 else
30 counter=‘expr $counter + 1‘
31 fi
32 done
33
34 echo "I: $counter applications are going to be analyzed..."
35
36 for dir in ‘find -maxdepth 1 -type d‘
37 do
38 if [ "$dir" = "." ] || [ "$dir" = ./manifest ];then
39 continue
40 fi
41
42 cd $dir
43
44 echo "I: $dir"
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45
46 echo "I: joining files..."
47
48 # Joins the Development libraries’ permissions with the
49 # app permissions.
50 cat GeneratedManifestApp.txt >> tmp.txt
51 cat GeneratedManifestdevelopmenttools.txt >> tmp.txt
52 awk ’!x[$0]++’ tmp.txt > AppDev.txt
53 rm tmp.txt
54 sort AppDev.txt -o AppDev.txt
55 sed ’/^$/d’ AppDev.txt > AppDevDef.txt
56 rm AppDev.txt
57
58 # Joins the AdLibraries’ permissions with the app
59 # permissions.
60 cat GeneratedManifestadlibraries.txt >> tmp.txt
61 cat GeneratedManifestApp.txt >> tmp.txt
62 awk ’!x[$0]++’ tmp.txt > AppAd.txt
63 rm tmp.txt
64 sort AppAd.txt -o AppAd.txt
65 sed ’/^$/d’ AppAd.txt > AppAdDef.txt
66 rm AppAd.txt
67
68 # Joins the Social SDKs’ permissions with the app
69 # permissions.
70 cat GeneratedManifestsocialsdks.txt >> tmp.txt
71 cat GeneratedManifestApp.txt >> tmp.txt
72 awk ’!x[$0]++’ tmp.txt > AppSoc.txt
73 rm tmp.txt
74 sort AppSoc.txt -o AppSoc.txt
75 sed ’/^$/d’ AppSoc.txt > AppSocDef.txt
76 rm AppSoc.txt
77
78 # Joins the Obfuscated’ permissions with the app
79 # permissions.
80 cat GeneratedManifestothers.txt >> tmp.txt
81 cat GeneratedManifestApp.txt >> tmp.txt
82 awk ’!x[$0]++’ tmp.txt > AppOb.txt
83 rm tmp.txt
84 sort AppOb.txt -o AppOb.txt
85 sed ’/^$/d’ AppOb.txt > AppObDef.txt
86 rm AppOb.txt
87
88 # Joins all the files together
89 cat GeneratedManifestdevelopmenttools.txt >> tmp.txt
90 cat GeneratedManifestadlibraries.txt >> tmp.txt
91 cat GeneratedManifestsocialsdks.txt >> tmp.txt
92 cat GeneratedManifestothers.txt >> tmp.txt
93 cat GeneratedManifestApp.txt >> tmp.txt
94 awk ’!x[$0]++’ tmp.txt > TotalPermissions.txt
95 rm tmp.txt
96 sort TotalPermissions.txt -o TotalPermissions.txt
97 sed ’/^$/d’ TotalPermissions.txt > TotalPermissionsDef.txt
98 rm TotalPermissions.txt
99
100 echo "" > ResultsUnecessary.txt
101 echo "" > ResultsMissing.txt
102
103 echo "I: Analysing..."
104
105 # Counts the number of permissions granted to the application
106 for line in ‘cat AndroidManifest.txt | uniq‘
107 do
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108 counter1=‘expr $counter1 + 1‘
109 done
110
111 echo "$counter1" >> ../TotalNumberOfPermissions.txt
112
113 # If a permission required by the application itself is not present
114 # in the manifest we have a missing permission.
115 for line in ‘cat GeneratedManifestApp.txt‘
116 do
117 counter2=‘cat AndroidManifest.txt | grep -i -c "$line"‘
118
119 if [ $counter2 -eq 0 ];then
120 echo "Missing permission: $line" >> ResultsMissing.txt
121 fi
122 done
123
124 # If a line from the manifest is not present in the TotalPermissions
125 # it is an unecessary permission.
126 for line in ‘cat AndroidManifest.txt‘
127 do
128 counter3=‘cat TotalPermissionsDef.txt | grep -i -c "$line"‘
129
130 if [ $counter3 -eq 0 ];then
131 echo "Unecessary permission: $line" >> ResultsUnecessary.txt
132 fi
133 done
134
135 for permission in ‘cat /volume1/scratch/r0442265/Analysis/apktool/permissions.txt‘
136 do
137 #echo $permission
138
139 counter4=‘cat GeneratedManifestApp.txt | grep -i -c "$permission"‘
140 counter5=‘cat GeneratedManifestdevelopmenttools.txt | grep -i -c "$permission"‘
141 counter6=‘cat GeneratedManifestadlibraries.txt | grep -i -c "$permission"‘
142 counter7=‘cat GeneratedManifestsocialsdks.txt | grep -i -c "$permission"‘
143 counter8=‘cat GeneratedManifestothers.txt | grep -i -c "$permission"‘
144 counter9=‘cat AppDevDef.txt | grep -i -c "$permission"‘
145 counter10=‘cat AppAdDef.txt | grep -i -c "$permission"‘
146 counter11=‘cat AppSocDef.txt | grep -i -c "$permission"‘
147 counter12=‘cat AppObDef.txt | grep -i -c "$permission"‘
148 counter13=‘cat AndroidManifest.txt | grep -i -c "$permission"‘
149 echo $counter4 >> GeneratedManifestAppPermissions.txt
150 echo $counter5 >> GeneratedManifestdevelopmenttoolsPermissions1.txt
151 echo $counter6 >> GeneratedManifestadlibrariesPermissions1.txt
152 echo $counter7 >> GeneratedManifestsocialsdksPermissions1.txt
153 echo $counter8 >> GeneratedManifestothersPermissions1.txt
154 echo $counter9 >> AppDevPermissions1.txt
155 echo $counter10 >> AppAdPermissions1.txt
156 echo $counter11 >> AppSocPermissions1.txt
157 echo $counter12 >> AppObPermissions1.txt
158 echo $counter12 >> AndroidManifestPermissions.txt
159 done
160
161 paste GeneratedManifestdevelopmenttoolsPermissions1.txt AndroidManifestPermissions.txt >>
GeneratedManifestdevelopmenttoolsPermissionsc.txt
162 awk ’{ if ($2 != 0) print $1; else print 0 }’
GeneratedManifestdevelopmenttoolsPermissionsc.txt >>
GeneratedManifestdevelopmenttoolsPermissions.txt
163 rm GeneratedManifestdevelopmenttoolsPermissionsc.txt
164 rm GeneratedManifestdevelopmenttoolsPermissions1.txt
165
166 paste GeneratedManifestadlibrariesPermissions1.txt AndroidManifestPermissions.txt >>
GeneratedManifestadlibrariesPermissionsc.txt
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167 awk ’{ if ($2 != 0) print $1; else print 0 }’ GeneratedManifestadlibrariesPermissionsc.txt
>> GeneratedManifestadlibrariesPermissions.txt
168 rm GeneratedManifestadlibrariesPermissionsc.txt
169 rm GeneratedManifestadlibrariesPermissions1.txt
170
171 paste GeneratedManifestsocialsdksPermissions1.txt AndroidManifestPermissions.txt >>
GeneratedManifestsocialsdksPermissionsc.txt
172 awk ’{ if ($2 != 0) print $1; else print 0 }’ GeneratedManifestsocialsdksPermissionsc.txt
>> GeneratedManifestsocialsdksPermissions.txt
173 rm GeneratedManifestsocialsdksPermissionsc.txt
174 rm GeneratedManifestsocialsdksPermissions1.txt
175
176 paste GeneratedManifestothersPermissions1.txt AndroidManifestPermissions.txt >>
GeneratedManifestothersPermissionsc.txt
177 awk ’{ if ($2 != 0) print $1; else print 0 }’ GeneratedManifestothersPermissionsc.txt >>
GeneratedManifestothersPermissions.txt
178 rm GeneratedManifestothersPermissionsc.txt
179 rm GeneratedManifestothersPermissions1.txt
180
181 paste AppDevPermissions1.txt AndroidManifestPermissions.txt >> AppDevPermissionsc.txt
182 awk ’{ if ($2 != 0) print $1; else print 0 }’ AppDevPermissionsc.txt >> AppDevPermissions.
txt
183 rm AppDevPermissionsc.txt
184 rm AppDevPermissions1.txt
185
186 paste AppAdPermissions1.txt AndroidManifestPermissions.txt >> AppAdPermissionsc.txt
187 awk ’{ if ($2 != 0) print $1; else print 0 }’ AppAdPermissionsc.txt >> AppAdPermissions.
txt
188 rm AppAdPermissionsc.txt
189 rm AppAdPermissions1.txt
190
191 paste AppSocPermissions1.txt AndroidManifestPermissions.txt >> AppSocPermissionsc.txt
192 awk ’{ if ($2 != 0) print $1; else print 0 }’ AppSocPermissionsc.txt >> AppSocPermissions.
txt
193 rm AppSocPermissionsc.txt
194 rm AppSocPermissions1.txt
195
196 paste AppObPermissions1.txt AndroidManifestPermissions.txt >> AppObPermissionsc.txt
197 awk ’{ if ($2 != 0) print $1; else print 0 }’ AppObPermissionsc.txt >> AppObPermissions.
txt
198 rm AppObPermissionsc.txt
199 rm AppObPermissions1.txt
200
201 sort ResultsUnecessary.txt -o ResultsUnecessary.txt
202 sort ResultsMissing.txt -o ResultsMissing.txt
203
204 for ln in ‘cat ResultsUnecessary.txt‘
205 do
206 echo $ln >> ../ResultsNameUnecessary.txt
207
208 tmp=‘echo $ln | grep -c "Unecessary"‘
209 counter3=‘expr $counter3 + $tmp‘
210 tmp=0
211 done
212
213 for ln in ‘cat ResultsMissing.txt‘
214 do
215 echo $ln >> ../ResultsNameMissing.txt
216
217 tmp=‘echo $ln | grep -c "Missing"‘
218 counter4=‘expr $counter4 + $tmp‘
219 tmp=0
220 done
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221
222 #Total number of unecessary permissions.
223 echo "$counter3" >> ../ResultsNumbersUnecessary.txt
224 echo "$counter4" >> ../ResultsNumbersMissing.txt
225
226 cd smali
227
228 #Calculates the number of Development tools libraries
229 for library in ‘cat /volume1/scratch/r0442265/Analysis/apktool/adlibraries.txt‘
230 do
231 for dir in ‘find * -maxdepth 1 -type d‘
232 do
233 tmp=‘echo $dir | grep -c "$library"‘
234 counter13=‘expr $counter13 + $tmp‘
235 tmp=0
236 done
237 echo "$counter13" >> ../NumberAd.txt
238 counter13=0
239 done
240
241 #Calculates the number of AdLibraries libraries
242 for library in ‘cat /volume1/scratch/r0442265/Analysis/apktool/developmenttools.txt‘
243 do
244 for dir in ‘find * -maxdepth 1 -type d‘
245 do
246 tmp=‘echo $dir | grep -c "$library"‘
247 counter14=‘expr $counter14 + $tmp‘
248 tmp=0
249 done
250 echo "$counter14" >> ../NumberDev.txt
251 counter14=0
252 done
253
254 #Calculates the number of Social SDKs libraries
255 for library in ‘cat /volume1/scratch/r0442265/Analysis/apktool/socialsdks.txt‘
256 do
257 for dir in ‘find * -maxdepth 1 -type d‘
258 do
259 tmp=‘echo $dir | grep -c "$library"‘
260 counter15=‘expr $counter15 + $tmp‘
261 tmp=0
262 done
263 echo "$counter15" >> ../NumberSoc.txt
264 counter15=0
265 done
266
267 #calculates the number of directories
268 for dir in ‘find * -maxdepth 1 -type d‘
269 do
270 counter16=‘expr $counter16 + 1‘
271 done
272 echo "$counter16" >> ../NumberDir.txt
273 counter16=0
274
275 cd ..
276 cd ..
277
278 counter1=0
279 counter2=0
280 counter3=0
281 counter4=0
282 counter5=0
283 counter6=0
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284 counter7=0
285 counter8=0
286 counter9=0
287 counter10=0
288 counter11=0
289 counter12=0
290 done
291
292 for file in ‘find * -type f -name "NumberAd.txt"‘
293 do
294 cat $file >> ListNumberAd.txt
295 done
296 for file in ‘find * -type f -name "NumberDev.txt"‘
297 do
298 cat $file >> ListNumberDev.txt
299 done
300 for file in ‘find * -type f -name "NumberSoc.txt"‘
301 do
302 cat $file >> ListNumberSoc.txt
303 done
304 for file in ‘find * -type f -name "NumberDir.txt"‘
305 do
306 cat $file >> ListNumberDir.txt
307 done
308
309 #Counts the number of third-party libraries found of each category
310 awk ’{ sum += $1 } END { print sum }’ ListNumberAd.txt >> totalNumberAd.txt
311 awk ’{ sum += $1 } END { print sum }’ ListNumberDev.txt >> totalNumberDev.txt
312 awk ’{ sum += $1 } END { print sum }’ ListNumberSoc.txt >> totalNumberSoc.txt
313 awk ’{ sum += $1 } END { print sum }’ ListNumberDir.txt >> totalNumberDir.txt
314
315 rm ListNumberAd.txt
316 rm ListNumberDev.txt
317 rm ListNumberSoc.txt
318 rm ListNumberDir.txt
319
320 totalad=‘cat totalNumberAd.txt‘
321 totaldev=‘cat totalNumberDev.txt‘
322 totalsoc=‘cat totalNumberSoc.txt‘
323 totaldir=‘cat totalNumberDir.txt‘
324 totalobfuscated=$((totaldir-totalad-totaldev-totalsoc))
325
326 echo $totalobfuscated
327
328 sort ResultsNameUnecessary.txt -o ResultsNameUnecessary.txt
329 sed ’/^$/d’ ResultsNameUnecessary.txt > ResultsNameUnecessaryDef.txt
330 rm ResultsNameUnecessary.txt
331
332 sort ResultsNameMissing.txt -o ResultsNameMissing.txt
333 sed ’/^$/d’ ResultsNameMissing.txt > ResultsNameMissingDef.txt
334 rm ResultsNameMissing.txt
335
336 # Counts the number of Over-privileges as well as the number of Unecessary permissions.
337 awk ’{ sum += $1 } END { print sum }’ ResultsNumbersUnecessary.txt >> totalUnecessary.txt
338 awk ’{ sum += $1 } END { print sum }’ ResultsNumbersMissing.txt >> totalMissing.txt
339
340 echo "" >> GeneratedManifestAppPermissionsTotal.txt
341 for file in ‘find * -type f -name "GeneratedManifestAppPermissions.txt"‘
342 do
343 if [ $file = "GeneratedManifestAppPermissions.txt" ];then
344 continue
345 fi
346 paste GeneratedManifestAppPermissionsTotal.txt $file > tmp
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347 mv tmp GeneratedManifestAppPermissionsTotal.txt
348 done
349 awk ’{ for(i=1; i<=NF;i++) j+=$i; print j; j=0 }’ GeneratedManifestAppPermissionsTotal.txt >>
GeneratedManifestAppPermissionsTotalDef.txt
350 rm GeneratedManifestAppPermissionsTotal.txt
351 awk ’{ if ($counter != 0) print $1/’$counter’; else print 0 }’
GeneratedManifestAppPermissionsTotalDef.txt >> AppProb.txt
352 rm GeneratedManifestAppPermissionsTotalDef.txt
353
354 echo "" >> GeneratedManifestdevelopmenttoolsPermissions.txt
355 for file in ‘find * -type f -name "GeneratedManifestdevelopmenttoolsPermissions.txt"‘
356 do
357 if [ $file = "GeneratedManifestdevelopmenttoolsPermissions.txt" ];then
358 continue
359 fi
360 paste GeneratedManifestdevelopmenttoolsPermissions.txt $file > tmp
361 mv tmp GeneratedManifestdevelopmenttoolsPermissions.txt
362 done
363 awk ’{ for(i=1; i<=NF;i++) j+=$i; print j; j=0 }’
GeneratedManifestdevelopmenttoolsPermissions.txt >>
GeneratedManifestdevelopmenttoolsPermissionsDef.txt
364 rm GeneratedManifestdevelopmenttoolsPermissions.txt
365 awk ’{ if ($totaldev != 0) print $1/’$totaldev’; else print 0 }’
GeneratedManifestdevelopmenttoolsPermissionsDef.txt >> DevProb.txt
366 rm GeneratedManifestdevelopmenttoolsPermissionsDef.txt
367
368 echo "" >> GeneratedManifestadlibrariesPermissions.txt
369 for file in ‘find * -type f -name "GeneratedManifestadlibrariesPermissions.txt"‘
370 do
371 if [ $file = "GeneratedManifestadlibrariesPermissions.txt" ];then
372 continue
373 fi
374 paste GeneratedManifestadlibrariesPermissions.txt $file > tmp
375 mv tmp GeneratedManifestadlibrariesPermissions.txt
376 done
377 awk ’{ for(i=1; i<=NF;i++) j+=$i; print j; j=0 }’ GeneratedManifestadlibrariesPermissions.txt
>> GeneratedManifestadlibrariesPermissionsDef.txt
378 rm GeneratedManifestadlibrariesPermissions.txt
379 awk ’{ if ($totalad != 0) print $1/’$totalad’; else print 0 }’
GeneratedManifestadlibrariesPermissionsDef.txt >> AdProb.txt
380 rm GeneratedManifestadlibrariesPermissionsDef.txt
381
382 echo "" >> GeneratedManifestsocialsdksPermissions.txt
383 for file in ‘find * -type f -name "GeneratedManifestsocialsdksPermissions.txt"‘
384 do
385 if [ $file = "GeneratedManifestsocialsdksPermissions.txt" ];then
386 continue
387 fi
388 paste GeneratedManifestsocialsdksPermissions.txt $file > tmp
389 mv tmp GeneratedManifestsocialsdksPermissions.txt
390 done
391 awk ’{ for(i=1; i<=NF;i++) j+=$i; print j; j=0 }’ GeneratedManifestsocialsdksPermissions.txt
>> GeneratedManifestsocialsdksPermissionsDef.txt
392 rm GeneratedManifestsocialsdksPermissions.txt
393 awk ’{ if ($totalsoc != 0) print $1/’$totalsoc’; else print 0 }’
GeneratedManifestsocialsdksPermissionsDef.txt >> SocProb.txt
394 rm GeneratedManifestsocialsdksPermissionsDef.txt
395
396 echo "" >> GeneratedManifestothersPermissions.txt
397 for file in ‘find * -type f -name "GeneratedManifestothersPermissions.txt"‘
398 do
399 if [ $file = "GeneratedManifestothersPermissions.txt" ];then
400 continue
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401 fi
402 paste GeneratedManifestothersPermissions.txt $file > tmp
403 mv tmp GeneratedManifestothersPermissions.txt
404 done
405 awk ’{ for(i=1; i<=NF;i++) j+=$i; print j; j=0 }’ GeneratedManifestothersPermissions.txt >>
GeneratedManifestothersPermissionsDef.txt
406 rm GeneratedManifestothersPermissions.txt
407 awk ’{ if ($totalobfuscated != 0) print $1/’$totalobfuscated’; else print 0 }’
GeneratedManifestothersPermissionsDef.txt >> ObfProb.txt
408 rm GeneratedManifestothersPermissionsDef.txt
409
410 echo "" >> AppDevPermissions.txt
411 for file in ‘find * -type f -name "AppDevPermissions.txt"‘
412 do
413 if [ $file = "AppDevPermissions.txt" ];then
414 continue
415 fi
416 paste AppDevPermissions.txt $file > tmp
417 mv tmp AppDevPermissions.txt
418 done
419 awk ’{ for(i=1; i<=NF;i++) j+=$i; print j; j=0 }’ AppDevPermissions.txt >>
AppDevPermissionsDef.txt
420 rm AppDevPermissions.txt
421 appdev=‘expr $counter + $totaldev‘
422 awk ’{ if ($appdev != 0) print $1/’$appdev’; else print 0 }’ AppDevPermissionsDef.txt >>
AppDevProb.txt
423 rm AppDevPermissionsDef.txt
424
425 echo "" >> AppAdPermissions.txt
426 for file in ‘find * -type f -name "AppAdPermissions.txt"‘
427 do
428 if [ $file = "AppAdPermissions.txt" ];then
429 continue
430 fi
431 paste AppAdPermissions.txt $file > tmp
432 mv tmp AppAdPermissions.txt
433 done
434 awk ’{ for(i=1; i<=NF;i++) j+=$i; print j; j=0 }’ AppAdPermissions.txt >> AppAdPermissionsDef.
txt
435 rm AppAdPermissions.txt
436 appad=‘expr $counter + $totalad‘
437 awk ’{ if ($appad != 0) print $1/’$appad’; else print 0 }’ AppAdPermissionsDef.txt >>
AppAdProb.txt
438 rm AppAdPermissionsDef.txt
439
440 echo "" >> AppSocPermissions.txt
441 for file in ‘find * -type f -name "AppSocPermissions.txt"‘
442 do
443 if [ $file = "AppSocPermissions.txt" ];then
444 continue
445 fi
446 paste AppSocPermissions.txt $file > tmp
447 mv tmp AppSocPermissions.txt
448 done
449 awk ’{ for(i=1; i<=NF;i++) j+=$i; print j; j=0 }’ AppSocPermissions.txt >>
AppSocPermissionsDef.txt
450 rm AppSocPermissions.txt
451 appsoc=‘expr $counter + $totalsoc‘
452 awk ’{ if ($appsoc != 0) print $1/’$appsoc’; else print 0 }’ AppSocPermissionsDef.txt >>
AppSocProb.txt
453 rm AppSocPermissionsDef.txt
454
455 echo "" >> AppObPermissions.txt
96
A.8. Discussion
456 for file in ‘find * -type f -name "AppObPermissions.txt"‘
457 do
458 if [ $file = "AppObPermissions.txt" ];then
459 continue
460 fi
461 paste AppObPermissions.txt $file > tmp
462 mv tmp AppObPermissions.txt
463 done
464 awk ’{ for(i=1; i<=NF;i++) j+=$i; print j; j=0 }’ AppObPermissions.txt >> AppObPermissionsDef.
txt
465 rm AppObPermissions.txt
466 appobf=‘expr $counter + $totalobfuscated‘
467 awk ’{ if ($appobf != 0) print $1/’$appobf’; else print 0 }’ AppObPermissionsDef.txt >>
AppObfProb.txt
468 rm AppObPermissionsDef.txt
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Appendix B
Source Code of LPDroid
B.1 User level source code
B.1.1 MyLocation application
Next, the source code of the Show User Location application can be found. Notice
how all the necessary steps are included in the onCreate() and onResult() methods.
1 package org.example.locationtest;
2
3 import java.util.List;
4
5 import android.app.Activity;
6 import android.content.Intent;
7 import android.location.Criteria;
8 import android.location.Location;
9 import android.location.LocationListener;
10 import android.location.LocationManager;
11 import android.location.LocationProvider;
12 import android.os.Bundle;
13 import android.view.Gravity;
14 import android.widget.TextView;
15 import android.widget.Toast;
16
17 public class LocationTest extends Activity{
18
19 private LocationManager mgr;
20 private LocationListener locationListener;
21 private Location location;
22 private Criteria criteria;
23 private LocationProvider info;
24 private TextView output;
25 private String best;
26
27 private static final String[] A = {"invalid" , "n/a", "fine", "coarse"};
28 private static final String[] P = {"invalid" , "n/a", "low", "medium", "high"};
29 private static final String[] S = {"out of service" , "temporally unavailabe"};
30
31 @Override
32 protected void onCreate(Bundle savedInstanceState) {
33 super.onCreate(savedInstanceState);
34 setContentView(R.layout.main);
35 /*LOCATION_SERVICE: use with getSystemService(String) to retrieve a LocationManager for
controlling location updates. Return the handle to a system-level service by name. The
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class of the returned object varies by the requested name. */
36 mgr = (LocationManager) getSystemService(LOCATION_SERVICE);
37 output = (TextView) findViewById(R.id.output);
38
39 locationListener = new LocationListener(){
40 @Override
41 public void onLocationChanged(Location location) {
42 dumpLocation(location);
43 }
44
45 @Override
46 public void onProviderDisabled(String provider) {
47 log("\nProvider disabled: " + provider);
48 }
49
50 @Override
51 public void onProviderEnabled(String provider) {
52 log("\nProvider enabled: " + provider);
53 }
54
55 @Override
56 public void onStatusChanged(String provider, int status, Bundle extras) {
57 log("\nProvider status changed: " + provider + ", status = " + S[status] + ", extras = " +
extras);
58 }
59 };
60
61 //Sets the criteria for getting the best provider and figures out which one is it
62 criteria = new Criteria();
63 criteria.setAccuracy(Criteria.ACCURACY_FINE);
64 criteria.setAltitudeRequired(true);
65
66 if (!mgr.isProviderEnabled(LocationManager.GPS_PROVIDER)) {
67 Toast toast1 = Toast.makeText(this, "GPS not enabled", Toast.LENGTH_LONG);
68 toast1.setGravity(Gravity.CENTER, 0, 0);
69 toast1.show();
70 Toast toast2 = Toast.makeText(this, "Please activate GPS and press back", Toast.LENGTH_LONG);
71 toast2.setGravity(Gravity.CENTER, 0, 0);
72 toast2.show();
73 /*Opens the location settings*/
74 Intent gpsOptionsIntent = new Intent(android.provider.Settings.
ACTION_LOCATION_SOURCE_SETTINGS);
75 startActivity(gpsOptionsIntent);
76 }
77
78 /*String getBestProvider(Criteria criteria, boolean enabledOnly) returns the name of the
provider that best meets the given criteria. We could also use List<String> getProviders
(Criteria criteria, boolean enabledOnly) which returns a list with the names of the
providers that fulfill the requirements */
79 best = mgr.getBestProvider(criteria, true);
80
81 log("Location providers: ");
82 dumpProviders();
83
84 log("\nBest provider according to the selected criteria is: " + best);
85
86 log("\nLocations (starting with last known): ");
87 location = mgr.getLastKnownLocation(best);
88 dumpLocation(location);
89 }
90
91 @Override
92 protected void onResume() {
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93 super.onResume();
94 //Initializes the updates
95 //requestLocationUpdates(String provider, long minTime, float minDistance, LocationListener
listener)
96 //listener: must be someone who contains the method onLocationChange() so we pass this.
97 mgr.requestLocationUpdates(best, 15000, 1, locationListener);
98 }
99
100 @Override
101 protected void onPause() {
102 super.onPause();
103 /*Stops the updates in order to save battery removeUpdates(LocationListener listener).
Removes all location updates for the specified LocationListener*/
104 mgr.removeUpdates(locationListener);
105 }
106
107 //Writes the string in the TextView widget
108 private void log(String string){
109 output.append(string + "\n");
110 }
111
112 //Writes the information of all the Location Providers
113 private void dumpProviders(){
114 List<String> providers = mgr.getAllProviders();
115 for (String provider : providers){
116 dumpProvider(provider);
117 }
118 }
119
120 //Writes the information of only one provider
121 private void dumpProvider(String provider){
122 info = mgr.getProvider(provider);
123 StringBuilder builder = new StringBuilder();
124
125 builder.append("LocationProvider[")
126 .append("name=")
127 .append(info.getName())
128 .append(", enabled=")
129 .append(mgr.isProviderEnabled(provider))
130 .append(", getAccuracy=")
131 .append(A[info.getAccuracy() + 1])
132 .append(", getPowerRequirements=")
133 .append(P[info.getPowerRequirement() + 1])
134 .append(", hasMonetaryCost=")
135 .append(info.hasMonetaryCost())
136 .append(", requiresCell=")
137 .append(info.requiresCell())
138 .append(", requiresNetwork=")
139 .append(info.requiresNetwork())
140 .append(", requiresSatellite=")
141 .append(info.requiresSatellite())
142 .append(", supportsAltitude=")
143 .append(info.supportsAltitude())
144 .append(", supportsBearing=")
145 .append(info.supportsBearing())
146 .append(", supportsSpeed=")
147 .append(info.supportsSpeed())
148 .append("]");
149 log(builder.toString());
150 }
151
152 //Prints the current location
153 private void dumpLocation(Location location){
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154 if(location == null)log("\nLocation[unknown]");
155 else log("\n" + location.toString());
156 }
157 }
B.1.2 LocationApps application
In this section, the source code of the List Permissions application can be found.
1 public class RequireLocationApps extends Activity {
2
3 /*ArrayList is an implementation of List, backed by an array. All optional operations
including, removing, and replacing elements are supported. This class is a good choice
as your default List implementation. All elements are permitted, including null.*/
4 private ArrayList<String> lista;
5 /*A List is a collection which maintains an ordering for its elements. Every element in the
List has an index. Each element can thus be accessed by its index, with the first index
being zero. Normally, Lists allow duplicate elements, as compared to Sets, where
elements have to be unique.*/
6 private List<PackageInfo> applist;
7 private ListView listView;
8
9 @Override
10 protected void onCreate(Bundle savedInstanceState) {
11 super.onCreate(savedInstanceState);
12 setContentView(R.layout.main);
13
14 listView = (ListView) findViewById(R.id.listView1);
15 // Instanciating an array
16 lista = new ArrayList<String>();
17 lista = getInstalledApps(this);
18
19 /*An adapter is used for managing the items in the list. Every line in the list view consists
of a layout which can be as complex as you want. The adapter would inflate the layout
for each row in its getView() method and assign the data to the individual views in the
row.
20 It takes the context of the activity as a first parameter, the type of list view as a second
parameter and your array as a third parameter.*/
21
22 /** The simple_list_item_1 is a built-in layout:
23 <TextView xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/android"
24 android:id="@android:id/text1"
25 style="?android:attr/listItemFirstLineStyle"
26 android:paddingTop="2dip"
27 android:paddingBottom="3dip"
28 android:layout_width="fill_parent"
29 android:layout_height="wrap_content" />**/
30
31
32 ArrayAdapter<String> arrayAdapter =
33 new ArrayAdapter<String>(this,android.R.layout.simple_list_item_1, lista);
34 listView.setAdapter(arrayAdapter);
35 }
36
37 private ArrayList<String> getInstalledApps(Context context) {
38 ArrayList<String> results = new ArrayList<String>();
39 /*Class for retrieving various kinds of information related to the application packages that
are currently installed on the device. You can find this class through getPackageManager
()*/
40 PackageManager packageManager = context.getPackageManager();
41 //abstract List<PackageInfo> getInstalledPackages(int flags)
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42 applist = packageManager.getInstalledPackages(0);
43
44 //An iterator over a sequence of objects, such as a collection.
45 Iterator<PackageInfo> iterator = applist.iterator();
46 /*abstract boolean hasNext()
47 Returns true if there is at least one more element, false otherwise.*/
48 while (iterator.hasNext()) {
49 /*Overall information about the contents of a package. This corresponds to all of the
information collected from AndroidManifest.xml.*/
50 PackageInfo pk = (PackageInfo) iterator.next();
51 if ((pk.applicationInfo.flags & ApplicationInfo.FLAG_SYSTEM) != 0) {
52 /*Information you can retrieve about a particular application. This corresponds to
information collected from the AndroidManifest.xml’s <application> tag.
53 CharSequence loadLabel(PackageManager pm)
54 Retrieve the current textual label associated with this item.*/
55 Log.v("system app = ", ""+pk.applicationInfo.loadLabel(packageManager));
56 continue;
57 }
58 /*public abstract int checkPermission (String permName, String pkgName)
59 Check whether a particular package has been granted a particular permission*/
60 if (PackageManager.PERMISSION_GRANTED == packageManager.checkPermission(Manifest.permission.
ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION,pk.packageName) || PackageManager.PERMISSION_GRANTED ==
packageManager.checkPermission(Manifest.permission.ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION,pk.packageName)
)
61 results.add("" + pk.applicationInfo.loadLabel(packageManager));
62 }
63
64 Log.v("app using location = ", results.toString());
65
66 return results;
67 }
68 }
Finally, the source code of the LPDroid user application can be observed:
1 package com.example.locationprivacyproject;
2
3 import android.app.Activity;
4 import android.os.Bundle;
5 import android.widget.CompoundButton;
6 import android.widget.RadioButton;
7 import android.widget.RadioGroup;
8 import android.widget.RadioGroup.OnCheckedChangeListener;
9 import android.widget.Toast;
10 import android.widget.ToggleButton;
11
12 public class LocationPrivacy extends Activity {
13
14 private boolean isStarted = false;
15 private int selectedLevel = 2;
16
17 private ToggleButton start_button;
18 private RadioGroup radioLevelGroup;
19 private RadioButton radioLevelButton;
20
21 @Override
22 protected void onCreate(Bundle savedInstanceState) {
23 super.onCreate(savedInstanceState);
24 setContentView(R.layout.main);
25
26 addListenerOnButton();
27 addListenerOnRadioGroup();
28 }
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29
30 private void addListenerOnButton(){
31 start_button = (ToggleButton) findViewById(R.id.toggleButton1);
32
33 start_button.setOnCheckedChangeListener(new CompoundButton.OnCheckedChangeListener() {
34 @Override
35 public void onCheckedChanged(CompoundButton buttonView,boolean isChecked) {
36 if(isChecked) isStarted = true;
37 else isStarted = false;
38 }
39 });
40 }
41
42 private void addListenerOnRadioGroup() {
43 radioLevelGroup = (RadioGroup) findViewById(R.id.radioLevel);
44
45 radioLevelGroup.setOnCheckedChangeListener(new OnCheckedChangeListener()
46 {
47 public void onCheckedChanged(RadioGroup group, int checkedId) {
48
49 // find the radio button by returned id
50 radioLevelButton = (RadioButton) findViewById(checkedId);
51
52 //Toast
53 if(isStarted){
54 mapValues();
55 Toast.makeText(LocationPrivacy.this,radioLevelButton.getText(), Toast.
LENGTH_SHORT).show();
56 }
57 }
58 });
59 }
60
61 private void mapValues() {
62 if(radioLevelButton.getText() == "low") selectedLevel = 1;
63 else if (radioLevelButton.getText() == "medium") selectedLevel = 2;
64 else selectedLevel = 3;
65 }
66 }
B.2 Framework level source code
In Figure B.1 we can see the modiﬁcations done in the LocationManager class to
implement the lowest privacy level obfuscation strategy. The switch cases have been
deleted to solely leave the lowest level case. The core of this LPPM resides in lines
18 and 19 where the casting is executed.
In Figure B.2 we can see the modiﬁcations done in the LocationManager class
to implement the medium privacy level obfuscation strategy. As before, we have
deleted the rest of the cases. It is important to notice the call in line 29 to the
setTaggedLocationCoordinates() method. This method returns a Location object
created with the given arguments, which are the ﬁxed coordinates of the ESAT
department.
In Figure B.3 we can see the modiﬁcations done in the LocationManager class to
implement the medium privacy level obfuscation strategy. As before, we have omitted
the rest of the cases. In lines 19 and 20 we make a call to generateRandomCoordinates()
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1 public Location fakeLocation(Location current, Context context){
2 /**
3 * Depending on the selected preferences we’ll implement a certain LLPM or another one.
4 */
5 Log.i(TAG, "Location Privacy: New location coordinates have been received, checking
whether we should obfuscate them or not");
6
7 if (checkPrivacy(context) == 1){
8
9 privacyLevel = checkPrivacyLevel(context);
10
11 switch(privacyLevel){
12 case 1:
13 /**
14 * Rounds the current location.
15 */
16 Log.i(TAG, "Location Privacy: Tool activated with level 1, proceding to obfuscate
the new coordinates");
17
18 randomRoundFakeLatitude = (int) current.getLatitude();
19 randomRoundFakeLongitude = (int) current.getLongitude();
20
21 current = setTaggedLocationCoordinates(randomRoundFakeLatitude,
randomRoundFakeLongitude, current);
22 break;
23 default:
24 Log.i(TAG, "The tool is not activated");
25 break;
26 }
27 }
28 else{
29 Log.i(TAG, "The tool is not activated");
30 return current;
31 }
32 return current;
33 }
Figure B.1: Lowest level obfuscation strategy source code.
method. This method returns an integer number randomly generated within the
interval (-90, 90). Once we have a longitude and a latitude coordinates we call the
method setTaggedLocationCoordinates() to create the Location object with the
newly generated coordinates.
Figure B.4 shows how the getLasLocation() and the getLastKnownLocation()
methods make a call to the fakeLocation() method before returning the last known
location.
Finally, Figure B.5 shows the code that implements the checkPrivacy() and
checkPrivacyLevel() methods. The former, retrieves the value stored in the
PRIVACY_ACTIVATED ﬂag from the Settings provider. The latter, retrieves the value
stored in the PRIVACY_LEVEL ﬂag from the Settings provider.
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1 //Part 1
2 private static final String fixedFakeLocation = "Fake Location";
3 private static final double fakeLatitude = 50.862346;
4 private static final double fakeLongitude = 4.686362;
5
6 //Part 2
7 public Location fakeLocation(Location current, Context context){
8 /**
9 * Depending on the selected preferences we’ll implement a certain LLPM or another one.
10 */
11 Log.i(TAG, "Location Privacy: New location coordinates have been received, checking
whether we should obfuscate them or not");
12
13 if (checkPrivacy(context) == 1){
14 /**
15 * Now, we should check the selected level of privacy.
16 * This level should be 2 (medium) by default.
17 * In this configuration, location coordinates will be replaced by randomly generated
18 * coordiantes.
19 */
20 privacyLevel = checkPrivacyLevel(context);
21
22 switch(privacyLevel){
23 case 2:
24 /**
25 * This LPPM replaces the Location coordinates by some fixed coordinates.
26 */
27 Log.i(TAG, "Location Privacy: Tool activated with level 1, proceding to obfuscate
the new coordinates");
28
29 current = setTaggedLocationCoordinates(fakeLatitude, fakeLongitude, current);
30
31 Log.i(TAG, "Location faked with fixed coordinates");
32 break;
33 default:
34 Log.i(TAG, "The tool is not activated");
35 break;
36 }
37 }
38 else{
39 Log.i(TAG, "The tool is not activated");
40 return current;
41 }
42 return current;
43 }
44
45 private Location setTaggedLocationCoordinates(double latitude, double longitude, Location
current){
46
47 current.setLatitude(latitude);
48 current.setLongitude(longitude);
49
50 Date date = new Date();
51 current.setTime(date.getTime());
52
53 return current;
54 }
Figure B.2: Medium level obfuscation strategy source code.
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1 //Part 1
2 public Location fakeLocation(Location current, Context context){
3 /**
4 * Depending on the selected preferences we’ll implement a certain LLPM or another one.
5 */
6 Log.i(TAG, "Location Privacy: New location coordinates have been received, checking
whether we should obfuscate them or not");
7
8 if (checkPrivacy(context) == 1){
9
10 privacyLevel = checkPrivacyLevel(context);
11
12 switch(privacyLevel){
13 case 3:
14 /**
15 * This LPPM replaces the Location coordinates by some randomly generated
coordinates
16 */
17 Log.i(TAG, "Location Privacy: Tool activated with level 3, proceding to obfuscate
the new coordinates");
18
19 randomFakeLatitude = generateRandomCoordinates();
20 randomFakeLongitude = generateRandomCoordinates();
21
22 current = setTaggedLocationCoordinates(randomFakeLatitude, randomFakeLongitude,
current);
23
24 Log.i(TAG, "Location faked with random coordinates");
25 break;
26 default:
27 Log.i(TAG, "The tool is not activated");
28 break;
29 }
30 }
31 else{
32 Log.i(TAG, "The tool is not activated");
33 return current;
34 }
35 return current;
36 }
37
38 //Part 2
39 private int generateRandomCoordinates(){
40 int min = -90;
41 int max = 90;
42 int tmp;
43
44 Random r = new Random();
45 tmp = r.nextInt(max - min + 1) + min;
46
47 return tmp;
48 }
Figure B.3: Highest level obfuscation strategy source code.
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1 public Location getLastLocation() {
2 String packageName = mContext.getPackageName();
3
4 /**
5 * If the privacy too has been activated by the user, we will not provide the last known
location
6 * to the location based applications. Instead, we will return null and we will obfuscate
any new
7 * data.
8 *
9 * However, if the Privacy Tool is not activated, we will retrieve the Last Known
10 * location to the location based applications. Moreover, we will be able to retrieve
11 * a non-obfuscated version of the last known coordinates, even if they were obfuscated
12 * in the past. This is a good point in terms of power cosumption.
13 */
14
15 try{
16 Log.i(TAG, "Location Privacy: Tool desactivated, returning las known coordinates");
17 Location loc = mService.getLastLocation(null, packageName);
18 loc = fakeLocation(loc, mContext);
19 return loc;
20 }catch (RemoteException e) {
21 Log.e(TAG, "RemoteException", e);
22 return null;
23 }
24 }
25
26 public Location getLastKnownLocation(String provider) {
27 checkProvider(provider);
28 String packageName = mContext.getPackageName();
29 LocationRequest request = LocationRequest.createFromDeprecatedProvider(provider, 0, 0,
true);
30
31
32 try{
33 /**
34 * Vid supra.
35 */
36
37 Log.i(TAG, "Location Privacy: Returning last known coordinates");
38 Location loc = mService.getLastLocation(request, packageName);
39 loc = fakeLocation(loc, mContext);
40 return loc;
41
42 }catch (RemoteException e) {
43 Log.e(TAG, "RemoteException", e);
44 return null;
45 }
46 }
Figure B.4: Modiﬁcations done in the getLastKnownLocation() and getLastLocation() methods.
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1 private int checkPrivacy(Context context){
2 try{
3 privacy = android.provider.Settings.System.getInt(context.getContentResolver(), android.
provider.Settings.System.PRIVACY_ACTIVATED);
4 }catch (android.provider.Settings.SettingNotFoundException e) {
5 privacy = 0;
6 e.printStackTrace();
7 }
8 return privacy;
9 }
10
11 private int checkPrivacyLevel(Context context){
12 try {
13 privacyLevel = android.provider.Settings.System.getInt(context.getContentResolver(),
android.provider.Settings.System.PRIVACY_LEVEL);
14 }catch (android.provider.Settings.SettingNotFoundException e) {
15 privacyLevel = 2;
16 e.printStackTrace();
17 }
18 return privacyLevel;
19 }
Figure B.5: checkPrivacy() and checkPrivacyLevel() methods.
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